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Chapter 1
Introduction: The predicament
of externalities between
different generations
The Brundtland Report (1987) defines sustainable development as ‘meeting
the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of fu-
ture generations to meet their needs’. Hence, sustainable development is an
attempt to solve the dynamic problem of intergenerational fairness. Issues
that directly concern this intergenerational fairness are environmental and re-
source problems. These problems have a particular feature in common: The
present generation faces an intertemporal negative externality. That means
e.g. that this generation, when it is only concerned about its own welfare, has
an incentive to exploit resources in a way that there is not much left for the
future generations or that this generation does not care about pollution stocks
where the impact manifests when this generation is not present any longer. A
prominent example is the greenhouse gas effect. Economists have been quite
successful in developing instruments to deal with externalities. By introduc-
ing standards, a Pigouvian tax, or by issuing tradable permits governments
cope with these external effects by internalizing them. If the implementor has
sufficient knowledge about costs and benefits, an optimal solution is feasible.
The problem with intergenerational externalities is the dynamic aspect of the
externality: The benefits of the detrimental behavior accrue to the present
generation while the future generations have to bear the burden of the costs.
Given that people’s preferences are represented by the classical rational agent
who cares only about his consumption possibilities, there is no one in the cur-
rent generation who has to pay the burden. Hence, at the moment there is
no one who is interested in the introduction of instruments that could control
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a negative externality. Thus, if sustainable development should be induced,
other motivations but financial ones e.g. intergenerational altruism have to be
addressed.
In order to assess the existence and the possibility of using these additional,
non-monetary motivations , experimental economics can provide valuable in-
sights. Experimental evidence from the last two decades has challenged the
classical economic paradigm of economic agents to be solely motivated by mon-
etary incentives in decision making.
In various situations people frequently exhibit behavior suggesting that
non-monetary considerations must have influenced their decisions. The dicta-
tor game is one of the most famous experiments showing that non-pecuniary
motivations are inherent in human nature. In that game, one subject, called
the dictator or allocator, is free to divide a certain amount of money between
the allocator and a second person, called the recipient, whose role is completely
passive. No matter how the allocator decides, the division is solely made ac-
cording to the allocator’s decision. Although game theory predicts that in
a subgame perfect equilibrium rational allocators will take the whole pie for
themselves - thus leaving nothing for the recipient -, such an outcome is not
necessarily observable. Depending on the experimental set-up, it may even be
the exception rather than the rule.
Forsythe et al. (1994, hereafter, FHSS) were the first to conduct systematic
experiments on the dictatorial division of an amount of money. In their seminal
study they find that, on average, recipients obtain 21% of the pie. Since the
dictator game does not give rise to any strategic considerations, something
else must influence the allocator’s decision, for example the desire to be fair
to the recipient. After FHSS many studies, summarized below, tried to shed
light on this puzzle. Hoffman et al. (1994, 1996, hereafter, HMSS) control for
subject-experimenter anonymity, while Bohnet and Frey (1999), Charness and
Gneezy (2003), and Burnham (2003) use different degrees of social distance.
Goeree et al. (2007) and Leider et al. (2007) use a network structure to
elicit subjects’ allocation behavior. Andreoni and Bernheim (2007) introduce
a random element in the procedure.
To explain the deviation from the subgame perfect equilibrium in these
experiments, several authors such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000), Andreoni and Miller (2002), and Charness and Rabin (2002)
employ different models of social preferences. The most prominent explana-
tions are altruism, reciprocity, and inequality aversion. By contrast, Bardsley
(2005) and List (2007) interpret all findings where subjects care about some-
body else’s wealth as pure experimental artefacts.
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In this paper, I draw on altruistic or reciprocal behavior models and ask
whether friendly behavior can be bequeathed or transmitted to others. In
other words, I investigate whether, if a person B has been treated nicely by
a person A, then B will ‘reciprocate’ with such friendly behavior to a third
person C. For this purpose, I enhance the traditional dictator game by a
third ‘generation’, giving the set-up a sequential character. I therefore refer
to this game as the intergenerational three-person dictator game. The name
sequential dictator game is already occupied by Cason and Mui (1998), who
had two dictator games played one after another but with new endowments on
each occasion. In particular, I investigate the influence of social interaction, the
role of reciprocity in the intergenerational set-up, and introducing uncertainty
if A was a human subject or a random process.
To be more precise, I set up four different treatments with three subjects
each, A, B, and C. In each treatment, subject A is asked to divide a certain
amount of money Π into an amount αΠ that she can keep for herself and an
amount (1−α)Π to be passed on to subject B. Subject B in her turn is asked
to divide (1−α)Π into an amount β(1−α)Π that she can keep for herself and
an amount (1− β)(1− α)Π to be passed on to subject C. In all treatments I
ensure (almost total) anonymity between subject A and subject C.
My baseline treatment 1 is just a sequence of the usual two person dictator
game. In treatments 2 and 3, I introduce some kind of social interaction both
between A and B and between B and C, thus contributing to the studies
where social distance is varied. The social interaction consists of a simple
cooperative form of a scrabble game, where additional money can be earned.
In treatment 2, the social interaction takes place after A or B respectively
have divided the pie, while in treatment 3 the order is reversed. Here, social
interaction takes places first between A and B (or B and C), and then A (or
B) makes the decision how to divide the pie. The final treatment 4 is similar
to treatment 1, but I introduce a random element that has some parallels to
the one proposed by Andreoni and Bernheim (2007). In this treatment there
is no social interaction. The toss of a coin decides whether subjects A or a
random mechanism divides the pie.1
My main findings are, first, that even in the normal intergenerational dic-
tator game (treatment 1), subject A passes on an amount to B and C that is
significantly higher than in the two-person dictator game. Second, I observe
more generosity on the part of players A and B in the two treatments with
social interaction. Third, I do not find any significant differences between be-
1I am grateful for John List’s ideas on the set-up of treatment 4.
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havior in treatments 2 and 3, although the motivation for being more generous
than in treatment 1 may be different in both treatments. In treatment 2, the
reason may be that subjects A (or B) want to avoid a situation where they
have to spend some embarrassing time with subjects B (or C). In treatment
3, by contrast, the driving force for greater generosity may be increased affec-
tion towards B (or C) induced by the previous social interaction. Comparing
treatments 1 and 4, I do not find any significant differences concerning A’s be-
havior. But, to my surprise, there was a highly significant difference between
the allocation behavior of the subjects B in treatment 1 and 4.
In addition, I controlled for several socioeconomic data pertaining to the
participants. For the first generation (A), I find that income is positively re-
lated to generosity. Gender also matters, since females are less parsimonious
than males. For the second generation (subjects B), the dominant factor
determining their allocation choice is the first generations’ choice and the in-
troduction of the random element, while other factors are not significant.
To the best of my knowledge, there has so far been only one set-up that
is remotely similar to this experiment, but this set-up lacks the sequential
character. Karni et al. (2001) study the behavior of a dictator who assigns
probabilities of winning a lottery to two recipients. My set-up can also be seen
in line with the literature on common-pool resources, where other-regarding
behavior in intergenerational set-ups is investigated. The studies closest to my
are the ones by Chermak and Krause (2002), Sadrieh (2003), and Fischer et
al. (2004). The problem with regard to these approaches is that they confront
subjects with complicated strategic considerations that make it difficult to
interpret their decisions in terms of other-regarding behavior. Subjects usually
are faced with a growing resource that can be extracted. Overall welfare is
maximized if extraction takes place in the last period possible. But there
is always an individual incentive to preempt the others in extracting. This
strategic trade-off makes it difficult to assess the optimal behavior for altruistic
subjects and also to evaluate if subjects try to be altruistic. My approach,
by contrast, is so simple that the subjects’ altruistic intentions are obvious.
Hence, the intergenerational three person dictator game can be perceived as
an ideal type in the sense of Max Weber2 in order to capture problems with
intertemporal externalities like environmental and resource problems.
The thesis is organized as follows. In the second chapter I survey the present
2Max Weber developed so-called ideal-types that are simplified models of the reality
where redundant aspects are neglected while only focussing on important features. These
ideal types are no one-to-one translation from reality but still have informative value, think
e.g. of a map or of most economic models.
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literature that is relevant for the intergenerational dictator game. Therefore, I
briefly sketch the father of the dictator game, the ultimatum game, and some
experimental studies of the ultimatum game. Then, I summarize all relevant
studies of the dictator game. In this summary, I will focus on procedural
aspects and results. Experimental aspects like show-up fee, amount to be
allocated, numbers of observations, applied statistical methods and some of
the results can be seen in an overview in the appendix (see section 11.3.2).
The reason for including these information is to show which setup-features are
standard and which are not and to later contrast these with my experiment.
In the third chapter I present the methodology that is mainly used to analyze
dictator games and I explain why I chose particular methods. In the fourth
chapter I present the experimental setup of my study in detail. In chapter five,
I begin to investigate the results from the intergenerational dictator game. I
start by analyzing the allocation behavior of subjects A. First, I use non-
parametric methods to compare the different treatments. Then I continue with
a regression analysis where I explain allocation behavior using personal data,
in addition. In chapter six, I proceed with the allocation behavior of subjects
B in the same way done for the allocation behavior by A as in chapter five. In
chapter seven I examine the expectations of subjects B and C with regard to
allocation behavior. In chapter eight, I qualitatively analyze the justification
of subjects A and B for their allocation behavior. In chapter nine, I mention
the lessons I have learned from doing experimental studies with respect to the
setup and procedure. In chapter ten, I will summarize the experimental studies
from the literature review and I will relate this summary to the experimental
study of this thesis. Finally, I will recapitulate the results from the analysis of
the intergenerational dictator game and conclude by reviewing and extending
these results.
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Chapter 2
The evolution of the dictator
game - an odyssey from the
very beginnings to state-of-art
adaptations
2.1 The ultimatum game - father of the dicta-
tor game
The introduction of the ultimatum game has been a cornerstone for the evolve-
ment of experimental economics. St˚ahl (1972) developed this experiment theo-
retically in a work about bargaining behavior and ever since this experimental
concept has been widely applied in various experimental setups and modifi-
cations. The dictator game, on which this experimental study is built, can
be seen in the line of the offsprings of the ultimatum game. I will present
the dictator game in section 2.2. The original ultimatum game matches two
people, a ‘proposer’ and a ‘respondent’. The proposer is in charge of dividing
a certain amount of money between him and the respondent while the respon-
dent accepts or rejects his offer. If the offer is accepted the money is divided
according to the proposed distribution. If the offer is rejected both receive
nothing. Under the classic assumption of a subject motivated solely by mon-
etary payoff the ultimatum game has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Using backward induction we obtain the result that the proposer should allo-
cate the minimum amount possible to the respondent. The respondent should
accept this amount since the respondent is better off taking the money than
receiving nothing.
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Unless mentioned otherwise, the experimental studies on both the ulti-
matum and the dictator game, summarized below, share a couple of com-
mon design features: Subjects are taken from a student pool. The exper-
imental setup is complete information to all subjects. The position of be-
ing proposer/allocator and being respondent/recipient is assigned randomly.
‘Between-subject anonymity’ is ensured which means that subjects do not get
to know personal information from each other during the experiment. Usually,
subjects are paid for all decisions they make and payment is done in private so
that only the subjects themselves and the experimenter know about the sub-
jects’ allocations. In some experiments, only some subjects are paid randomly,
I will only mention this specifically if it is of importance.
2.1.1 The ultimatum game: From the first steps to the
standard setups
Gu¨th et al. (1982) were the first to challenge the concept of the rational agent
by actually conducting an experimental study on the ultimatum game. In
their experiment, between-subject anonymity seemed not to be ensured since
subjects were recruited from a seminar. Surprisingly, Gu¨th et al. found that a
considerable share of proposers offered much more than the amount of money
which should be offered according to game theoretic predictions. The average
share offered was 0.35, a share of 0.33 of the proposers chose a fair split. A
share of 0.1 of the respondents refused the allocation by the proposer (in the
first case the proposer had taken all, in the second case the proposer took 0.8).
Gu¨th et al. conclude, that the classic economic bargaining theory is of little
help understanding ultimatum game results.
There had been numerous replications and modifications of the ultimatum
game by Gu¨th et al. (1982). As an example, I present the study by Forsythe
et al. (1994), from here on FHSS. FHSS try to elicit subjects preferences by
comparing the results of ultimatum and dictator games (see section 2.2.2 for
the dictator game results). Proposers were gathered in one room and respon-
dents in another room and both did not meet during the whole experiment.
Communication’ was done via forms carried from one room to another by the
experimenter, thus in-between’ subjects anonymity was ensured. The alloca-
tion of the pie was done on paper and the money was paid later, seemingly in
private. None of the proposers offered to pass no money, most offers ranged
around the equal split. The mean share offered was 0.46. A share of 0.09 of
the proposers offered a share of 0.20. Half of these offers were rejected. Even
an offer of 0.4 of the share was rejected. Confirming the results by Gu¨th et al.
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(1982), FHSS conclude that subjects do not behave according to theory since
they depart from choosing the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Bolton and Zwick (1995) developed the so-called cardinal ultimatum game
which allows for a higher degree of control and enables the researcher to test
more specific hypotheses. In the cardinal ultimatum game, the proposer has
to choose between given distributions of a pie. Then the respondent either
accepts the chosen distribution or rejects it. If the respondent accepts it, both
will receive their share of the pie according to the given distribution. If the
respondent rejects the distribution, both will be left without any payoff. In
each cardinal ultimatum game, the subject had to decide between a equal split
of the pie of 4$ and an unequal split. The unequal splits were according to
Figure 2.1. Then, the respondents had to decide whether they accepted or not.
Table 2.1: Allocation menus in the dictator game by Bolton and Zwick (1995)
Trial Allocator’s amount Recipient’s amount
1 2.2 1.8
2 2.6 1.4
3 3.0 1.0
4 3.4 0.6
5 4.0 0
6 2.2 1.8
7 2.6 1.4
8 3.0 1.0
9 3.4 0.6
10 4.0 0
Source: Own design
Bolton and Zwick found that the reduced degrees of freedom with respect to the
allocation choice did not alter the results compared to the ‘usual’ ultimatum
game results (see e.g. FHSS).
2.1.2 The influence of culture on allocation behavior
Roth et al. (1991) conducted a series of ultimatum games with samples from
different industrial countries (USA, Israel, Slovenia and Japan) in order to see
if cultural differences may induce differences in allocation behavior. Mean of-
fer for American and Japanese subjects was 0.45, while mean offer for Israeli
subjects was 0.36.1 There were significant differences between the distribution
of offers for all countries. The only exception was that American and Slove-
1The mean values are taken from the article by Henrich (2000) where Slovenia is not
mentioned.
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nian offers did not significantly differ. Rejection rate was 0.19 for American
subjects, 0.23 for Slovenian subjects, 0.14 for Japanese subjects, and 0.13 for
Israeli subjects. Where offers were low (Japan and Israel), no significantly
higher rates of rejection compared to other countries could be observed. Roth
et al. conclude that there must be different expectations on which offer is
adequate triggered by cultural differences.
Henrich (2000) continued to investigate the influence of the cultural back-
ground on allocation behavior. He compared allocation behavior by comparing
the ultimatum game results from the USA to ultimatum game results from the
Machiguenga who live in the tropical forest and subsist on hunting, fishing and
gathering. In the Machiguenga society there is little social hierarchy or polit-
ical complexity, cooperation above family level is almost unknown and most
Machiguenga live in 300 person communities. In the USA, only subjects from
the department of Anthropology could participate to mimic the community’
of the Machiguenga. Pie-size in Los Angeles was equivalent to the pie size for
the Machiguenga in that respect that both would have had to work roughly
the same time to earn this amount of money. Mean offer was 0.26 for the
Machiguenga and 0.48 for students from Los Angeles. The difference between
both samples was significant. The rejection frequency was very low among
the Machiguenga with a share of 0.05. But also in Los Angeles the rejection
frequency was low with a share of zero. A qualitative analysis revealed that
the Machiguenga would have accepted any amount. They did not feel unfairly
treated by the proposer but rather they simply felt that they had had bad luck
being respondent. It became clear that the Machiguenga anticipated that the
respondent would be unlikely to reject the offer. The L.A. students, however,
said that they assumed that most subjects would have accepted unfair offers
while only few subjects might reject an unfair offer. But in order to be sure
to gain the 80$ they split fairly. Henrich concludes that obviously, there are
cultural differences. He states that the Machiguengua proposers seem to have
no feeling of an obligation to split equally and that Machigengua respondents
do not expect them to do so. Subjects seem to acquire behavioral rules via
social learning, hence not all human beings seem to share the same economic
preferences.
Henrich et al. (2001) continued the study with different other societies in-
cluding three foraging societies, six that practice slash-and-burn horticulture,
four nomadic herding groups and three sedentary, small-scale agricultural so-
cieties. Mean offers in the sample ranged from 0.26 to 0.58. Also the rejection
rates varied considerably but since these could be contingent on offers, I ne-
glect to list them in detail. Henrich et al. explained the allocation behavior by
9
two dimensions: The payoff, a group receives from cooperation in their daily
life and the extent to how much the group relies on market exchange in their
daily life. He constructed two indices and uses these indices as independent
variables in a regression where the offers were the dependent variable. Both
regressors were positive and had a substantial impact. Also R2 was consid-
erably high with 0.68. It is worth mentioning with regard to the rejection of
offers that in one society even hyperfair offers (offering a share above 0.50)
were sometimes rejected. This society was a gift exchange society where unso-
licited gifts were expected to be reciprocated in the future and rendered one in
a subordinant position. Henrich et al. state, that there is a close link between
bargaining behavior and subjects’ daily life. They conclude that long-run evo-
lutionary processes both with regard to the distribution of genes as well as
cultural practices could predispose subjects’ behavior in certain situations.
2.1.3 The relation between neurological responses and
allocation behavior
Sanfey et al. (2003) conducted an ultimatum study where subjects’ brains
were scanned during their decision in order to see if neurological patterns can
explain allocation behavior. Subjects were only participating as respondent.
Subjects were placed in a MRI2 and played the ultimatum game via a computer
screen. Each respondent was played ten rounds of the ultimatum game with
a human proposer, ten rounds of the ultimatum game with a computer as
proposer and ten rounds where subjects received money for pressing a button
as control treatment. Subjects knew whether they faced a human proposer
or a computer as proposer. Both human and computer offers (in contrast to
what has been said to subjects) were predetermined: Half of the offers were
fair, the rest was increasingly unfair.
Participants accepted all fair offers while acceptance rates were declining
for unfair offers. Comparing the rejection rate of unfair offers made by the
computer to the unfair ones by humans yielded a significant difference. Us-
ing the MRI, Sanfey et al. found that there were certain brain areas that
responded stronger to unfair than to fair offers from human partners. These
particular areas are usually associated with negative emotional states. In par-
ticular, comparing human to computer offers, or human to control offers re-
spectively, yielded a significantly stronger magnitude in activation. There was
also a significant correlation between rejection of an offer and the activation
2A MRI (Magnetic resonance imaging) measures signal changes in the brain caused by a
change in neural activity.
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of particular areas. Sanfey et al. also measure the difference in activation
between the region with the negative emotional representation and another
region which is associated with cognitive tasks. They assume that the region
associated with cognitive tasks is used to ensure the achievement of the goal
to earn as much money as possible. Comparing the described difference for
rejected and accepted offers yielded a significant difference. The difference be-
tween activation in the region for emotions and the one for cognitive tasks is
assumed to represent the trade-off of between obtaining a maximum of money
and retributing for unfair offers. Sanfey et al. conclude that there are emo-
tional factors influencing economic-decision making and that the neurological
substrates of these emotional states have predictive power in decision mak-
ing. This result is also confirmed by Knoch et al. (2006) who used magnets
to disrupt the neural activity in one area of subjects’ brains where emotion
impulses are thought to be processed. In this study, subjects accepted offers
in an ultimatum game that are normally perceived as intentionally unfair and
hence were rejected in comparable studies (see e.g. FHSS).
2.1.4 The genetic influence on allocation behavior
Wallace et al. (2007) conducted an ultimatum study with twins to investigate
the genetic influence on allocation behavior. They compared the behavior
of monozygotic (MZ, with the same genes) to the behavior of dizygotic (DZ,
whose genes are imperfectly correlated) twins. Subjects had to state in advance
for multiples of shares of 0.1 if they accepted the offer or not. Comparing
acceptance thresholds between the group of MZ twins and the group of DZ
twins yielded no significant difference. However, Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficient for acceptance thresholds was 0.39 for pairs of MZ twins and -
0.04 for pairs of DZ twins. This difference was significant. Hence, there is a
strong claim for a genetic component in ultimatum game behavior, since the
allocations of a MZ twin correlated considerably while in case of DZ twins
there was almost not correlation.
The authors used a mixed-effects ordered probit model to explain the
threshold levels of acceptance of the subjects. As independent variables, they
took genes, shared environment (e.g. childhood diet, schooling, parental social-
ization), and unshared environment (e.g. influences not shared by the co-twins.
What these were in specific the authors did not mention). The authors were
not explicit on how these regressors were measured, this would be particularly
interesting for the genetic factor. They find that 0.42 of the variance of the
thresholds of acceptance levels could be explained by genetic factors, while the
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influence of the same environment was very modest. The authors claim that
genetic factors have a substantial impact on the rejection decision in ultima-
tum game. This implies a heterogeneity among subjects’ preferences which in
turn explains that authors from previous studies had considerable difficulties
in finding a unified, stable model for preferences.3
Sanfey et al. (2003) found that activity in certain areas in the brain is
correlated with acceptance levels. Since the structure of the brain in this area
is under a strong genetic influence, Wallace et al. claim that the importance
of genetic factors is also backed up by the study by Sanfey et al..
2.1.5 An ultimatum game with two recipients where
one recipient has no influence on the allocation
Gu¨th and van Damme (1998) conducted an experimental study in order to in-
vestigate whether subjects propensity to be generous in past ultimatum stud-
ies was due to strategic considerations or due to altruism. In their ultimatum
game setup, they matched an allocator with two respondents. One of the re-
spondents had the same function as in the traditional two-person ultimatum
game while the other respondent, called ‘dummy’, was not allowed to decline
the proposed allocation and was hence completely powerless. There were three
treatments. In the first treatment, called ‘full information’, the respondents
with the power to decline received information on the entire allocation. In
the second treatment, called ‘essential information’ the respondents with the
power to decline received only information on their share of the pie. In the
last treatment, called ‘irrelevant information’, the respondents with the power
to decline received only information on the share of the dummy.
In the treatments ‘full’ and ‘essential information’, the proposer demanded
an average share of one half while leaving an average share of one third to the
powerful respondent. In the ‘irrelevant’ treatment, the proposer took almost
the entire amount possible, leaving both respondents with a very low amount
of the initial pie.
Gu¨th and van Damme (1998) claim that when reciprocating is possible,
proposers act strategically, making their offers appear fair. However, they
state that subjects do not have a strong intrinsic motivation for fairness due
to the low amounts proposed to the dummy in all treatments and due to the
low amounts proposed to both respondents when retaliating was not possible
for the powerful respondents.
3See later in section 2.2.13
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2.2 The dictator game - fundament of this ex-
perimental study
The dictator game is a very simple form of the ultimatum game reducing the
interaction of the game to the offer of the proposer. The respondent has no
opportunity to reject the offer. Hence, we have no longer a bargaining game but
a mere allocation task. Thus, this experimental setup enables us to abstract
from strategic considerations and allows us more precisely to pinpoint the
motivations behind the allocation behavior. In the dictator game, I will refer to
the proposer as allocator’ and to the respondent as recipient’ to account for the
passive nature of the second player. Under the classic assumption of a subject
motivated solely by monetary payoff there is a unique Nash-equilibrium for
the dictator game: The allocator takes all and leaves nothing for the recipient.
2.2.1 The starting point of the dictator game
Kahneman et al. (1986) were among the first to conduct dictator experiments.
Their aim was to challenge the traditional model of the rational agent by inves-
tigating the impact of fairness considerations on subjects’ allocation behavior.
They carried out two experiments: In ‘experiment 1’, they asked subjects to
choose between two divisions of a pie of 20$. They could choose between
splitting equally or an allocation where the dictator received 18$ while the
recipient obtained 2$. A share of 0.76 of the subjects preferred to allocate an
equal split. In ‘experiment 2’, subjects could either choose to divide 10$ evenly
with an allocator which had been ‘fair’ in experiment 1’ or divide 12$ evenly
with a formerly ‘unfair’ dictator from ‘experiment 1’. A share of 0.74 of the
students chose to split with the ‘fair’ allocator although they had to sacrifice
1$ for it. Separating the subjects of ‘experiment 2’ into the ones which had
been ‘fair’ in ‘experiment 1’ and the others which had been ‘unfair’ in ‘exper-
iment 1’ reveals, that there is a strong relation between the results of the two
experiments. Considering the subjects that had been ‘fair’ in ‘experiment1’
reveals that a share of 0.88 of these subjects would like to reward the other
subjects that had been ‘fair’ in ‘experiment 1’. While considering the subjects
that had been ‘unfair’ in ‘experiment 1’ reveals that only a share of 0.31 of
the ‘unfair’ allocators would like to reward the subjects that had been ‘fair’ in
‘experiment 1’. Kahneman et al. conclude that obviously subjects both care
about being treated fairly and treating others fairly.
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2.2.2 The first ‘real’ dictator game
Forsythe et al. (1994, FHSS) were the first to gather empirical data on the
standard dictator game, even though the publication in the year 1994 was
preceded by e.g. Sefton (1992). But since they conducted their experiment
in 1988, they were the first to run a standard dictator game. In their study
they investigated if the generosity observed in ultimatum games stems from
strategic or from altruistic concerns. Most experimental features (recruitment,
payment,...) were similar to the ultimatum game by FHSS (see section 2.1.1).
Surprisingly at that time, FHSS found that the empirical results differed from
the ones theoretically predicted, the recipient obtained a mean share of 0.21
of the pie. FHSS claim that incentives for a proposer in the ultimatum game
and an allocator in a dictator game could be different. In the ultimatum
game, the proposer could pass a share that is larger than the smallest amount
possible due to two reasons: Either the proposer is altruistic or anticipates
that the respondent might reciprocate on behavior that the respondent deems
unfair. Hence, there is a bargaining component involved. In the dictator game,
only altruistic motives could drive the allocator’s generosity. FHSS checked
if fairness considerations were the only explaining factor in the ultimatum
game. If this fairness’ hypothesis was true, there should be no significant
differences between the results of the dictator and the ultimatum game. The
comparison of the results of the distribution for the money passed on in the
dictator and the ultimatum game revealed that the fairness hypothesis could
not be sustained. There was a significant difference between both games, hence
there were strategic considerations in the ultimatum game. Interestingly, the
distribution of the assigned shares for the dictator game was bimodal. That
means that there was a ‘cloud’ of observations close to the fair outcome where
the allocator passed half of the pie and a ‘cloud’ of observations where the
allocator passed zero. FHSS conclude that there are two types of players, one
of them solely driven by monetary incentives and another type which must
have preferences which do not only incorporate monetary considerations but
also different, other motivations.
Finally, FHSS examine whether the size of the pie, which had to be allo-
cated, mattered. So far, pie-size had been 5$. Now, they conducted additional
treatments of the dictator and the ultimatum game with a pie size of 10$.
None of the distributions were significantly changed if the size of the pie was
increased, also the fairness hypothesis was still rejected significantly. FHSS
conclude that the pie size (at least if it is not extremely small or large) does
not matter.
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2.2.3 Paying subjects randomly
The study by FHSS was carried out with real payments, however, the au-
thors conducted a series of additional experiments with hypothetical payments.
They investigated a question, which they called the ‘pay hypothesis’: They
checked whether the results of the experiments were altered if the subjects
allocate hypothetical money without real payments. They found that there
was a significant difference between the dictator game with real and virtual
money. FHSS conclude that using real’ money is mandatory to obtain useful
results.
Sefton (1992) conducted a series of dictator games where he tested the
hypothesis that it does not matter if you pay all subjects in a dictator game
or if you only pay some subjects randomly. Sefton applied the experimental
procedure by FHSS. There were two treatments. In the first treatment called
‘full payment’ all allocators were paid. Sefton finds no significant difference
between the results by FHSS and his replication and hence he pools the data.
In the second treatment called ‘random pay’ everything was left unchanged
except that only a share of 0.25 of the subjects was paid randomly. Comparing
the distribution of the offers of ‘random payment’ and pooled ‘full payment’
yielded a significant difference between both samples. The mean share of
offers in ‘random pay’ was 0.37 while that of the pooled ‘full pay’ sample
was 0.22. Comparing the results of the no pay experiments by FHSS (mean
share of offers was 0.38) to the results of ‘random pay’ by Sefton, yielded
no statistically significant difference. Sefton concludes that random payment
could distort dictator game results severely.
2.2.4 Increasing the degree of anonymity: The double
blind procedure
Hoffman et al. (1994, HMSS), investigated the role of anonymity with regard
to subjects’ allocation behavior and tested if a higher degree of anonymity
compared to the FHSS-setup leads to results which restore the paradigm of
the rational agent. They introduced ‘subject-experimenter’ anonymity in one
of their treatments. That means that not only between-subject anonymity
(see section 2.1) was guaranteed but that also the experimenter was not able
to link allocations to specific subjects The conducted experiments had four
different treatments and differed from the experiments by FHSS in several
aspects. In the first two treatments, all subjects were gathered in one room.
The allocators and recipients stayed in the same room together but it was
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ensured that subjects did not get to know who was allocator and recipient
and who was matched with whom. Between-subject anonymity was ensured,
payment was done individually and privately.
In the first treatment, referred to as ‘random exchange’, HMSS used the
same instructions and the same way to instruct the subjects as FHSS but de-
part in one aspect. FHSS used the term: ‘A sum of 5$ has been provisionally
allocated to each pair’ when describing the pie, the allocator had to divide.
HMSS presented the allocator as seller and recipient as buyer. Depending on
which price the seller (allocator) chose, seller and buyer (recipient) received
certain shares of the pie which can be seen in the payoff chart (see Figure
2.1). Thus, the allocation problem remained completely the same compared
to FHSS, only the way of presentation was changed. HMSS explained the
Figure 2.1: Payoff chart given to subjects. Source: Hoffman et.al. (1994)
introduction of new instructions in ‘random exchange’ with the different im-
pressions which were conveyed. If it was said that a sum was ‘provisionally
allocated to a pair’ this could frame the subjects to believe that the pie belongs
to both the allocator and the recipient and hence trigger altruism. If you act
as buyer and seller, this framing effect should disappear.
The next treatment, referred to as ‘context exchange’, was done in the same
way as ‘random exchange’. The only difference was that HMSS assigned the
positions as allocator or recipient according to the results of general knowledge
quiz. Thus, the subjects results were ordered with respect to success and
the upper half became allocator and the lower half recipient. According to
HMSS, replacing the randomization process deciding on subjects’ position by
an assignment via the knowledge contest should have an impact. If subjects
earned the right to decide, they might be inclined to perceive themselves as
more deserving as it would have been the case, if they obtained this position
by pure chance and hence be less generous.
In the third treatment, referred to as ‘double blind 1’, HMSS ensured
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subject-experimenter anonymity. Thus, not only the subjects did not get to
know each other but also the experimenter did not get to know which alloca-
tion was made by which subject. The position as allocator or recipient was
assigned randomly. The allocators were seated in room A and the recipients
in room B. Then a monitor was voluntarily selected from the allocators. The
monitor took the role of the experimenter and received a payment of 10$4.
Now, each of the remaining allocators received an envelope. For most of the
allocators (a share of 0.83) the envelope contained 10 blank slips and 10 bills of
1$. For the other allocators (a share of 0.17), the envelopes contained 20 blank
slips of paper. Then one allocator after another entered a large cardboard box
in the same room. In this cardboard box, the allocator was invisible for the
rest. Then, the allocator chose an allocation of the pie by choosing the number
of bills and slips for themselves and for the recipient. The slips and bills for
the recipient were put in an envelope, the remaining bills and slips were kept
by the allocator. The number of slips and bills had to add up to 10 such that
subjects could not infer from the thickness of the envelopes to the amount of
money distributed. Then the recipients from room B were one by one called
in room A and chose one of the envelopes (without knowing which allocator
filled the envelope). The money left for B was recorded.
The last treatment was similar to the ‘double blind 1’ but there was no
monitor and the share of envelopes which only contained slips were replaced
by envelopes containing also dollar bills. This treatment was referred to as
‘double blind 2’
The idea behind the introduction of the double blind treatment was the
following: HMSS claim that subjects (maybe unconsciously) build up expecta-
tions about the experimenter’s objective. They may think that their behavior
in the current experiment might affect future decisions of the experimenter.
Maybe the chance of being chosen for a future experiment or the chance of
being chosen for a particular beneficial experiment could be affected by the
current behavior. The double blind treatment rules out such considerations.
Another reason to introduce the double blind treatment may be that subjects
do not like to appear greedy or selfish in the eyes of the experimenter. Handing
out some envelopes with no bills ensured that recipients and the experimenter
could not know if the allocator had been greedy or if she simply had not had
the possibility to pass some money (in case all other allocators had taken the
whole amount). Still there were some possible influences left. The fact that the
monitor gained an amount equivalent to the whole pie might have induced the
4Which is the same amount a dictator receives if the dictator takes all.
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subjects to believe that they were supposed to take the entire pie as well. Giv-
ing a certain share of envelopes to subjects which only contained slips might
evoke the impression that leaving no money was all right. These influences
were eliminated in ‘double blind 2’ by omitting the monitor and the envelopes
that only contained slips.
Comparing the ‘random exchange’ to FHSS yielded no statistically signif-
icant difference, while comparing the ‘contest exchange’ to FHSS lead to a
significant difference. HMSS found that the ‘contest exchange’ lead to signif-
icantly lower results than the ‘random exchange’. ‘Double blind 1’ was not
statistically different from ‘double blind 2’. But there was a significant dif-
ference between the double blind treatments and all other treatments. The
double blind procedures lead to much lower offers than the other treatments.
HMSS claim that the results from the double blind procedure are a hint
that the evidence from other experiments that have so far been interpreted in
a way that fairness should be incorporated into the subjects utility function
could be a mere artefact. Subjects consider the regard of others of themselves
as an important issue but not the particular welfare of the others.5 In line of
this argument the idea of the selfish agent can be sustained. If there is social
monitoring, subjects will incur costs to be ‘nice’ while hoping that they would
be treated nicely in return since people usually reciprocate and discriminate
against ‘unkindly’ people. Hence, HMSS claim that subjects simply apply
the theory of repeated games in the laboratory experiments: Subjects in real
life are frequently confronted with repeated game environments where being
friendly is useful to build up a reputation as ‘nice guy’ and hence reap the
profits of positive reciprocity from this reputation.
In a sequent article Hoffman et al. (1999), from here on HMS, added two
more treatments to the treatments by HMSS. One treatment, called ‘single
blind 1’ was similar to ‘double blind 2’ except that there was no experimenter-
subject anonymity any longer but only between-subject anonymity. After al-
locating the money while being alone in a cardboard box, the subject returned
to the experimenter and the allocation was recorded. Then the subject left
with his money. Social distance in ‘single blind 1’ was narrowed with respect
to the double blind treatment.
The other treatment was called ‘single blind 2’. Here, the social distance
was reduced even more. Now, subjects used a decision form instead of real
dollar bills. HMS predicted, that there should be a negative relation between
social distance and generosity: Subjects will be more generous if there is less
5As noted above, the chance of being chosen for a future experiment could be affected
by being fair. Or subjects do not like to appear selfish in the eyes of the experimenter.
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social interaction between the subjects. Using a non-parametric order test, the
hypothesis that the offers were the same across all treatments was significantly
rejected. However, pairwise comparisons of the treatment generally did not
lead to significant differences. HMS interpret the results as a confirmation for
their results from HMSS.
2.2.5 Introducing allocation menus
Bolton and Zwick (1995) developed a modification of the dictator game, which
was derived from the cardinal ultimatum game (see section 2.1.1). The allo-
cator had (again) a menu of possible allocations from which he could choose,
e.g. choosing between passing nothing or half of the pie. By using this kind
of game, Bolton and Zwick tried to enhance the control of the experiment by
filtering certain aspects while directly testing certain other aspects. The menu
for unequal splits followed the ultimatum game by Bolton and Zwick (1995)
(see section 2.1.1, Figure 2.1). Overall, a share of 0.98 of all choices was un-
equal. Bolton and Zwick conclude that subjects behaved in line with classical
economic theory.
Bolton et al. (1998) conducted a series of experiments which was based
on the experiments by Bolton and Zwick and hence used menus. In each
treatment (see Figure 2.2), the overall amount of money to be allocated was
10$. In the so called ‘1Game6Card’ treatment, the allocator had to make one
1Game Anonymity
6Card
2Card
10.00/0.00
9.00/1.00
8.00/2.00
7.00/3.00
6.00/4.00
5.00/5.00
10.00/0.00
5.00/5.00
Cash:
1 $5 bill
5 $1 bill
-
Figure 2.2: Dictator game treatments. Source: Bolton et al. (1998), slightly
altered compared to original.
decision between different amounts of money which he would keep, starting
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with 5$ up to 10$ with increments of 1$. In the so called ‘1Game2Card’
only two choices were provided : Either the allocator took all or she split
equally. Then there was another treatment, the anonymity treatment. This
treatment was similar to the ‘1Game6Card’ treatment but ensured subject-
experimenter anonymity and allocators received the cash directly instead of
using paper and being paid, later. The menu in the ‘2Card’ treatment put
the allocators in a position where they faced two possibilities when it came
to their decisions: Either one of the splits offered in the menu matched their
preferences (that means they would have taken all or divided equally) or they
would like to choose a split in between these two extreme values which they
now could not accomplish. In the latter case, the subjects had to decide which
split fitted their preferences best. They were confronted with the decision to
either deviate from their original preference to an allocation in their favor or
to one in favor of the recipient. Comparing the proportion of subjects leaving
0 in the ‘1Game2Card’ (0.53) to this proportion in the ‘1Game6Card’ (0.93)
yielded a significant difference. Bolton et al. (1998) conclude that in case the
menu does not allow to choose the desired allocation, subjects switch to the
allocation which favors them.
Comparing the ‘1Game6Card’ and ‘anonymity’ yielded no significance dif-
ference, hence, in this case increased anonymity has no impact on allocation
behavior. Bolton et al. claim that the effect of being more greedy in the
double blind treatments by HMSS compared to their baseline treatment (or
compared to FHSS) is not caused by the increased anonymity but by framing
via the instructions and the setup. They state that using the phrase ‘provi-
sionally allocated’ or the idea of a market exchange generates a notion of being
obliged to pass on money while putting money directly into envelopes conveys
a different moral surrounding possibly not evoking this sense of obligation.
Bolton et al. conclude that the effect of decreased generosity in presence of
experimenter-subject anonymity does not show up in their study because they
held their game frame constant.
2.2.6 Getting to know each other
Bohnet and Frey (1999) used the experimental study by HMS as point of
departure. They investigated if allocators became more generous, given that
they get to know the recipient closer. There were four treatments. The first
treatment, ‘anonymity’ was designed to be close to ‘double blind 2’ by HMSS.
In the second treatment, ‘one-way identification’, allocators could take a glance
at their respective recipient, while the recipients did not know their allocators.
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In the third treatment, ‘one-way identification with information’, recipients
were also asked to tell their name, where they came from, their study major
and their hobbies. In the last treatment ‘two way identification’, allocators and
recipients both saw each other for a short while. In all treatments, subject-
experimenter and between-subject anonymity was guaranteed (for allocators).
The distribution of money passed on in the one-way identification with
information and the two way identification were significantly different from
the anonymity treatment, while the one-way identification without information
was not significantly different from the anonymity treatment. Comparing the
proportion of allocators taking the whole pie yields the same results as the
comparisons of the distributions of the share passed. In contrast to HMSS,
Bohnet and Frey conclude that the social interaction ‘transforms anonymous,
faceless entities into visible, specified human beings’ (Bohnet and Frey, 1999,
p. 339) and hence triggers altruism.
2.2.7 Is there really a recipient?
Frohlich et al. (2001) investigated if increased anonymity as in HMSS could
cast doubts among the subjects if there really was a recipient. They ran two
treatments. The first treatment, ‘two-rooms’, was similar to the ‘double blind
1’ treatment by HMSS, there was only one thing changed: After allocating
the money, the subjects had to fill out a questionnaire about their beliefs
concerning the existence of a recipient and if this recipient would receive all
the money.6 The second treatment, ‘one-room’, was similar to ‘two-rooms’
except that allocators and recipients were together in one room, now (hence
eliminating doubts about the actual existence of the recipient).
Mean share passed in ‘two-rooms’ was 0.18, mean share passed in ‘one-
room’ was 0.25. Unfortunately, there was no statistical comparison of the
distributions of the amount of money passed in the two treatments. Instead
Frohlich et al. define a binary variable: The first category, ‘selfish’ contained
the allocators passing nothing or 1$. The other category, ‘other-regarding’
contained the allocators who passed 4$ or more. Note, that pie size was 5$. The
observations, where an allocator passed 2$ or 3$, were discarded, leaving overall
41 observations.7 Comparing the beliefs (which were measured on a scale) of
the ‘selfish’ and the ‘other-regarding’ type with regard to the existence of the
recipient yielded a significant difference. The selfish type had much higher
6This was implemented in a way such that ‘double blind’ was still preserved
7The reason for discarding these observations was possibly to form clear cut categories,
since it is difficult to attribute choices of 2$ or 3$ to the categories ‘selfish’ and ‘other-
regarding’.
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doubts about the veracity of the procedure. Frohlich et al. also ran a probit
regression with a binary dependent variable for the allocator type being either
‘selfish’ or ‘other regarding’. Regressors were a dummy variable for allocators
who doubted that the money was passed to a recipient, a dummy variable for
allocators who perceived the experiment as game8 and the product of both
regressors. All regressors were significant.9 Frohlich et al. conclude that the
double blind treatment could cast substantial doubts on the the existence of
the recipients hence rendering allocators purely selfish. They note that the
one-room design does decrease the degree of anonymity and thus could also
increase generosity through this channel.
2.2.8 Varying the degree of social distance
There had been many studies that investigated the impact of varying the social
distance in dictator games. All of these studies had a baseline treatment in the
spirit of the traditional dictator game, most of these studies used a replication
of the ‘double blind 1’ procedure by HMSS.
Johannesson and Persson (2000) used a treatment where recipients were
not present but were randomly chosen from the general population in Sweden.
These recipients did not participate actively in the experiment and did not
know about being chosen. Comparing both mean share passed and proportion
of subjects keeping all of this treatments to the baseline treatment yielded no
significant difference.
Charness and Gneezy (2003) used a treatment where the allocators knew
the name of the recipient. Telling the private name increased the mean passed
share by about 50% compared to the baseline treatment, the difference in
distributions was significant.
Burnham (2003) studied the impact of showing photos. In one treatment,
called ‘dictator photo’, a picture of the allocator was enclosed in the envelope
that was passed to the recipient. In another treatment, called ‘recipient photo’,
a picture of the recipient was given to the allocators with the money slips. The
pictures were taken upon arrival of the subjects to the experiment and shred-
ded after having been viewed. Comparing the distributions of all treatments
pairwise yielded no significant differences. Using the proportion of subjects
passing on half reveals a significant difference between both treatments where
a photo is shown and the baseline treatment. Burnham consequently states
that showing photos (some information) makes a difference. He claims that for
8This was also an information asked in the questionnaire.
9Note, that the authors used one-tailed test statistics which is unusual.
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ancestral humans social information was normally accompanied by likely future
social interaction which made it reasonable to be generous to induce recipro-
cal behavior. In addition, he claims that this process is partly unconscious
and evolutionary engrained in our genes. He concludes that in our modern
world social interaction does not necessarily correlate with future interaction.
Nonetheless, social information triggers enhanced generosity because of our
genetic heritage.
Bran˜as (2006) investigated the impact of using friends as subjects. In a
treatment called ‘friends’, allocators got to know if the recipient was a friend
or someone unknown before they allocated. Comparing the two treatments
revealed that allocators were significantly more generous to friends than to
strangers.
2.2.9 Varying the degree of social distance within a known
network structure
Unlike the studies in the previous subsection, the following studies do not vary
social distance by giving e.g. one additional information (a rather ‘discrete’
way) but by changing the social distance within a network structure (in a
rather ‘continuous’ way).
Goeree et al. (2007) investigate the impact of having different social dis-
tances between allocator and recipient. Unlike usually subjects were recruited
from an all girls school from 5th and 6th grade. First, a survey was conducted
to investigate the network structure with respect to friendship relations among
the girls and further data on personal characteristics were collected. Then each
subject had to play ten dictator games, where the name of the recipient was
given. In three dictator games subjects had to allocate to friends, in three
dictator games they had to allocate to friends of friends and in the remaining
games they had to allocate to others. Regressing the share passed on social
distance while also including some social features (race, height, shyness,...)
revealed that social distance was highly significant. The only other regressor
that was significant was the shyness of the allocator. Subjects with an infinite
distance (strangers) would receive 0.17 of the pie, 2nd degree friends an addi-
tional 0.2 and 1st degree friends an additional 0.16. Shyness reduced the share
passed by 0.03. The authors conclude that for adolescents social distance is
an important factor influencing the allocation choices.
Leider et al. (2007) conducted a study in the spirit of Goeree et al. (2007),
where they also tested allocation behavior with different social distances in
a network. The experiments were done via internet. There was a prelim-
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inary experiment in order to elicit the social network of the participants.
Then, two experiments with dictator games followed. The first experiment
was called ‘nameless’. Here, the recipient was anonymous but from the same
dormitory. Decisions should be made for two treatments: In the ‘anonymous’
treatment, the allocators’ and recipients’ names remained confidential. In the
‘non-anonymous’ treatment, at the end of the experiment, both players were
informed about each other’s identity via e-mail. Analogously to Andreoni and
Miller 2002 (see later section 2.2.13), the dictator game was done with differ-
ent hold and pass values of tokens (the tokens were converted into real money
after the experiment). To explain the concept of hold and pass values I use
the following examples: Consider e.g. a hold value of one for a token and a
pass value of three. That would mean that transferring one token raises the
recipient’s payoff by three tokens. Hence, the price of giving is one third. If
e.g. the hold value is one and the pass value is one too, the price of giving
is one and we have the usual dictator game. If e.g. the hold value is three
and the pass value is one, the allocator has to sacrifice three tokens in order
to pass one token to the recipient, hence the price of giving is three. In the
experiment by Leider et al. there were three decisions. In the first decision,
giving was ‘efficient’: The hold value of a token was one while the pass value
was three. In the second decision, hold and pass value were both two, hence
giving was ‘neutral’ and in the third decision, hold and pass value from the
first decision were reversed, hence giving was ‘inefficient’.
Some days after the first experiment, the second experiment was conducted,
called ‘social distance’. Now, procedure was the same as in the ‘nameless’
experiment (hence also both treatments ‘anonymous’ and ‘non-anonymous’
were conducted) except that the allocator played the games five times with
five different recipients where social distance was widened in the following
way: Direct friend - friend of a friend - friend of a friend of a friend - someone
from the same floor - someone from the dormitory who was not in the former
categories.
For both experiments and for any social distance (in the second experiment)
the share given was significantly higher in the ‘non-anonymity’ treatment than
in the ‘anonymity’ treatment. In ‘social distance’, friends received significantly
higher shares than subjects at lower social distances in all treatments. Leider et
al. (2007) used a Tobit regression with the amount given in the ‘social distance’
experiment in the ‘anonymity’ treatment as dependent variable. They used
different models including different regressors, e.g. the social distance, amount
given in the ‘nameless’ experiment, gender and other factors. They found that
subjects who tended to give more in ‘nameless’ experiment also gave more in
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the ‘social distance’ experiment. Gender, both for allocator and recipient was
not significant. Also, allocations to friends were higher than to subjects with
larger social distance and were decreasing with social distance, though mostly
not significantly.
In a second Tobit regression, Leider et al. used the amount given in the
‘social distance’ experiment in the ‘non-anonymity’ treatment as dependent
variable. Now, in addition to the regressors from the first regression they
included a dummy for the ‘anonymity’ treatment. They found that there was
a significant positive effect of being non-anonymous. If giving was efficient10
being matched with a friend had a significant positive impact , this effect also
showed up for ‘neutral’ while it vanished in ‘inefficient’. Leider et al. conclude
that directed altruism (giving to a friend) makes subjects more generous.
2.2.10 Manipulating the degree of privacy or the in-
structions
Haley et al. (2005) tested if subjects react to cues not directly related to the
experiment. The first treatment was called ‘baseline’. This treatment was a
usual dictator game but conducted using a computer. The second treatment
called ‘eyespot’ was similar to ‘baseline’ except that there was a picture of
a pair of eyespots in the background of the screen. There was a significant
difference between both treatments, both in means and proportions of subjects
keeping the all. The authors conclude that generosity could be influenced by
many types of inputs and that the degree to which subjects react to these
cues is different, too. They claim that the presence of eyes facing in one’s
direction triggers the impression of being watched. Altering behavior if you
were being watched was evolutionary useful and this behavior seems still to
manifest in modern life. Haley et al. emphasize the importance of possible cues
in experiments that could lead subjects to specific assumptions with regard to
the social context in which their behavior takes place.
Bran˜as and Morales (2005) varied the instructions of their experimental
study with suggestive terms to see in how far subjects respond to such ma-
nipulations. Among others there were two treatments. The first treatment,
called ‘baseline’ was a dictator game, where the allocator divided points for
the exam of the course where the subjects were taken from.11 In the second
treatment, called ‘helping’ , the sentence ‘Note that your recipient relies on
10A pass value >1
11Actually, I have difficulties believing that researchers put students’ grades at stake in
experiments, but maybe they have another view on that matter in Spain.
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you’ was added to the instructions. There was a significant difference between
both treatments. The authors conclude that subjects can be induced to pay
increased attention to helplessness via instructions.
Dufwenberg and Muren (2006) varied the experimental procedure with re-
gard to the way, subjects were paid. The objective was to investigate the
impact of making the allocators decision public. Hence, they check if sub-
jects respond in their allocation behavior to the possible reputation effect of
their allocating behavior. Actually, only two pairs of all 352 observations were
randomly drawn to be payed, one pair for each treatment. Dufwenberg and
Muren used two treatments, ‘private payment’, where subjects were paid pri-
vately, and ‘open stage’, where subjects were paid on stage in a lecture hall
where all participants were invited. Comparing distribution of ‘private pay-
ment’ and ‘open stage’ yielded a significant difference. In this case, decreased
anonymity, unlike in the other literature, reduces generosity. Dufwenberg and
Muren suggest that group or audience effects may have outweighed the impact
of the reduced anonymity, here. They claim that subjects that were recruited
from a pool of economists12 may deviate from the choice they would make in
private in order to behave in accordance with the expectation of the group.
This expectation may be to behave as rational, selfish agent if you were be-
ginning to study economics. Complying to this expectation could be seen as
another reward apart from the monetary gain.
2.2.11 Varying the ‘perceived deservingness’ of the re-
cipient
Eckel and Grossman (1998) matched the allocator with a charity organization
as recipient. They investigated whether a recipient who could be perceived as
particularly deserving like a charity organization would receive a higher share
compared to usual recipients. There were two treatments, the first treat-
ment was a replication session of the double blind treatment by HMSS, called
‘replication’. Comparing the results from ‘replication’ to the results by HMSS
yielded no significant difference, hence Eckel and Grossman pooled the data.
The second treatment, called ‘charity’ was similar to ‘replication’ but instead
of matching the dictator with another subject, the recipient was replaced by
a charity organization (the American Red Cross). ‘Replication’ (pooled) was
significantly different from ‘charity’. Eckel and Grossman conclude that altru-
ism is part of subjects preferences and manifests if the recipient is perceived
as deserving even in double blind conditions, hence increased anonymity does
12Which was the case in this experiment.
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not necessarily extinguish altruism.
Ruﬄe (1998) conducted a series of dictator games where the size of the
pie was fixed endogenously according to the recipients skill. The idea behind
this was to test if the proposer changes his attitude towards the recipients
deservingness with respect to the outcome of the contest. Anonymity was
ensured according to the ‘double blind 1’ treatment by HMSS. There were two
treatments. In the first treatment, ‘skill’, the size of the pie is determined by
a skill contest. The contest had to be done by the recipients. The recipients
were ordered according to the skill-test, the upper half of the candidates of
the session gained 10$ which could be allocated by the dictator while the rest
received 4$ to be allocated by the dictator. The second treatment was called
‘coin’. Here, the pie-size (also 10$ or 4$) was determined by tossing a coin
in presence of the recipient. Both recipient and allocator learned about the
outcome of the pie size. For the subsample of winners (the allocators deciding
on 10$), comparing the distributions of money passed in ‘contest’ to ‘coin’
yielded a significant difference. There was a reward of merit, since the winners
of the contest received a share of 0.45 on average compared to the share of
0.34 which the lucky subjects received. For the 4$ pie, there seemed to be
a mild punishment of losers: The losing recipients in ‘skill’ received a mean
share of 0.23, while the unlucky recipients in ‘coin’ received a mean share of
0.31. Comparing the distributions of money passed in ‘contest’ to ‘coin’ for
a pie-size of 4$ yielded no significant difference. Ruﬄe (1998) claims that
the proposer faced a trade-off between the monetary benefit he received if
he took a high share and the moral distress he had to incur by perceiving
himself as unjust (since he chose an inequitable distribution). The allocators
understood that being able to distribute a large pie was due to the effort or
competence of the recipient. In order to maintain a positive self-image the
allocators passed on more than the classical strategic Nash-equilibrium would
have suggested. Of course the losing recipients were less deserving from the
point of view of the allocators and hence received less than the successful ones.
Ruﬄe’s results contrast with the double blind treatment by HMSS where the
offers were much lower on average. Ruﬄe rejects the conclusion by HMSS who
claim that fairness is primarily explained by expectations. If someone appears
deserving (and for the skill winners this fact seems to be obvious) then other-
regarding behavior is the normal reaction of subjects. Ruﬄe concludes that
ability and effort are rewarded, lack of skill or effort are moderately punished.
The experiment by Cherry et al. (2003) was in the spirit of Ruﬄe’s (1998)
study, but here, the pie size was determined according to the allocators results
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from a quiz.13 The objective was to see, if the allocators change their allo-
cating behavior given that the pie-size was dependent on a previous effort by
the allocators. There were three treatments. In the first treatment, ‘earning’,
there were two stages. In the first stage, the allocators played a quiz. If al-
locators answered ten or more questions correctly they earned 40$, otherwise
they received 10$. In the second stage, the allocator could split the earned
money with the recipient, the setup was similar to FHSS. The second treat-
ment, ‘double blind with earnings’, was identical to ‘earnings’ except that in
the second step the procedure was according to ‘double blind 1’ by HMSS. The
third treatment, ‘baseline’ was similar to the procedure by FHSS and involved
either a pie of 10$ or 40$ (in order to make this treatment comparable to the
two other treatments). Cherry et al. found that the proportions of allocators
passing on zero and the distribution of offers were significantly higher in ‘base-
line’ compared to the ‘earning’ treatments. Comparing ‘earning’ with ‘double
blind with earning’ yielded a significant difference for the high stakes (40$)
both for proportion of nonzero offers and for the distribution while for the low
stakes there were no significant results. Hence, anonymity only partially in-
creased parsimony. Nevertheless, the striking evidence of the experiment were
the results for ‘double blind 1’. A share of 0.95 of the low stake proposers
and a share of 0.97 of the high stake proposers kept all of the money they
earned and thus stuck to the game-theoretic prediction. The authors conclude
that if the money the proposers receive is legitimized via effort and if strategic
behavior is ruled out by guaranteeing anonymity, the rational, game-theoretic
behavior is the norm. According to Cherry et al., altruism is triggered by
strategic concerns (e.g. pleasing the experimenter as suggested by HMS).
List and Cherry (2004) check if an equal pre-allocation endowment of the
subjects affects generosity in dictator games and if it matters if subjects earned
their pre-endowment. There were three treatments. The first treatment was
called ‘symmetric’ and had two stages: The first stage was the earning stage:
Here, both allocators and recipients had to answer a quiz. If they were suc-
cessful, they received 100$, if not, they received 20$. In the second stage
allocators now decided on how to split the amount of money they earned.
The second treatment was called ‘asymmetric’. This treatment was similar to
‘symmetric’ except that recipients skipped the first stage and did not receive
any money. The last treatment was called ‘baseline’ and was almost similar to
HMSS except that stake size is altered to 20$ or 100$ respectively. Compar-
ing the distribution of the samples for the stake size of 20$ and 100$ within
13Remember, in Ruﬄe (1998) the pie was assigned according to the recipients results from
a quiz.
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the treatments (hence, checking if stake size matters) yielded no significant
difference. Thus, the data was pooled within the treatments. Comparing the
distributions of ‘asymmetric’ and ‘baseline’ yielded no significant difference
while comparing ‘symmetric’ to ‘baseline’ yielded a significant difference, also
comparing ‘symmetric’ to ‘asymmetric’ yielded a significant difference. List
and Cherry conclude that in contrast to the results by HMSS14, earning enti-
tlements have at most a modest effect. Since subjects propensity to give was
reduced a lot in the symmetric treatment, List and Cherry claim that subjects
exhibit inequality aversion.
2.2.12 Using workers as subjects
Carpenter et al. (2005) ran a dictator game where they control for the social
background of the individuals. There was one group (both allocator and recip-
ient) of aﬄuent, young students, one group of older and less aﬄuent students
and a group of less aﬄuent workers who were older than students from both
groups. Comparing the distribution of offers between groups lead to a sig-
nificant difference between aﬄuent students and workers and to a significant
difference between less aﬄuent students and workers. The difference between
students was not significant. Carpenter et al. conclude that altruistic norms
have a higher impact on workplace than in classroom.
2.2.13 Deriving preferences from experimental results
The aim of the experiments of the following section was to derive the subjects’
utility function via revealed preferences. Andreoni and Miller (2002) conduct a
series of menu-based dictator games with tokens which have different hold and
pass values (see section 2.2.9 for an explanation of hold and pass values). The
different budgets and hold and pass values can be seen in Table 2.2. Subject-
experimenter anonymity was guaranteed.
Andreoni and Miller compared the results of the decisions where the to-
kens had a pass and hold value of one with the corresponding treatment results
of FHSS. They found that the results were strikingly similar, all ranging be-
tween a share passed of 0.22 to 0.25. They conclude that their results are
representative with respect to the previous experiments.
Andreoni and Miller constructed a utility function that reflects subjects’
preferences. They developed three categories of preferences, the perfectly self-
ish type whose utility depends only on her own pay, the inequality aversion
14Here, earning the position as allocator made a crucial difference.
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Table 2.2: The different treatments by Androni and Miller (2002)
Treatment Token endowment Hold value Pass value Average number of
tokens passed
1 40 3 1 8.0
2 40 1 3 12.8
3 60 2 1 12.7
4 60 1 2 19.4
5 75 2 1 15.5
6 75 1 2 22.7
7 60 1 1 14.6
8 100 1 1 23.0
9 80 1 1 13.5
10 40 4 1 3.4
11 40 1 4 14.8
Source: Andreoni and Miller (2002)
type with a Leontief utility function with her and the recipient’s payoff as ar-
guments and finally the type who maximizes overall utility where the payoffs
for the allocator and the recipient are perfect substitutes. Every type was sub-
divided into either types of the pure form, where subjects’ preferences match
exactly the pure form of the utility function (a share of 0.43 of all subjects),
and types of the weak form, where the utility function is relaxed by some pa-
rameters to better match the preferences (a share of 0.57 of all subjects). The
parameters of the utility functions for the weak forms were determined for
every subcategory using a Tobit estimation (since the subjects choices were
limited at both ends). A CES function had the best fit with the data and
hence was chosen. For every weak type the parameters selfishness and convex-
ity of preferences were significant. Andreoni and Miller conclude that altruism
can be rational if you apply the correct preferences. Using different quasi-
concave utility functions for individuals reconciles the theory of the rational
agent with empirical observations. Consequently, the paradigm of the rational
agent is sustained but under different assumptions. The often cited altruistic
components in individuals utility functions have to be taken into account but
only for parts of the population.
Charness and Rabin (2002) used an approach which was quite similar to
Andreoni and Miller (2002). First, they conduct a series of menu-based dicta-
tor games (see Table 2.3) where allocators had to choose between two alloca-
tions.
They found, that given that the payoff of the allocator is the same for
both allocations, more than 2\3 of the allocators chose allocations where the
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Table 2.3: Two-person dictator game
Treatment Two-person dictator game Left Right
(# of obs) (Payoff A, payoff B)
Berk29 B chooses 0.31 0.69
(26) (400,400) vs. (750,400)
Barc2 B chooses 0.52 0.48
(48) (400,400) vs. (750,375)
Berk23 B chooses 1.00 0.00
(36) (800,200) vs. (0,0)
Barc8 B chooses 0.67 0.33
(36) (300,600) vs. (700,500)
Source: Charness and Rabin (2002), slightly altered compared to original.
recipient received more than the allocator instead of the same amount. Hence,
they preferred Pareto-superior allocations even if this implied increased in-
equity at their own expense. The other third of the subjects thus exhibited
Pareto-damaging preferences induced by difference aversion. If increasing the
recipient’s payoff was at a little expense of the dictator’s payoff (hence also
Pareto-damaging), the share of dictators refusing to help the recipient dimin-
ished to one-half. All dictators chose the pareto-superior allocations, even if
inequity was increased, given that the alternative would be a zero payoff for
both players.
Second, Charness and Rabin introduced the so-called ‘response game’ (see
Figure 2.3, pi denotes subjects’ payoff). In this game, there was a proposer
(’A’, from here on) and a respondent (’B’, from here on). At the first stage,
A could decide if she chose one given allocation or let B choose between two
other given allocations.
If A chose the allocation (‘out’), the game was over and the payoffs were
paid according to the one given allocation. If A chose to let B choose (‘in’),
B chose one out of two allocations and then payoffs were made according to
this allocation.15 Considering the different menus given in this game, there
could be different motivations that had to be taken into account. First, the
question was whether A chose ‘in’ or ‘out’. Possible motivations could of course
simply be about the distribution of the payoffs for A and B as in the menu-
based dictator game, depending on the different menus. But this setup implied
possible strategic interaction as in the ultimatum game. If A chose ‘in’ to let
B make the decision, this could either be perceived as neutral, nice or malign
15Note, that in order to maximize observations, B was asked to decide contingent on the
case that A chose ‘in’ without knowing if A actually chose in. From my point of view, this
could distort outcomes.
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Figure 2.3: Game tree response game. Source: Own
by B, depending on B’s payoff given ‘out’ and B’s possible payoff given ‘in’
(see Table 2.4, 2.5).
Depending on the menu, B had the chance to reward nice behavior or
retaliate in case of malign behavior. One has to keep in mind that this possible
reciprocal behavior might be, depending on the menu, at the expense of B’s
own payoff. A could have anticipated this reasoning and adapted his allocation
behavior accordingly.
The response game was analyzed with respect to the previous dictator
games by Charness and Rabin. This could be done since the allocations which
could be chosen by B in the response games were similar to the ones in the
dictator games (given that A chose ‘in’). Given ‘in’ and A’s choice helps B
(payoff B ‘in’> payoff B ‘out’) and if helping was not costly for B (allocations
where the payoff is the same for B in both choices but higher for A in one of
the allocations), Charness and Rabin find that reciprocity seemed to dominate
difference aversion in case there was a conflict between motivations! Remember
that a share of one-third of the allocators exhibited pareto-damaging difference
aversion in the dictator games (see Table 2.3, Berk29). This share was reduced
to 0.06 in order to reward A for his choice (see Table 2.4, Barc7). Here, there
was positive reciprocity. Interestingly, if A chose ‘in’ and B is worse off by
this choice (not much, but worse off), then there seemed to be no negative
reciprocal behavior, since B’s allocation behavior remained roughly the same
as in the dictator setup. (see Table 2.4, Barc5, and Table 2.3, Berk29).
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Table 2.4: Two-person response games - B’s payoffs identical
Treatment Two-person response games Out Enter Left Right
(# of obs) B’s payoffs identical (piA, piB)
Barc7 A chooses (750,0) 0.47 0.53 0.06 0.94
(36) or lets B choose
(400,400) vs. (750,400)
Barc5 A chooses (550,550) 0.39 0.61 0.33 0.67
(36) or lets B choose
(400,400) vs. (750,400)
Source: Charness and Rabin (2002), slightly altered compared to original.
Taking a look at cases where B had to sacrifice in order to help A, B did
not much change his allocation behavior (with respect to the dictator games)
as long as A acted neutral by choosing ‘in’ (see Table 2.5, Barc3, and Table
2.3, Barc2). As soon as A seemed to act selfishly (A hurt B by choosing ‘in’),
B’s willingness to help A was significantly reduced compared to the dictator
game (see Table 2.5, Barc1, and Table 2.3, Barc2). Hence, there was evidence
for negative reciprocity. However, if A sacrifices payoff by choosing ‘in’, B does
exhibit no positive reciprocity compared to the dictator game (see Table 2.5,
Barc6, and Table 2.3, Barc8).
Table 2.5: Two-person response games - B’s sacrifice helps A
Treatment Two-person response games - Out Enter Left Right
(# of obs) B’s sacrifice helps A (piA, piB)
Barc3 A chooses (725,0) 0.74 0.26 0.62 0.38
(42) or lets B choose
(400,400) vs. (750,375)
Barc1 A chooses (550,550) 0.96 0.04 0.93 0.07
(44) or lets B choose
(400,400) vs. (750,375)
Barc6 A chooses (750,100) 0.92 0.08 0.75 0.25
(36) or lets B choose
(300,600) vs. (700,500)
Source: Charness and Rabin (2002), slightly altered compared to original.
Charness and Rabin tried to reconcile the data with distributional pref-
erences of the players. They compared four different preference types. The
‘narrow self-interest’ type reflected the classical economics agent who was only
interested in his own payoffs. The ‘competitive’ type mainly would like to
maximize the relative distance between her and the other’s payoff while still
caring about the other’s pay-off directly. The difference aversion type was
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inspired by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). His
preferences were such that his utility increases with income. But inequity re-
duces this types utility, hence she would sacrifice money to minimize inequity.
The social welfare type (developed by Charness and Rabin) would like to max-
imize payoffs both for himself and for others. This type was more interested
in getting a payoff for himself, if he was behind. But he was willing to accept
payoff differences (even at his own expense) if overall payoffs were significantly
increased. In these models, intentions and resulting reciprocity were not yet
included. Charness and Rabin found that the social welfare preferences fits
best with their data when checking for consistency of subjects’ decisions.
Charness and Rabin also estimated different utility functions using the dif-
ferent preference types. The model explaining subjects’ behavior best implies
that allocators only care about the payoff of the ones being worse off than the
allocator. They also find that reciprocity is an important component of peo-
ples’ preferences. Charness and Rabin conclude that there is strong evidence
that subjects’ preferences are best matched by the social welfare type.
2.2.14 Experiments that have some similarities with our
setup
The following experiments are mentioned because they have some features
in common with our setup. Their contribution to the evidence or theory of
dictator games is rather modest.
Ben-Ner et al. (2004) ran two consecutive dictator games after one another
where they changed the role of being allocator to see if reciprocity is important.
Departing from the traditional setup, Ben-Ner et al. had two stages. In the
first stage, there was a traditional dictator game. In the second stage, the
roles of being allocator and recipient were exchanged. The allocators in the
first stage were not informed that there was a second stage, which is not usual
in experimental economics, where procedure is normally common knowledge
to subjects. There were two treatments. The first stage was similar for both
treatments. In the second stage, roughly half of the recipients were matched
with the same allocator as in the round before (treatment ‘same match’) while
the other half was matched randomly with a new dictator (treatment ‘random
match’). Ben-Ner et al. tested for reciprocity between the two stages by using
an OLS regression with the share sent from the second stage as dependent
variable and the share sent in the first stage plus a constant as independent
variables. They ran a regression for both treatments. The results revealed
that for ‘same match’ in both stages, for every $ sent in the first stage, an
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additional 0.83$ was sent back. This parameter was significant and R2 for
the regression was 0.61. In the treatment with random matching, there was
only 0.1$ sent back for every $ sent in the first stage and the parameter was
insignificant while R2 is only 0.013. Hence, reciprocity plays a role.
Diekmann (2004) used a design, where he also changed the role in two
sequent dictator games and used the expression ‘sequential dictator game’ for
his setup. Since the existence of second stage was common knowledge, we
have a pure reciprocity case which is not worth investigating since I survey the
results for reciprocity setups in section 2.1, the ultimatum game section.
Cason and Mui (1998) conduct two sequential dictator games after one
another. Their objective was to see if subjects adapt their choice in the second
dictator game if they receive information about the allocation choices of other
subjects from the first dictator game. There were no clear results, I mention
this experiment because the authors used the name ‘sequential dictator game’
which I would have used if it had not been taken by Cason and Mui.
Karni et al. (2001) were the first to introduce two recipients in a dictator
game. Instead of assigning money, probabilities of winning 15$ were assigned.
The chances had to sum up to one. Subjects were randomly assigned to be-
ing A, B and C. A was the allocator while B and C were recipients. The
authors tried to investigate if subjects preference structure can be modelled
by minimizing the difference in probabilities between A, B and C or by only
minimizing the difference in probabilities between the two recipients B and C.
The authors find little evidence for former but some for the latter preference
structure.
2.2.15 Hiding behind a random process
Andreoni and Bernheim (2007) investigate allocators’ behavior given that it is
unclear for the recipient if the allocator or a random process decided on the
allocation. Participants were gathered in a room. Allocator and recipient who
were sitting opposite to each other were matched as a pair and received the
same group number. Then, both allocator and recipient were one by one asked
to stand up and state: ‘Hello, I am in group number X, I am your partner’.
There were two treatments. In both treatments, nature could allocate instead
of the subject with a certain probability which ranged from 0 (hence, it was
certain that subjects allocated) to 0.75 (hence, in three out of four cases nature
decided). Note, that the experimental setup was designed in such way that
allocators knew if they decided or nature while the recipients were only aware
of the probability that nature decided. Nature’s allocation was decided by
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tossing a dice in front of the audience. In treatment 0, in case nature decided
either the allocator or the recipient received the whole pie. Probability of both
events was one half. Treatment 1 was similar to treatment 0, except that
the allocation was 19$ and 1$. The important feature of the experiment was
that if allocators chose the same allocation as in the case where nature chose,
recipients could not infer from the allocation whether nature or the allocator
made the choice.
In treatment 0, in case the probability that nature decided was zero, a
proportion of 0.57 of the dictators divided equally and a share of 0.3 took the
whole pie. If nature was introduced with probability of 0.25, the proportion
of fair allocators was reduced to around 0.32 while proportion of allocators
passing nothing increased to around 0.53. For the probability of nature coming
into play with 0.5 (0.75), the proportion of fair offers decreased to 0.27 (0.27),
respectively, while the proportion subjects taking all increased to 0.72 (0.70).
In treatment 1, given that nature was not involved, a proportion of 0.69
divided equally, a proportion of 0.17 kept the whole pie and a proportion of 0.03
kept 19$. Increasing the likelihood that nature decided reduced the proportion
of fair divisions to proportions of 0.45 to 0.35, respectively, while the proportion
of subjects taking all was reduced to 0.1. Note, that the proportion of the
subjects who chose to pass one (hence making it impossible for the recipient
to determine if nature moved or not) increased from 0.03 to proportion of
>0.35 if nature was introduced with probabilities ≥0.25.
Andreoni and Bernheim used two random-effect probit models for their
analysis. In the first model, the dependent binary variable was ‘choosing the
allocation that cannot be distinguished from nature’ or ‘not choosing this al-
location’. Independent variables were dummy variables for the different prob-
abilities that nature comes into play and treatment 1. All dummies for the
different probabilities >0 of nature coming into play were significant and posi-
tive. This makes sense since the more likely it was that nature came into play
the more ‘comfortable’ it was to ‘hide’ one’s choice behind nature. Also the
dummy for treatment 1 was significant. That might reflect the subjects who
were unconcerned with social image and still chose the maximum amount for
themselves instead of taking 19$ and thereby hiding behind nature.
In the second regression, the dependent binary variable was ‘choosing the
fair split’ or ‘not choosing the fair split’ while the regressors remained the
same. Dummies for nature were significant again, but now with negative sign,
which makes sense, since it became harder to attribute unfair behavior to
allocators. The dummy for treatment 1 was not significant. Andreoni and
Bernheim conclude that the degree of fairness among people varies. There is
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strong support that people would like to be seen as fair, hence audience effects
play an important role in subjects’ decision behavior. Thus, many subjects
will choose an unfair split if they are anonymous while being generous if their
allocation is public information.
2.2.16 Altruism in dictator games - an experimental
artefact?
Bardsley et al. (2008) were the first to actually allow allocators to take money
from the recipient in a dictator game (the experiments were run before 2005).
His study was designed to check if the results obtained from dictator games
so far were a scientific artefact triggered by subjects desire to conform to
the expectations of the experimentor. In one experiment, allocators received
an endowment of £10 while the recipients received an endowment of £5. In
treatment 1, allocator could give £0-3, while in treatment 2 they could take
£0-3, but were not allowed to give. Increments were 0.25 in both treatments.
A share of 0.55 gave money in treatment 1, while a share of 0.83 took money in
treatment 2. The proportion of subjects giving in treatment 1 should not have
been larger than the ones not taking in treatment 2, since this would mean
that that a share of subjects was giving in one treatment and while taking in
another treatment. Ceteris paribus this would not be rational.
Bardsley claims that opportunities trigger certain behavior. This effect
could be explained in such way that subjects infer from the experimental sit-
uation to a particular behavior that seems to be adequate and try to conform
with this. Hence, in the traditional dictator game, the mere opportunity to
give conveys the impression to the subjects that they are expected to give
something by the experimentor. In the dictator game where taking is allowed,
subjects infer from the opportunity to take that they are expected by the ex-
perimentor to take something and hence conform to this expectation, taking
higher shares than compatible with the results from the traditional dictator
game.
Bardsley concludes that one cannot derive fixed preferences from experi-
mental results in the way e.g. Andreoni and Miller (2002, see section 2.2.13)
and Charness and Rabin (2002, see section 2.2.13) do.
List (2007) replicates the basic idea by Bardsley (2008). Experimental
procedure was similar to FHSS unless some modifications with respect to en-
dowment. There were four treatments. In treatment 1, both players received
5$, allocators received an additional 5$ that they could allocate in the spirit of
the dictator game. Treatment 2 was similar to treatment 1, but subjects were
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also allowed to take 1$. Treatment 3 was identical to treatment 2, but alloca-
tors could take up to 5$. Treatment 4 is identical to treatment 3 except that
subjects had to spend some time earning the money during the experiment
(by sorting and handling mail) instead of simply receiving their endowments
In treatment 1, subjects passed a mean share of 0.27, a proportion of 0.71
made positive offers. In treatment 2, mean share passed was 0.07, a proportion
of 0.35 made a positive offer, while a proportion of 0.21 took 1$. In treatment
3, mean share passed was -0.5, only a proportion of 0.1 made positive offers,
while a proportion of 0.42 took 5$. In treatment 4, mean share passed was
-0.2, a proportion of 0.06 made a positive offers, while a proportion of 0.66
neither took nor gave something. The decrease of positive offers of treatment
2 compare to treatment 1 was significant. List claims that adding an additional
option to the available option set has a significant impact. The proportion of
positive offers of treatment 3 was significantly lower than the one in treatment
2. Hence, introducing symmetry in the option set by allowing a pass range
from -5 to +5 instead of -1 to +5 induced subjects to significantly change their
behavior. In treatment 4, a large share of the subjects neither took nor gave.
The proportion of subjects taking was significantly lower than in treatment
3. Thus, List states that the origin of the endowment is also crucial for the
experimental outcome. Taking away earned money increases ‘moral’ costs for
subjects.
List comes to the same conclusion as Bardsley (2008). He states that ex-
perimental results from dictator games should not be interpreted by trying
to construct preferences from the choices but should be seen as altered ex-
pectations on the supposed adequate behavior. List challenges the usefulness
of dictator games at all. He claims that the experimenter is an authoritative
figure who has credibility in the eyes of the subject. If this authority asks
whether the subject would like to share money with someone who did not re-
ceive as much money as the allocator, subjects conform to what they perceive
as socially adequate, and pass on money. He stresses the importance of being
careful to export insights from lab experiments to the real world. Nonetheless,
he acknowledges that lab experiments provide insight how institutions could
affect individuals.
2.3 The impact of gender in dictator games
The evidence on gender effects in dictator games is mixed. Some authors find
that gender does not matter, some authors observe significant effects of gender.
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The first to investigate this issue were Bolton and Katok (1995). They
used the 1Game-6Card and two other treatments by Bolton et al. (1998) (see
section 2.2.5) to test for gender differences within each treatment but do not
find any significant differences.
Eckel and Grossman (1998) conducted an experimental study with the
objective to investigate the impact of gender. They applied the ‘double blind
1’ procedure by HMSS. In half of the experimental sessions all the allocators
were men, in the other half women. It is not mentioned in the article, if the
recipients were also unisex. Women roughly sacrificed twice as much as men
with a mean share of passed money of 0.16, while men only donated 0.08. The
difference between the distributions of passed money by men and by women
was significant. Also comparing distributions conditional on passing a positive
amount yielded a significant difference. Eckel and Grossman conclude that
women are more generous than men.
Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) used the data from Andreoni and Miller
(2002, see section 2.2.13) to check for gender differences in behavior. Unlike
Eckel and Grossman, there were no unisex groups, selection was not controlled
for gender. Men passed an average of 2.56$ while women passed 2.60$ which
is not significantly different. Taking the ratio of the hold and pass value (see
section 2.2.9 for an explanation of the concept of hold and pass values) and
thereby constructing the relative price of giving, a new picture emerges: De-
pending on this price, there were gender-related differences. The amount of
passed money (in pass values) was increased for both male and women if the
relative price of giving was reduced. But male subjects increased the propor-
tion given with respect to their endowment while women did the opposite.
This difference between proportions was significant for a price larger than one,
while for a price lower than one the difference was marginally significant. An-
dreoni and Vesterlund conclude that there is a gender difference in the price
elasticity of demand of ‘generosity’.
Andreoni and Vesterlund also analyzed whether there are differences be-
tween men and women with regard to preference types. They use the classi-
fication by Andreoni and Miller (2002, see section 2.2.13). They found that a
share of 0.47 of the males were of the selfish type while this share of women
was only 0.36. Men were more likely to see others payoff as perfect substitutes
for their own. With regard to the Leontief preferences, the share of males was
0.25 while the share of women was 0.54. Testing, if the utility function was
independent from gender was rejected significantly. Men were more likely to be
of the traditional type of the perfectly selfish agent or to maximize joint payoffs
while women were more likely to be in favor of an equitable outcome. Compar-
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ing their results with the other results, Andreoni and Vesterlund reconcile the
mixed results by Bolton et al. and Eckel and Grossman. They mention that
the variance of giving was maximum at a relative price of giving equal to one.
This might lead to different results due to this high variance if the sample size
was not too large (which was the case in Bolton et al. 1998). They conclude
that contingent on the setup men or women can be more altruistic.
2.4 The impact of study subject on the propen-
sity to be altruistic
Marwell et al. (1981) were the first to find that study subject might mat-
ter in people’s allocation behavior. In a public good provision experiment,
graduate economists where significantly less fair than non-economists. Grad-
uate economists invested only a share of 0.2 of their endowment for the public
good, unlike the rest who, depending on the treatment, invested between 0.4
and 0.6. Marwell et al. (1981) tried to explain this phenomenon with two
reasons. First, there could be a selection effect: People with a certain person-
ality might be attracted by studying economics and this particular personality
might increase the inclination to be egoistic. Second, there may be an indoctri-
nation effect since economists might be more prone to act ’rationally’ because
they internalized the theory they have been taught and act accordingly.
Carter and Irons (1991) were inspired by this experiment and used a stan-
dard ultimatum game setup (the one suggested by Kahnemann, Knetsch and
Thaler, 1986) to check if the previous results could be sustained. Student sub-
jects belonged to four groups: Freshmen non-economists, freshmen economists,
senior non-economists and senior economists. Carter and Irons (1991) com-
pared the results using a regression analysis. First, the minimum amount
accepted (not distinguishing between freshmen and seniors) was used as depen-
dent variable which was regressed on a constant and a dummy for economist.
They found that the dummy is negative and significant. They conclude that
there is a difference between economists and non-economists. They used the
same equation while adding a senior and a senior economist dummy in order
to control for a maturation effect. The economist dummy remained negative
and significant, the senior economist dummy was positive and significant and
the senior dummy was negative and marginally significant. Carter and Irons
(1991) conclude that there is a selection effect, economists are more greedy
from the begin on, while studying economics does not increase greed. In a sec-
ond step they ran regressions with the proposal as dependent variable. Using
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only a dummy for the economists, this dummy was positive and significant.
Including again a senior and a senior economist dummy lead to non-significant
results for all coefficients. Despite the non-significance of the regressors, Carter
and Irons state that this confirms the selection effect. From my point of view,
using non-parametric sample comparison methods would have been a more
adequate methodology for this kind of analysis.
Gross (2005) investigated the effect of studying economics in a dictator
game. Gross did not run any test on sample distribution difference. But
around 0.7516 of the economists pass nothing and around 0.09 split fairly while
around 0.39 of the non-economists pass nothing and around 0.27 split fairly.
Gross concludes that economists may have less concern for fairness.
Meier and Frey (2004) investigate the donations of a very large sample of
students from Zu¨rich with 180225 observations. Students were asked every
semester whether they would like to donate money for needy or foreign stu-
dents. Using a Probit Regression with ‘donating or not’ as binary dependent
variable, they found that the probability that an economist student contributes
is lower by 0.04 compared to a non-economist which was significant. They also
controlled for other socio-economic features. Meier and Frey claim that eco-
nomic students’ reduced generosity stems from a selection effect while there is
no indoctrination effect (see Marwell, 1981).
2.5 The role of intentions in sequential alloca-
tion behavior
It is intuitive that it matters for people whether an action was performed
intentionally or whether it was unintentional (maybe as a byproduct of another
action or just accidentally). There is a perceptional difference if someone had
the impression that another person stepped on her foot because this person
did not pay attention or because she did it on purpose. The problem with
these cases is that often the intentions of someone else are not that obvious to
other people. Nonetheless, people still could attribute intentions to actions.
2.5.1 Intentional action triggers reciprocity in a com-
mon pool resource game
Rutte et al. (1987) investigated the impact of intentional action in a common
pool resource (CPR) setup. They analyze whether subjects extraction behavior
16The exact share is unclear, I inferred the share from a figure
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from a CPR is affected by previous subjects’ extraction behavior from this
CPR. Subjects could take 0 to 10 guilders from a resource pool and they were
told that the pool initially contained 5 to 55 guilders (randomly chosen by
a computer). There were six subjects extracting sequentially, subjects were
told at which position of the sequence they were extracting. The game was
played once. In the first treatment, subjects were aware of both the initial
pool size and the current pool size at the position they were extracting while
in the second treatment they were only told about the current pool size at the
position they were extracting but not about the initial pool size. Hence, in
the first treatment, it was possible to attribute intentions to previous subjects’
behavior while in the second treatment this was impossible.17 Rutte et al.
found that subjects in the first treatment responded to perceived intentions
from previous subjects’ extractions (in comparison to the second treatment).
If previous extractors took deliberately more than the equal share in the first
treatment, subjects reciprocated by being less generous (in comparison to the
second treatment). If previous extractors took deliberately less than the equal
share in the first treatment, subjects reciprocated by being more generous (in
comparison to the second treatment). The difference in behavior between the
two treatments was significant.
2.5.2 Intentional action triggers reciprocity in an ulti-
matum game
Blount (1995) did a study of a modified ultimatum game investigating the role
of intentions by replacing the proposer with either a third party or a random
process. There were three treatments. The first treatment, called ‘baseline’,
was a traditional ultimatum game. In the second treatment, called ‘third
party’, another students was involved. This third party was drawn from a
sample of students, who were not in the sample for the experiment but from
the same graduate school. The third party neither knew the proposer nor
the respondent. The third party decided on the proposed allocation while not
receiving anything from this allocation. The (passive) proposer would still re-
ceive the payoff if the proposition (by the third party) was accepted by the
recipient. The last treatment, called ‘random’, was similar to ‘baseline’ except
that a random process (generated by a computer) proposed the split instead
of a human proposer, possible outcomes (increments of 1$) were uniformly
17Note, that in this experiment, there was a large discrepancy between what subjects
have been told and how the experiment was actually conducted. Since it was an experiment
by psychologists, this is not unusual, but the standard for economic experiments is that
description and actual procedure are identical.
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distributed. In each treatment subjects were asked about their minimum ac-
ceptable offer
Mean minimum share of acceptable offers was 0.29 in the ‘baseline’, 0.21
in ‘third party’ and 0.12 in ‘random’.18 The distribution of acceptable offers
of ‘random’ was significantly different from ‘third party’ and from ‘baseline’.
‘Third party’ and ‘baseline’ were not significantly different. Blount concludes
that in the random treatment subjects acted more in spirit of the selfish agent
who maximizes payoff, while in the other two treatments subjects also re-
sponded to intentions by forfeiting offers which they perceived as too low.
Blount concludes that attribution plays a crucial role in social decision con-
texts. Perceived intentions are important, triggering the desire to retribute in
case of a perceived unfair action.
2.5.3 Mainly negative intentions trigger reciprocity
Offerman (2002) investigated whether there was a difference in subjects’ re-
sponse to actions that were either intentional or unintentional. He also an-
alyzed whether the nature (positive/negative) of the intended action played
a role. The experiment was a sequential game. At the first stage, the first
mover decided between a helpful choice giving himself 8 guilders and the sec-
ond mover 4 guilders or a hurtful choice where the first mover received 11
guilders and the second mover -4 guilders. At the second stage, the second
mover observed the first mover’s choice and then decided, whether the payoff
from the first stage of both players was increased, reduced or left unaltered.
The choice was between three moves: ‘Cool’, where the first mover’s payoff
was unaltered and the second mover received additional 10 guilders, ‘reward’,
where the first mover obtained 4 additional guilders and the second mover 9
additional guilders or ‘punish’, where 4 guilders were subtracted from the first
mover’s payoff from the first stage while the second mover obtained addition-
ally 9 guilders. There were two treatments, in the first treatment ‘nature’,
a random process decided on the first movers choice between ‘helping’ and
‘hurting’ with a probability of 0.5 for each choice. This was done by the first
mover tossing a dice. In the second treatment ‘hot flesh’, the choice was made
by the first mover.
In case of the helpful choice, a share of 0.75 reciprocated positively in the
‘hot flesh’ treatment (choosing ‘reward’) while only a share of 0.5 did so in
the ‘nature’ treatment, the difference between both treatments was not signif-
18Responders had to state their minimum acceptable proposal in advance of getting to
know the true proposal
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icant. The rest chose the ‘cool’ reaction, none punished for helping. In case
the first mover chose hurting, a share of 0.83 chose to punish in the ‘hot flesh’
while only a share of 0.17 did so in the ‘nature’ treatment, which was sig-
nificant. Obviously, negative intentionality was more important than positive
intentionality. Offerman also asked second movers about their emotions af-
ter they made their choice. For helping, positive emotions were triggered but
there was no significant difference between the ‘nature’ or ‘hot-flesh’ treat-
ment. But for hurting, negative emotions were always weak in the state of the
‘nature’ treatment while for the majority of the ‘hot-flesh’ treatment, negative
emotions were strong. This difference was significant. Offerman explains the
difference in reactions on positive and negative intentions with a self-serving
bias. Subjects tend to attribute good events to internal causes like competence
but bad events to external causes as uncontrollable circumstances. He claims,
that subjects perceive it as normal that someone helps ‘someone as nice as
oneself’. Hence, reciprocating is not imperative since this action is assumed to
be standard. While being intentionally unfair is perceived as an insult which
demands retribution.
Knobe (2006) claims that moral considerations play an important role in
reasoning. If an action is good or harmful this has an impact on peoples’
judgement on the intentions of the action. Knobe used the following case in
an experiment in order to shed light on the influence of moral judgement on
people’s impression with respect to intentions. In the first treatment, subjects
were confronted with a simple case: The vice-president of a company went
to the chairman of the board and said, ‘We are thinking of starting a new
program. It will help us increase profits, but it will also harm the environment.’
The chairman of the board answered, ‘I dont care at all about harming the
environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can.’ They started the
new program. Sure enough, the environment was harmed.
In the second treatment, the word ‘harm’ was replaced by ‘help’, such that
the vignette became: The vice-president of a company went to the chairman
of the board and said, ‘We are thinking of starting a new program. It will
help us increase profits, and it will also help the environment.’ The chairman
of the board answered, ‘I dont care at all about helping the environment. I
just want to make as much profit as I can. Lets start the new program.’ They
started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was helped.
A share of 0.82 of the subjects who received the story about environmental
harm said that the chairman harmed the environment intentionally, whereas a
share of only 0.23 of the subjects who received the story about environmental
help said that the chairman helped the environment intentionally.
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This simple connection has been proven in several different contexts in
different experimental studies (Knobe 2003a, Knobe 2003b, Knobe and Burra
forthcoming, Leslie and Knobe 2004, Nadelhoffer 2004). Hence, if a side-effect
was good, people were less likely to infer that it was brought about intentionally
than in the case where the side effect was bad.
2.6 Common pool resource experiments
Common pool resource (CPR) experiments are usually more complicated than
dictator games. In most cases there is a common resource that can be extracted
over periods and if extraction is not too large, the resource will grow. In
an experimental one generation setup of a CPR with multiple players and a
number of periods larger than one there is usually a conflict between socially
and individually optimal behavior: Often, it is socially optimal to let the
resource grow and to not extract too much (depending on the setup) while
there is an individual incentive to preempt others on extracting as much as
possible.
Now assume a setup with an intergenerational component. The problem
with regard to intergenerational CPR approaches is that they confront sub-
jects with complicated strategic considerations. Given that subjects do not
only care about their own payoff but also about the future payoff of all other
generations, they have to build expectations on the following generations be-
havior to determine their optimal decision. It may be the case that subjects
assume that future generations will be selfish and exploit their generosity by
appropriating the whole surplus passed on instead of passing most of it on to
the following generations. Thus, altruistic subjects would prefer to behave self-
ishly themselves. It may also be the case that altruistic subjects assume that
following generations will be altruistic as well, then they would sacrifice re-
sources for the sake of these future generations. Hence, although in both cases
subjects have a latent desire to be altruistic, this desire only manifests given
that particular circumstances with regard to expectations are met. Hence,
these experiments make it difficult to interpret subjects’ decisions in terms of
other-regarding behavior.
2.6.1 An intergenerational approach
Chermak and Krause (2002) investigated intergenerational behavior with re-
gard to a CPR. In addition, they analyze how information affects CPR-related
consumption decisions. Subjects were randomly assigned to groups consisting
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of three generations. Group membership was changed each trial.19 Subjects
of the first generation played from period 1 to 3, the second generation from 2
to 4 and the third generation from 3 to 5. There were two treatments. In the
first treatment, subjects knew ex-ante to which generation they belonged. This
treatment was called ‘informed’. The second treatment, called ‘uninformed’,
was similar, except that subjects got to know to which generation they be-
longed ex post and . Each player had the possibility to consume a part of the
resource in each period. The common pool resource had a specific growth rate
depending on the extent of the extraction of the three generations participat-
ing. The resource stock could increase, decline, stay constant or be completely
depleted (in this case the game ends). The consumption determined the sub-
jects payment. After every period, subjects were informed about the current
resource stock. If the resource was not completely depleted at the last trial,
the rest was given to a charity, chosen by the third generation.
In ‘informed’, a share of 0.14 exhausted its resource, in the ‘uninformed’
0.17 did so. 0.13 of the subjects behaved sustainably, allowing the following
subjects to extract the same amount they took, 0.18 were trying to maximize
payoffs, extracting most in their last period, while 0.27 were following the
classic economic behavior using backward induction and extracting most in
the first period. The strategies of the rest were unclear. The mean level of the
resource at the end of the last period was rather high (more than nine times
the initial level though, though one has to note that a growth factor of three
was part of the formula governing the resource path). On average, subjects
withdrew less than the sustainable level. Standard deviation of extraction was
substantial. It did matter if subjects were in the ‘uninformed’ or the ‘informed’
treatment. In the ‘informed’ treatment, the pattern of strategies followed was
much clearer. The results of the ‘uninformed’ and ‘informed’ treatment did
only differ significantly the first two periods, from the third period on they
were not significantly different. Chermak and Krause conclude that subjects
adapt their behavior to the position in an intergenerational chain in case they
are aware of this position.
2.6.2 Intergenerational generosity: Triggered by the de-
sire to give or to achieve equity?
The objective of the study by Sadrieh (2003) was to find out whether inter-
generational generosity is triggered by subjects’ desire to pass something on
(without the aim to achieve a specific equity distribution) or whether subjects
19If the membership to a generation was changed, too, is unclear from the article.
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explicitly have the goal of obtaining an equitable outcome. Sadrieh identified
the ‘warm glow’ type who derives utility from the mere act of giving and the
altruistic type who derives utility from others’ increased utility or equitable
outcome. Anonymity was ensured according to ‘double blind’ by HMSS.
The CPR was constructed as follows: The part of the resource that was
not extracted grew and was then at the disposal of the future generations. The
payoff of the subject was also subject to a formula, depending on the extrac-
tion. There was an individually optimal amount to be extracted. Extracting
too little or too much resulted in less payoff. I will focus on two treatments of
the experiment: In the ‘very slow’ treatment, the individually optimal extrac-
tion rate was higher than the growth rate of the resource, in the ‘very fast’
treatments, this was reversed. There were 15 periods, but both the number
of periods and which period the subjects were assigned to was unclear to the
subjects, they only knew that the number of periods was limited. A subject
did not play all generations but only played for one generation, hence we have
a one-shot game.
Subjects maximizing their own payoff simply had to choose an individu-
ally optimal extraction level that was unique. If subjects wanted to achieve
intergenerational equity they would have had to alter their individually opti-
mal extraction level depending on the treatment. They would have to exhibit
‘growth compensating’ behavior: In the ‘very fast’ treatment they would have
to increase their extractions compared to the individually optimal behavior to
compensate for the high growth rate in order to obtain an intergenerationally
equitable outcome. In the ‘very slow’ treatment, extractions must be much
smaller compared to the individually optimal behavior (and hence compared
to the ‘very fast’ treatment as well) in order to compensate for the reduced
growth rate. If subjects only wanted to obtain a warm glow of giving, such
considerations should not matter, they would simply pass on more than indi-
vidually optimal regardless of the treatment.
The results showed that subjects on average depart from the individually
optimal level by choosing lower levels of extraction, hence displaying a propen-
sity for altruism. The slower the growth rate the more subjects reduce the
extraction below the individually optimal level, the difference between ‘very
slow’ and ‘very fast’ was significant. Subjects caring about intergenerational
equity should overexploit the resource in the fast growing treatment. But the
overwhelming share of the subjects did the opposite. Only a share of 0.08 of
the subjects chose to take more than individually optimal. Thus, there was
clear evidence that altruism was not motivated by equity concerns. In ‘very
slow’, a share of 0.36 chose the individually optimal level, while a share of 0.46
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did so in ‘very fast’. Thus, roughly half of the subjects exhibited a propensity
for intergenerational altruism, while the other half was strictly selfishly moti-
vated. Sadrieh concludes that in case intergenerational altruism was present,
it was mainly motivated by the warm glow of giving.
2.6.3 Investigating intergenerational altruism by elicit-
ing expectations
The experiment by Fischer et al. (2004) was a CPR game that was close to
the one by Sadrieh (2003). Fischer et al. tried to shed light on the motivations
of the subjects with regard to altruism by asking for expectations on the other
subjects’ behavior. With the help of the expectations it was easier to evaluate
the motives behind an extraction choice. As in Sadrieh (2003), subjects knew
there was a limited number of periods but not how many periods there were
overall and to which period they were assigned to. Subjects only played for
one generation, hence we had a one-shot game, too. In the experiment, there
were four sequential generations of three players extracting once at the same
time from the same resource. The features of the CPR can be described as
follows: There was a hump-shaped production function of the resource, having
the sum of the exploitation of all players as argument. Each subjects produc-
tion (and hence their earnings from the experiment) depended positively on
subjects’ individual extraction level and positively on the stock of the resource.
As soon as total exploitation was larger than the social optimum, a negative
externality arose, induced by the hump-shaped production function. In the
individual optimum, assuming rational agents who care only about their own
payoff, players extraction would be well above the social optimum. There were
three treatments. The baseline treatment, called ‘restart’, had no intergenera-
tional features, the stock of the resource was held constant every period. The
two other treatments were intergenerational. In these treatments, the stock de-
pended both on its growth rate and on extraction levels of the former periods.
In the second treatment, called ‘slow’, the growth rate was rather low which
meant if subjects wanted to obtain an intergenerationally equitable outcome,
they would need to extract less than individually and socially optimal. In the
last treatment, called ‘fast’, the resource growth rate was rather high, implying
that subjects who would like to achieve intergenerational equity should extract
more than individually and socially optimal.
Extraction levels were significantly smaller in ‘slow’ and in ‘restart’ than
in ‘fast’, while there was no significant difference between ‘slow’ and ‘restart’.
In all treatments, the means of extraction were significantly lower than in
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the individual but larger than in the symmetric social optimum (each subject
exploits the same amount and the social optimum is achieved). Hence, there
was a willingness to forfeit personal consumption possibilities for the sake of
intra- and intergenerational fairness. Compared to the growth compensating
path, there were significantly smaller extractions in the ‘fast’ treatment and
significantly larger extractions in the ‘slow’ treatment. Thus, there is definitely
no evidence for growth compensating behavior confirming the evidence by
Sadrieh (2003).
Subjects were also asked about their expectations about others’ decisions
(the better the guess, the more money was paid). Comparing subjects ex-
pectations about others’ extraction levels and their own choices revealed that
subjects deliberately chose a level below the individual optimum, subjects in-
tended to be altruistic. Interestingly, there was more intended free riding in
‘slow’ compared to the other treatments. In general, subjects were too op-
timistic about cooperation of the others, especially in ‘slow’. Fischer et al.
conclude, that the presence of an intergenerational element does positively af-
fect subjects’ expectations about the others’ behavior, but since subjects did
behave the same way in ‘slow’ and ‘restart’, the consciousness of the inter-
generational problem does not result in behavioral alteration for the subjects
themselves.
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Chapter 3
Statistical methodology
The usual method for the analysis of dictator games is to compare different
treatments of one setup. In most cases, the distributions of the allocations
of different treatments are compared (see section 11.3.2). In experimental
contexts different from dictator or ultimatum games, treatment comparison is
usually done by the mean difference test, the z-test. But this test assumes
a normal distribution of the sample which is usually not given in the non-
normally distributed dictator game results. Hence, non-parametric tests are
commonly used. I will present these non-parametric tests in the next section.
In the second section of this chapter I will justify the choice of tests for the
analysis of the results of the intergenerational dictator game.
3.1 Mann-Whitney test
The Mann-Whitney test (MW) (see e.g. Conover 1971) is almost similar to
the Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum test (WI). For the WI the observations of the two
samples to be compared are pooled and ordered. Then, ranks are assigned
according to their position in the order (from lowest to largest). In case of
ties the average of the ranks of the ties is taken instead. Then the sum of the
ranks of each sample is taken, the smaller resulting value is the Wilocoxon-
Rank-Sum-statistic whose formula is given by
WI =
n∑
i=1
R(Xi)
The smaller WI, the larger the difference between the two distributions of the
samples. The intuition behind this is that for very different distributions, the
lower ranks should concentrate on one distribution and hence WI is small.
The non-standardized Mann-Whitney test statistic is simply a linear trans-
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formation of the Wilocoxon-Rank-Sum-statistic.
MW1 = WI − n(n+ 1)
2
where n denotes the sample size of the sample which yielded the smaller WI.
To calculate the MW statistic and the corresponding p-values I used the
Matlab-routine [p,h,stats]=ranksum(X1,X2), where X1 and X2 are the names
of the two samples. For large samples, MW1 follows a normal distribution. The
values given for MW in the following sections are calculated by standardizing
MW1:
MW =
MW1− µMW
σMW
µMW =
n1n2
2
σMW =
√
n1n2(n1 + n2 + 1)
12
3.2 Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic, KS, (see e.g. Conover 1971) is based on
the empirical distribution functions of the two samples which are compared.
I denote the empirical distribution functions by F (x) for this chapter. The
empirical distribution function is a cumulative probability distribution function
that concentrates probability 1/n at each of the n elements of the sample. The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test measures the largest vertical distance between the
two cumulated distribution functions of the two samples. Thus, the larger
this distance is (the number of observations is taken into account calculating
p-values) the more likely it is that the two samples have different distributions.
The test statistic is given by
KS = sup
x
|F1(x)− F2(x)|
3.3 Crame´r-von Mises test
The Crame´r-von Mises test, CM, is derived from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test. Here, roughly speaking, we sum up the squared differences between the
two empirical distribution functions of the two samples. Hence, all distances
between the cumulated distribution functions of the two samples are taken into
account. The larger this statistic the more likely we have two samples with
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different distributions. The test statistic is given by
CM =
n1n2
(n1 + n2)2
∞∫
−∞
[F1(x)− F2(x)]2 dF12(x)
F12(x) is the joint empirical distribution function of both samples.
3.4 Anderson-Darling test
The Anderson-Darling test, AD, is very similar to the Crame´r-von Mises test.
The only difference is that the tails of the two cumulated distribution functions
are weighted higher than in the Crame´r-von Mises test which is accomplished
by introducing the factor w(x) which increases the closer F12(x) comes to 0 or
1.
AD =
n1n2
(n1 + n2))2
∞∫
−∞
w(x) [F1(x)− F2(x)]2 dF12(x)
where
w(x) = [F12(x) (1− F12(x))]−1
To the best of my knowledge, no program routines for the AD statistic is
publicly available, hence I wrote a Matlab program for the AD (see appendix,
section 11.2.1). Later, I obtained a GAUSS-program from Martin Sefton for
the AD statistic (see appendix, section 11.2.2).
A problem with the AD statistic is that e.g. unlike the Epps-Singleton
statistic, it does not follow a parametric distribution which can easily be ob-
tained and hence is not included in standard statistical packages. Thus, the
critical values have to be approximated. The AD code by Sefton includes a
Monte Carlo simulation where this is done. The program generates two ran-
dom samples and calculates the corresponding AD-statistic from comparing
these two random samples. This is done e.g. 10000 times. Each time the AD-
statistic of comparing the two random samples is larger than the AD-statistic
from the actual sample comparison1, we add 1/10000 to a starting value of
zero. This yields the error-I statistic and hence the p-values.2
1From the two samples we want to compare.
2Hence, by repeated random sampling we obtain the share of randomly generated AD-
statistics that are larger than our statistic. For this share, we would have the case that we
reject the null hypothesis of identical distributions of the samples although the distributions
of the samples are actually the same (both are randomly generated). This is nothing else
but the error-I statistic we need. Due to the law of large numbers this procedure is fairly
accurate if done with enough repetitions.
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Note also, that with repetitions of 10000, the p-values may vary marginally.
This variation is usually limited to the third decimal place.
3.5 Epps-Singleton test
The Epps-Singleton test, ES, is based on the empirical characteristic functions
(CF) of the two sample distributions. These CFs are Fourier transformations
of the sample distribution functions. By Xkm I denote observationm in sample
k where m = 1, 2, ..., nk. Each observation Xkm is transformed according to
the following formula
g(Xkm) = (cos t1Xkm, sin t1Xkm, cos t2Xkm, sin t2Xkm)
′.
Then, for each sample we take the mean of the transformed samples, gk, k =
1, 2
gk = n
−1
k
nk∑
m=1
g(Xkm).
The transformation parameters t1 and t2 are given by
t1 =
0.4
σ̂
and
t2 =
0.8
σ̂
The parameters t1 and t2 have been chosen by Epps and Singleton after various
simulations in order to maximize the power of the test. σ̂ is used to standardize
t1 and t2.
σ̂ = 0.5
[
(YU + YU−1)
2
− (YL + YL+1)
2
]
where Y is the combined sample of both samples in ascending order. L is the
greatest integer in n1+n2
4
and U = n1 + n2 − L.3
The Epps-Singleton statistic is based on the squared distance between the
means of the transformed samples:
W = (n1 + n2) (g1 − g2)′ Ω̂−1 (g1 − g2) .
This squared difference is weighted by Ω̂ which is an estimator for the co-
3Note, that unlike in the original article by Epps and Singleton (1986) and unlike in
the article by Hoffman et al. (1994), where the formula for ES was copied from Epps and
Singleton (1986), σ̂ is not a sum but the difference of 0.5 (YU + YU−1) and 0.5 (YL + YL+1) .
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variance matrix of
√
(n1 + n2) (g1 − g2). Hence, Ω̂ normalizes W . Ω̂ is given
by
Ω̂ = 0.5(Ŝ1 + Ŝ2) (n1 + n2)
(
n−11 + n
−1
2
)
where Ŝ1 and Ŝ2 are the sample covariance matrices of the elements of g1 and
g2 given by
Ŝk = n
−1
k
nk∑
m=1
g(Xkm)g(Xkm)
′ − gkg′k
Finally, a small sample correction has to be applied if one of the samples has
less than 50 observations (which is always the case in my experimental study).
Thus, the Epps-Singleton statistic, ES, is given by
ES = W
(
1 + (n1 + n2)
−0.45 + 10.1
(
n−1.71 + n
−1.7
2
))−1
P-values for ES are given by χ2 (4).
To the best of my knowledge, no program routines for the ES statistic is
publicly available, hence I wrote a Matlab program for the ES statistic (see
appendix, section 11.2.3)
3.6 Justification for the choice of tests for the
data analysis
FHSS compare different non-parametric tests (KS, CM, AD, MW, and ES)
using Monte Carlo simulations. They find that the AD and the ES test have
the highest power. I have summarized which statistics have been used in
the overview on experimental studies of dictator games (see appendix, section
11.3.2). Interestingly, FHSS have been the only ones who used the AD. The
CM was not used since it has the same underlying concept as the AD but a
lower power. If the KS is used, this is done mostly in addition to other tests.
The ES statistic has been used more often. The test which has been most
commonly used, especially in the later publications, is the MW. Since this test
relies on a concept different from ES and AD, I will include it as well.
A shortcoming none of the authors so far addresses has to be mentioned.
Often, there are replications conducted to test if the experimental study is in
line with the results from standard studies. To do so, the tests mentioned above
are applied and as soon as there is no significant difference4 it is assumed that
the samples are drawn from the same population. However, the only thing that
can be inferred from this is that these samples are not significantly different,
4Even though in some studies e.g. by HMSS the test statistic is close to being significant.
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the reverse is of course not true, since there is no test controlling for type II
error. Still, I apply the same methodology due to the lack of alternatives.
In later studies, it has become popular to not only compare distributions
but also the proportions of subjects passing on a positive amount. Unfortu-
nately, significant differences are only found here if the impact of a specific
treatment is strong due to the rather small sample sizes which are used in
dictator games.
Regressions (in order to control for socio-economic features) are rarely used
in dictator games. Moreover, it is well known that in regressions with dictator
game data, the error terms are mostly non-normally distributed. This is also
the case for the first generation’s allocation choice of this study, the Jarque-
Bera statistic rejects the normality hypothesis with a p-value of 0.005. This
implies that the t-statistic, and hence the p-value in general, cannot be inter-
preted in the same way as with normally distributed error terms. However,
the regression is still unbiased and this effect vanishes when sample size in-
creases. According to Ratcliffe (1968), a number of 80 observations is sufficient
to ensure proper interpretation of the t-statistic. This is the case in my study
with its 166 observations. For the second generations choice I find the error
terms to be normally distributed, the Jarque-Bera statistic cannot reject the
normality hypothesis, the p-value is 0.992.
Note, however, that in dictator games the subjects’ decision process may
be divided into two steps. In a first step, the candidates have to make a
discrete choice: Do I pass money on or not? Once they have decided to pass
on some money, subjects decide in a second step how much to pass on. It may
therefore be the case that the factors determining the first decision are different
from those determining the second one. OLS fails to differentiate between the
impacts of the two sub-decisions and may therefore generate a biased estimate.
Accordingly, I also employ the Tobit regression method which accounts for this
problem.
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Chapter 4
Experimental design
The experiments were conducted from October 2000 to January 2001 in Hei-
delberg with 117 participants in 9 sessions, and from May 2002 to August 2007
in Kiel with 572 participants in 54 sessions. The sessions in Heidelberg were
carried out by Till Requate, the ones in Kiel by me. Each subject was allowed
to participate only once. The basic design has already been briefly sketched
in the introduction. Depending on the treatment, the experiments lasted be-
tween 35 to 90 minutes, and average payoff ranged between 13¿ and 15.5 ¿,
including a show-up fee of 3¿. The show-up fee is in line with comparable
experiments, e.g. ‘random exchange’ by HMSS also had a show-up fee of 3$,
though the standard experiment by FHSS had a show-up fee of 5$ (see section
11.3.2 in the appendix). The instructions for the experiments are attached
in the appendix.1 The subjects for the experiment were recruited by posting
flyers in student cafeterias. Accordingly, there was a wide range of study sub-
jects among the participants. In each session, 9, 12, or 15 participants were
gathered in a seminar room and asked to read the instructions. After 5 to
10 minutes (depending on the treatment), the experimenter answered ques-
tions concerning the experimental procedure. Then subjects were randomly
assigned to groups of three, consisting of members A, B, and C, except for the
replication treatment of the traditional dictator game. The position of being
A, B, or C was also assigned randomly. For treatment 3, after random division
into groups, subjects were asked within each group whether they knew each
other. If this was the case, they were re-matched in order to preclude any prior
relationship influencing the subjects’ behavior.
The basic game common to each of the four treatments was what I call
the intergenerational three-person dictator game. The experimental set-up is
1The instructions were in German, the attached version is a translation. Note that the
German instructions were gender-neutral.
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outlined in Figure 4.1.
A
B
C
(1- )Ðá
(1- )â (1- )Ðá
Figure 4.1: Basic experimental setup
Subject A received an amount Π of 30¿ (I did not use experimental cur-
rency units). This pie size is rather large compared to other experiments where
the pie-size was usually 5$ or 10$ (see section 11.3.2 in the appendix). In this
setup there is a ”third generation” hence pie-size should be increased by 50%.
However, this would mean a pie-size of max. 15¿. The use of 30¿ instead was
necessary to create a sufficient incentive for subjects to participate since some
of the treatments lasted up to 90 minutes while the experiment by e.g. FHSS
lasted 20 minutes. Since former experiments showed that pie-size alterations
from 5$ to 10$ had no influence on subjects allocation behavior (see FHSS,
section 2.2.2), a variation of pie the size to the extent introduced here should
not matter, however this cannot be excluded completely.
From the pie of 30¿ A had to choose a share α that she kept for herself,
passing the rest (1−α)Π on to B. Then B divided the rest (1−α)Π between
B and C, keeping a share β for herself and passing (1− β)(1− α)Π to C. All
subjects knew the rules of the game. In particular, A knew that B had to
divide the amount (1− α)Π between herself and C.
This basic set-up was now divided into four different treatments. Treat-
ments 1 and 4 ensured anonymity between A, B, and C, while in treatment
2 and 3 I introduced some social interaction between subjects A and B and
between B and C, respectively.
In treatment 1 (anonymity), subjects A were taken into separate rooms each
and asked to divide the initial pie Π between A and B. This division was done
in writing on a form (Form 1, see appendix2), the money being paid out later.
During their decision the subjects were left alone in the room. In addition,
2The forms were also in German, the attached version is a translation.
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personal data (gender, study subject, income, and age) were requested and
entered on the form. Then, Form 1 was collected, and subjects A received
a second form (containing parts of Form 2, see appendix) in which they were
asked about their motivation concerning the division of the pie and about their
knowledge of the concept of sustainability. Afterwards, subjects A received
their payoff, i.e. the amount αΠ plus the show-up fee, and left without meeting
subjects B or C, who were waiting in separate rooms, one for subjects B, one
for those of type C. Then subjects B were taken into separate rooms for each,
where the experimenter informed them how much of the initial pie Π had been
passed on to them by subject A. Subjects B were then asked to divide the
remaining amount (1− α)Π between themselves and subjects C by filling out
Form 1 that was adapted to B. When making their decisions, subjects B
were left alone in their rooms. After Form 1 had been collected, subjects B
were asked to fill out Form 2, where they had to answer the same questions
as subjects A before. In addition, subjects B were asked which amount of
money they had expected to be passed on by subjects A. Then subjects B
were paid off, i.e. they received the amount β(1 − α)Π plus the show-up fee,
and left. Finally, each subjects C were informed about the amount of money
(1 − β)(1 − α)Π passed on to them and were then asked to fill out Form 2
(adapted to C). Then subjects C were paid off and left. Anonymity was
ensured by the fact that A did not meet B and C directly, and B did not
meet C after the treatment had started. The subjects met only briefly in one
room while reading the instructions, being divided thereafter into groups and
assigned to type A to C (additionally, for treatment 3 I ensured that subjects
within one group did not know each other). I decided to choose a lower degree
of anonymity than in the treatments by FHSS and HMSS (who put allocators
and recipients into different rooms from the outset), because Frohlich et al.
(2001) have shown that subjects may doubt the existence of recipients if there
are no clues about them actually participating in the experiment.
Treatment 2 resembled treatment 1, except that A and B socially interacted
after A had divided the pie. Again, subjects A were first taken to separate
rooms and were asked to divide the pie Π between themselves, with a share to
be passed on to subject B. Alone in the room, they filled out Form 1. After
subjects A had completed the form, B was taken into the same room and was
informed about the amount of money being passed on to B by A. Then A and
B were asked to play a simple form of scrabble, where they cooperatively tried
to gain as many points as possible by forming German words from the scrabble
letters in a period of 15 minutes, following the usual rules of the scrabble game,
i.e. assigning points to the letters they had managed to use. In this game they
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could earn up to 3¿, depending on their success. The resulting payoff from the
scrabble game was split equally between A and B. The same procedure was
repeated for B and C, who also played the scrabble game after B had made
their decisions and filled out their forms.
Treatment 3 was similar to treatment 2, except that the choice on the
allocation of the pie was made after playing the scrabble game. After the
scrabble game was finished, subject B (or C) left the room, and A (or B) were
left alone in the room while making their decisions and filling out their forms.
Treatment 4 was similar to treatment 1, except that B and C did not know
whether the division of pie Π had been made by subject A or by a random
mechanism. By tossing a coin (in the presence of A), I decided whether the
division would be done byA or by the randommechanism. IfA was to make the
choice, the experiment continued as in treatment 1. If the random mechanism
was selected for division, a 20-sided dice was used (again, in the presence of
A) to determine the amount of money for A. Subject A could receive integer
values between 10¿ and 30¿. Since there are 21 integer numbers from 10 to
30, I omitted the number 11 as a possible outcome so as to obtain 20 possible
divisions that could be assigned to A. The intention was to keep the division
(10,20) frequently chosen by A in the set of possible allocations. I excluded
the values 0 through 9 since it was unlikely that A would take less than one
third of the pie. Since the random process yielded only integer allocations, A
(if A was allocating) was only allowed to choose integer allocations too, i.e. A
was not allowed to pass on, say, 12.5 euros.
Finally, I also ran a replication of the traditional dictator game (in the
following referred to as ‘TDG’) to ensure that my results were comparable to
other studies. Here, the set-up was similar to treatment 1, except that the pie
had only to be divided between subjects A and B.
Table 4.1 summarizes the the main features of the different treatments.
Table 4.1: Treatment overview
Treatment Social interaction Subject A
1 None Human
2 After decision Human
3 Before decision Human
4 None 50% human, 50% random
TDG None Human
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Chapter 5
Analysis of the first generation’s
allocation choice
In this chapter, I analyze the decisions of subjects A, the first generation,
and compare the impact of the different treatments. I start with descriptive
statistics, then I test for differences between treatments. Unlike in most of
the studies, I do not only test for treatment differences of the entire sample
but also for treatment differences, where the subjects taking the whole pie are
excluded. Finally, I investigate factors determining A’s decision by running
regressions using the asked personal data.
5.1 Treatment comparison entire sample
5.1.1 Descriptive analysis
Table 5.1 lists the number of observations for the different treatments and the
means of the shares passed on by A.
Table 5.1: Descriptive results allocation choice A
Treatment Number obs. Mean share of As
passed on by A
1A 54 0.34
2A 40 0.48
3A 39 0.49
4A 33 0.33
TDG 40 0.26
FHSS 69 0.23
HMSS 24 0.27
The number of observations is in line with comparable experiments, e.g.
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FHSS had 24 to 46 observations, HMSS had 24 to 41 observations per treat-
ment (see section 11.3.2 in the appendix).1
In treatments 1 and 4, subject A passed on an average of one third of
the initial pie. Social interaction increased the average of shares passed on
by A to about one half. In ‘TDG’, subjects A passed on a share of 0.26 on
average, which is in line with the results by FHSS and HMSS, who observed
mean shares of 0.23 and 0.27, respectively. Thus, in two-person dictator game
treatments a lower mean share was passed on than in treatment 1 with its
mean share of 0.34.
The results from the four treatments are displayed as histograms in Figure
5.1.
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Figure 5.1: Frequency distribution of shares passed on by A, treatments 1-4
Here I see that in the treatments with social interaction the frequency of
shares passed on by subject A peak at 0.7, while without social interaction the
frequency of those shares is rather uniformly distributed between zero and 0.7.
Note that the 0.7 column represents the subjects passing on two thirds of the
initial endowment, which is the equal share.
Interestingly, in treatment 2 there is one case of A passing on 26¿, which
1The number of 69 observations in Table 5.1 stems from pooling treatments with 5$ and
10$ pie-size.
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was substantially more than two thirds of the pie. This is surprising, since
subject A’s choice increases social inequity in favor of B and C. Since subjects
had to explain their division (in Form 2a), it turned out that this subject
had understood the rules but deliberately chose this allocation. She claimed
that her monthly income (which was around 350 to 500¿ after having paid
housing rent) was sufficient for living, and therefore she had no desire to earn
additional money but had just participated for the fun of it. Since in her
perception the other subjects’ participation was mainly motivated by monetary
considerations, she argued that it would be welfare-maximizing to pass on more
money than the equal split. This case favors the social welfare-preference
model by both Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Charness and Rabin (2002),
in contrast to the difference-aversion models by both Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). However, in my experiment, this kind of
behavior was exceptional.
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Figure 5.2: Frequency distribution of shares passed on by A, TDG (replication)
vs. FHSS and HMSS
I also compared my results from ‘TDG’ with the traditional dictator game
by FHSS 2 and HMSS.3 The results displayed in Figure 5.2 were roughly in line
2The sample for FHSS consists of a pooled sample combining the ‘dictator pay’ treatments
for both the pie sizes with 5$ and the one with 10$.
3The sample for HMSS consists of the sample from the ‘Dictator random entitlement’
treatment, whose set-up was largely similar to the one by FHSS.
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with those from FHSS and HMSS, however, the share of subjects allocating
equally is higher in my set-up (though not significantly). In the investigations
by FHSS and HMSS, subjects never passed on a share exceeding 0.5 (except
for two out of 69 subjects in FHSS), while in treatment 1 of the three-person
dictator game almost 30% of subjects A passed on shares larger than 0.5, but
not exceeding 0.66. This is plausible, since a reference point is the fair division
of one third to everybody. Although it is unlikely, I cannot rule out that some
differences in distribution may have stemmed from the different pie-size used
in my experiment compared to FHSS and HMSS.
5.1.2 Comparison of distributions
Testing for differences in the treatments, I first compare the outcomes of treat-
ments 1-4. My main focus is on the impact of social interaction. Then I test
for differences between the three-person dictator games and the traditional
dictator games. I also statistically compare the results from ‘TDG’ to the
outcomes of FHSS and HMSS. Finally, I investigate the influence of gender
and other socio-economic factors.
Testing for differences between treatments
I now compare the outcomes from the treatments 1 through 4. In Table 5.2,
I report the results from using the Mann-Whitney test (MW), the Anderson-
Darling test (AD), and the Epps-Singleton test (ES) of testing the null hy-
pothesis stating that the outcomes of the different treatments are equal. The
table lists the corresponding test statistics and the respective p-values in paren-
thesis beneath (the same holds for the remaining tables reporting treatment
comparisons).
My main findings from the comparisons are as follows: If I compare the
outcome of a treatment without social interaction (i.e. 1 or 4) to the outcome
of a treatment with social interaction (i.e. 2 or 3), in other words 1A vs. 2A,
1A vs. 3A, 2A vs. 4A, and 3A vs. 4A, I find that social interaction (either
before or after the allocation choice) significantly increases generosity.
Comparing the two treatments without social interaction, the choices of
subject A are not significantly different in treatments 1 and 4. Thus, intro-
ducing the possibility of a random element in the choice of A apparently does
not influence the decision of subject A in any significant way. Comparing the
two treatments with social interaction (treatments 2 and 3) I find that the
outcomes do not differ significantly. Thus, given that social interaction takes
place, it does not seem to play a major role for A’s choice whether social in-
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teraction takes place before or after A has to divide the pie between herself
and subjects B and C.
Table 5.2: Treatment comparison A
Treatments compared MW AD ES
The effect of social
interaction
1A vs 2A -2.549 3.544 10.107
(0.011) (0.014) (0.039)
1A vs 3A -2.827 3.891 10.658
(0.005) (0.010) (0.031)
2A vs 4A 2.934 4.184 11.795
(0.003) (0.007) (0.019)
3A vs 4A 3.188 4.716 14.420
(0.001) (0.004) (0.006)
Possibility of a
non-human allocator
1A vs 4A 0.295 0.343 1.599
(0.768) (0.913) (0.809)
Social interaction
before or after choice
2A vs 3A -0.384 0.785 1.559
(0.701) (0.494) (0.816)
Extension to three
persons
1A vs TDG 1.850 2.921 12.331
(0.064) (0.028) (0.015)
1A vs FHSS -2.686 5.150 15.883
(0.007) (0.002) (0.003)
1A vs HMSS 1.455 2.710 17.093
(0.146) (0.038) (0.002)
Comparison to
standard setups
TDG vs FHSS -0.751 0.985 5.220
(0.453) (0.368) (0.266)
TDG vs HMSS 0.261 0.972 8.117
(0.794) (0.375) (0.087)
Nevertheless, it might be the case that the motivation to pass on a larger
share compared to the treatments without social interaction is quite different
in treatment 2 compared to treatment 3. In treatment 2, where A decides
before social interaction, there are two possible explanations why A passes
on more than in the anonymous dictator games in treatments 1 and 4. The
first may be that A would like to give B an incentive to cooperate. If B feels
unfairly treated by A, B might want to punish A by refusing to cooperate in
the scrabble game and hence reciprocate according to the model suggested by
Rabin (1993). Even if this behavior was at B’s own expense (since B earns half
of the payoff from the scrabble game), this explanation would be consistent
with results from previous experiments. In ultimatum games, e.g. in Gu¨th et
al. (1982, see section 2.1.1), subjects revealed a strong desire to reciprocate
despite incurring costs by punishing someone they had perceived as behaving
unfairly. In my set-up, the impact of this reasoning should not be too large,
since the possible loss for A (through punishment by B) is rather low. Playing
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scrabble alone would not reduce a subject’s earnings in a dramatic way. If I
additionally compare the rather low maximum possible payoff of 3 Euros in
the scrabble game to the pie of 30¿, the influence of the willingness to provide
incentives to cooperate should not be too strong. Still, 10% of the subjects
in treatment 2 explained their choice by the incentive argument, while 7.5%
justified the low amounts they had passed on to B (and C) by indicating the
negligible impact of cooperation due to the small amount of money at stake.
An alternative explanation for A’s generosity in treatment 2 might be as
follows: If subject A treats subject B non-nicely by being greedy, A may have
to undergo an awkward situation when being forced to spend 15 minutes with
B in the same room working on a joint task. A might want to avoid this by
being (relatively) generous. However, with the exception of one subject, no
participant in treatment 2 explained her behavior with this argument. How-
ever, when looking at the subjects’ reasoning in treatments 1 and 4, I observe
that 20% and 12% of subjects A in treatments 1 and 4, respectively, justified
their behavior by referring to anonymity. This enables us to reverse the ar-
gument: If subjects name anonymity as justifying greedy behavior, observing
generosity in treatment 2 implies that social interaction is important.
Considering treatment 3, there may also be two effects that increase gen-
erosity. Firstly, subjects A may feel obliged to reward B for successful coop-
eration. However, only 5% of the subjects participating in treatment 3 used
this argument (from an incentive point of view there would be no reason for
this behavior). Secondly, subjects got to know each other during the scrabble
game that induced increased affection between A and B. In fact, only one
subject mentions this motive. There is nevertheless indirect evidence for the
existence of the second effect. It is the same argument as for treatment 2, i.e.
the high share of subjects mentioning anonymity in treatments 1 and 4.
There may be a third effect that plays a role in both treatments 2 and 3
which, in contrast to the effects described previously, reduces the amount that
A passes on to B. Since B plays the scrabble game twice, while A and C play
only once, A might account for this and pass on less than one third to B for
reasons of equity. This argument would be supported by the results of both
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). Actually, 5% of
the subjects A taking part in treatment 2 and 18% of those taking part in
treatment 3 put forward this argument to explain their decision.
I summarize these findings as follows:
Result 1: In the three-person dictator game as described above,
i) social interaction (either before of after the allocation choice) significantly
increases generosity (amounts passed on by A are significantly higher in treat-
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ments 2 and 3 than in treatments 1 and 4);
ii) introduction of a random element does not influence subject A′s choice in
a significant way (the outcomes of treatments 1 vs. 4 are not significantly
different with respect to the choice by subject A);
iii) the order of social interaction and division choice does not induce signifi-
cantly different outcomes with respect to the choice by subject A (the outcomes
of treatments 2 vs. 3 are not significantly different with respect to the choice
of subject A).
Three-person intergenerational dictator game vs. traditional dicta-
tor game
Comparing the results from the intergenerational (or sequential) dictator game
with the results from the traditional standard two-person dictator games, I
find that there is a significant difference between my results and the results
obtained by FHSS for all test statistics. Comparing my results to HMSS, I
obtain significant differences for both the AD and the ES test statistic, while
the MW test statistic is insignificant, which possibly has to do with the high
number of ties in the sample by HMSS. So when people decide how much to
keep for themselves, it obviously does matter whether they are sharing a pie
with one or with several people.
I summarize my findings as follows:
Result 2: In the three-person sequential dictator game, the first dictator
passes on more than the dictator in the traditional dictator games.
Note that these results contrast with the findings by Gu¨th and van Damme
(1998), who conduct an ultimatum game where allocations are made by a
proposer to a respondent and a passive third person. The passive person,
however, in contrast to the responder, receives only a very small share of the
pie. An explanation might be the claim by Bardsley (2008) and List (2007)
that subjects respond to options and infer from these to the behavior they
believe is expected by them and tend to conform to these expectations. Being
confronted with a setup were one party is powerless might induce subjects to
infer that they are supposed to neglect this party.
Comparing the results from the replication TDG with the results from the
traditional dictator game obtained by FHSS and HMSS yields no significant
difference.4 Obviously, the slight differences in instructions, procedure and
pie-size do not matter.
4Note that with a p-value of 0.087 the Epps-Singleton statistic for the comparison of my
replication and HMSS is close to being significant.
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The Impact of gender
Since experimental studies, such as those by Eckel and Grossman (1998) and
Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) often find significant differences in behavior
with respect to gender, I compared male and female decisions in the samples.
The descriptive results are summarized in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Descriptive results allocation choice A with regard to gender
Treatment Mean share Obs Mean share Obs
passed on males passed on females
by males by females
1A 0.31 37 0.40 17
2A 0.43 29 0.61 11
3A 0.46 28 0.56 11
4A 0.30 17 0.36 16
TDG 0.21 24 0.33 16
At first glance, males seem to pass on less than women in each treatment,
especially in treatment 2. When testing for gender differences within the treat-
ments, it can be see, however, that this difference is only significant in treat-
ment 2 (see Table 5.4). A possible explanation why females are more generous
Table 5.4: Testing for the impact of gender on A’s choice within treatments
Treatment MW AD ES
1A -1.145 1.039 2.492
(0.252) (0.340) (0.646)
2A -2.266 3.227 5.3451
(0.023) (0.019) (0.254)
3A -1.119 1.034 2.444
(0.263) (0.342) (0.655)
4A -0.871 0.815 2.831
(0.384) (0.476) (0.587)
TDG -1.514 1.536 5.817
(0.130) (0.167) (0.213)
in treatment 2 is that females may feel more uncomfortable then men about
being in a room and cooperating with someone they had treated ”unfairly.”
In fact, however, only one female subject justified her generosity by putting
forward this argument.
I also checked for treatment differences within genders (see Table 5.5).
Some differences significant for the overall sample are no longer significant for
some ‘uni-gender’ subsamples. Notably, the Epps-Singleton hardly detects any
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difference between treatments, which may be a result of the smaller sample
size. Employing the Mann-Whitney and the Anderson-Darling tests, I do find
differences between genders. First, for males the results from treatments 1
Table 5.5: Treatment comparison A for ‘uni-gender’ subsamples
Treatments compared MW AD ES
The effect of social
interaction
Males 1A vs 2A -1.704 1.734 5.271
(0.088) (0.126) (0.261)
Females 1A vs 2A -2.347 3.340 5.994
(0.019) (0.015) (0.200)
Males 1A vs 3A -2.209 3.027 6.821
(0.027) (0.024) (0.146)
Females 1A vs 3A -1.914 2.786 3.987
(0.056) (0.031) (0.408)
Males 2A vs 4A 1.808 1.879 5.030
(0.071) (0.106) (0.284)
Females 2A vs 4A -3.118 5.810 10.830
(0.002) (0.001) (0.029)
Males 3A vs 4A 2.175 2.627 7.416
(0.030) (0.041) (0.116)
Females 3A vs 4A -2.693 4.031 7.849
(0.007) (0.006) (0.097)
Possibility of a
non-human allocator
Males 1A vs 4A 0.216 0.218 0.417
(0.829) (0.991) (0.981)
Females 1A vs 4A 0.617 0.798 1.334
(0.537) (0.491) (0.856)
Social interaction
before or after choice
Males 2A vs 3A -0.686 0.654 0.839
(0.493) (0.606) (0.933)
Females 2A vs 3A -0.493 0.388 1.851
(0.622) (0.892) (0.763)
Extension to three
persons
Males 1A vs TDG 1.615 2.133 7.462
(0.106) (0.076) (0.113)
Females 1A vs TDG 1.147 1.329 8.035
(0.251) (0.220) (0.090)
vs. 2 and those from treatments 2 vs. 4 are no longer significantly different,
whereas the differences between both treatments 1 vs. 3 and treatments 3
vs. 4 prevail. Obviously, males care about social interaction if it takes places
after the allocation decision has been made, while social interaction seems to
be less important if it happens before dividing the pie. There are two possible
explanations why males behave less generously in treatment 2 than in treat-
ment 3. Either they simply do not anticipate the uncomfortable situation of
being together with someone they have not treated nicely, or they simply do
not care. Females, by contrast, are sensitive to social interaction regardless of
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when it takes place (though, possibly due to the small sample size, the com-
parison of treatments 1 vs. 3 is slightly above the 0.05 p-value from the MW
test). Secondly, for both subsamples I again observe no significant differences
between the different treatments without social interaction (i.e. 1 vs. 4) and
those with (i.e. treatments 2 vs. 3). Thirdly, the significant difference be-
tween the intergenerational (or sequential) dictator game and the traditional
standard two-person dictator games vanishes in uni-gender subsamples.
Besides sex, I controlled for age5, income, and the subjects studied the
by participants. Using Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient to test for the
impact of age, I find no significant correlation between the share taken by sub-
jects A and their age in treatments 1, 3, and 4. In treatment 2, by contrast,
I find a significantly positive relationship between the two variables. Obvi-
ously younger subjects are more fearful than older subjects of the prospect of
spending 15 minutes in a room with someone they have not treated fairly and
therefore pass on a higher share.
Controlling for income, I find a significantly negative relation between in-
come and the share passed on by A only in treatment 1. Interestingly, in
treatment 4, which has the same incentive structure as treatment 1, I do not
find this relation. The same holds for treatment 2 and 3.
I do find any significant correlation between study subjects by the partici-
pants and share passed on by A for all treatments.
5.1.3 Comparison of proportions passing zero
Taking a look at the proportions of subjects passing on zero we find that
the share of subjects passing nothing is lower in the treatments with social
interaction (see Table 5.6). However, the difference is not substantial.
Table 5.6: Proportion of subjects A passing zero
Treatment Proportion passing zero
1A 0.19
2A 0.13
3A 0.10
4A 0.15
TDG 0.25
FHSS 0.30
HMSS 0.21
Comparing proportions of the different treatments using Fisher’s exact test
5Carrying out an experimental study on contributions to a charity, List (2004) found
that age did matter.
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does not yield any significant differences between treatments, see Table 5.7.
Even pooling treatment 1 and 4, and 2 and 3 respectively (there are no signifi-
Table 5.7: Comparison of proportion of subjects A passing zero
Treatments compared P-value from Fisher exact test
1A vs 2A 0.571
1A vs 3A 0.381
1A vs 4A 0.776
2A vs 3A 1
2A vs 4A 0.747
3A vs 4A 0.723
14A vs 23A 0.378
1A vs TDG 0.623
1A vs FHSS 0.537
1A vs HMSS 1
TDG vs FHSS 0.661
TDG vs HMSS 0.769
cant differences between these treatments) and then comparing the two pooled
treatments yields a test statistic far from being significant. It seems as if the
decision to pass on zero is independent from the treatments. An explanation
may be that only subjects that are already willing to pass on a positive amount
seem to respond stronger to the different treatments.
Comparing proportions from the intergenerational (or sequential) dictator
game with the results from the traditional standard two-person dictator games
I do not find any significant differences. Again, subjects only seem to respond
to the added third person given they pass on positive amounts.
Also comparing the proportions from the replication TDG with the results
from the traditional dictator game obtained by FHSS and HMSS yields no
significant difference.
When comparing proportions of males and females passing on zero, I find
that in all treatments a higher share of men keeps the entire pie (see Table
5.8).
However, there are no significant differences between males and females
for all treatments (see Table 5.9). Note, that comparing pooled samples for
treatment 1 and 4 (14A) and for treatment 2 and 3 (23A) between males and
females yields marginally or close to marginally significant results. Hence,
sample size may matter, here.
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Table 5.8: Proportion of male and female As passing zero
Treatment Male: Female:
Proportion passing zero Proportion passing zero
1A 0.24 0.06
2A 0.17 0
3A 0.14 0
4A 0.24 0.06
TDG 0.29 0.19
Table 5.9: Comparison of proportion of male and female As passing zero within
treatments
Treatment P-value Fisher exact test
1A 0.259
2A 0.313
3A 0.558
4A 0.355
TDG 0.722
14A 0.080
23A 0.105
5.2 Treatment comparison, including only As
passing on a positive amount
In this section, I exclude the observations where subjects took the whole pie. Of
course the mean average passed on in all treatments is lower, now. The basic
descriptive results of comparing means remain the same, social interaction
increases generosity substantially (see Table 5.10).
Table 5.10: Descriptive results allocation choice A excluding observations
where A passed zero
Treatment Number observations Mean share A
1 44 0.42
2 35 0.55
3 35 0.54
4 28 0.39
TDG 30 0.34
FHSS 48 0.32
HMSS 19 0.34
When comparing the results for the distribution of the treatments excluding
the subjects taking all, I find no substantial differences compared to using the
entire sample (see Table 5.11 compared to Table 5.2 in section 5.1.2). There are
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Table 5.11: Treatment comparison A excluding observations where A passed
zero
Treatments compared MW AD ES
The effect of social
interaction
1A vs 2A -2.650 4.118 10.086
(0.008) (0.007) (0.039)
1A vs 3A -2.732 4.981 9.377
(0.006) (0.002) (0.052)
2A vs 4A 3.429 5.548 12.377
(0.001) (0.001) (0.015)
3A vs 4A 3.485 5.419 14.080
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
Possibility of a
non-human allocator
1A vs 4A 0.739 0.525 1.464
(0.460) (0.730) (0.833)
Social interaction
before or after choice
2A vs 3A 0.251 0.602 2.471
(0.802) (0.656) (0.650)
Extension to three
persons
1A vs TDG 1.887 2.828 12.521
(0.059) (0.032) (0.014)
1A vs FHSS -2.357 4.610 17.278
(0.018) (0.004) (0.002)
1A vs HMSS 1.785 3.523 18.074
(0.074) (0.013) (0.001)
Comparison to
standard setups
TDG vs FHSS -0.441 1.284 6.787
(0.659) (0.238) ( 0.148)
TDG vs HMSS 0.808 1.494 8.099
(0.419) (0.177) (0.088)
minor changes in statistics and p-values but all the basic results are sustained.
It is interesting that some results are even more pronounced while some are
less. Here, there are two effects at play: The sample size for the comparisons
excluding the subjects passing a zero amount is reduced hence reducing the
statistics and increasing the p-values. But if the share of subjects passing
on nothing is rather constant over treatments, the results should be more
pronounced, working in the opposite direction.
Excluding the observations from subjects who pass on zero does not change
the results from comparing the intergenerational dictator game to the results
from the traditional standard two-person dictator games by FHSS and HMSS.
The same holds for comparing my replication TDG to the results by FHSS
and HMSS.
I now take a look the results for the impact of gender within the different
treatments (see Table 5.12). Comparing these results to the results where
the entire sample is considered (see Table 5.4 in section 5.1.2) reveals that the
difference between men and women for treatment 2 is not significant any longer.
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This may be interpreted in the way that the strongest difference between men
and women is the share of subjects taking all, but the reduced sample size
could also be the reason for this. The rest of the results are confirmed, but the
change in p-values is relatively strong in treatment 1 increasing from 0.252 to
0.941 and also increasing in the other treatments.6
Table 5.12: Testing for the impact of gender on A’s allocation choice excluding
observations where A passed zero
Treatment MW AD ES
1A -0.074 0.214 0.249
(0.941) (0.993) (0.993)
2A -1.676 2.060 2.993
(0.094) (0.082) (0.559)
3A -0.459 0.443 0.553
(0.646) (0.826) (0.968)
4A 0.023 0.504 1.056
(0.982) (0.767) (0.901)
TDG -1.461 1.583 5.438
(0.144) (0.153) (0.245)
Then, I compare the results of the male and female subsamples, see Ta-
ble 5.13 to the results where the entire sample is considered (see Table 5.5
in section 5.1.2). Again, we have some differences between the results from
the entire sample and from the sample where observations passing zero are
excluded. First, I investigate the male subsample. Comparing treatment 2
and 4 and comparing treatment 1a to TDG is now significant for MW and AD
(p-value <0.05) while for the entire sample it was not. The rest of the results
is sustained. For the women, there is no substantial change in results, having
again some results being more, some being less pronounced.
6Note, that comparing results of the proportions of males and females taking all yields
no significant difference, which would be evidence against this hypothesis, but the non-
significant difference is possibly due to small sample size since the actual proportions differ
substantially.
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Table 5.13: Treatment comparison first generation
Treatments compared MW AD ES
The effect of social
interaction
Male 1A vs 2A -1.719 2.008 5.210
(0.086) (0.089) (0.267)
Female 1A vs 2A -2.191 2.982 5.074
(0.029) (0.023) (0.280)
Male 1A vs 3A -2.105 2.733 5.707
(0.035) (0.036) (0.222)
Female 1A vs 3A -1.734 2.437 3.187
(0.083) (0.049) (0.527)
Male 2A vs 4A -2.036 2.463 5.244
(0.042) (0.049) (0.263)
Female 2A vs 4A -2.995 5.424 9.807
(0.003) (0.001) (0.044)
Male 3A vs 4A 2.267 2.748 6.550
(0.023) (0.034) (0.162)
Female 3A vs 4A -2.547 3.668 6.762
(0.011) (0.009) (0.149)
Possibility of a
non-human allocator
Male 1A vs 4A 0.395 0.249 0.392
(0.693) (0.983) (0.983)
Female 1A vs 4A 0.658 0.884 1.416
(0.511) (0.431) (0.841)
Social interaction
before or after choice
Male 2A vs 3A 0.641 0.683 2.753
(0.522) (0.582) (0.600)
Female 2A vs 3A -0.493 0.388 1.851
(0.622) (0.892) (0.763)
Extension to three
persons
Male 1A vs TDG -2.044 2.858 7.566
(0.041) (0.030) (0.109)
Female 1A vs TDG 0.623 1.168 7.636
(0.533) (0.279) (0.106)
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5.3 Regression analysis of A’s choice
To shed more light on the factors determining the decisions of subjects A and
also to elicit some quantitative effects, I now regress the share passed on by
A, (1 − α), on gender, income, age, study subject, and knowledge about the
concept of sustainability. Gender is coded by a dummy (0=female, 1=male).
Income is divided into eight classes (since some students live with their parents,
I asked about disposable income after having paid the rent) starting from less
than 350¿ and then increasing in steps of 150¿ (350¿ to 500¿, 500¿ to 650¿,
and so on). For the regression these classes are coded as 0,1,2,...,7. For some
income data, corrections had to be made. These procedures are described in
more detail in section 5.3.1. To capture the impact of the subjects studied,
I split the participants into different groups. This procedure is described in
more detail in subsection 5.3.2. Sustainability is captured by a dummy variable
‘sust’ taking the value of 1 if the subject gives an appropriate definition of
sustainability and 0 otherwise. Treatments are also captured by a dummy
variable for each of the treatments 2-4, leaving treatment 1 as baseline setting.
Note, that for very few observations, some categories were not given because
e.g. a subject refused to state the income. Here, I used the mean of all other
subjects.
5.3.1 Presentation of the different income adjustment
methods
Initially (this is the case for 7 observations of treatment 2 and 32 observations
of treatment 3) I asked the participants about their monthly income in general.
Unfortunately, some of the students may live at their parents place (according
to the 17th ‘Sozialerhebung des Deutschen Studentenwerks’ 2003, which is a
survey about the socio-economic situation of students in Germany, this is the
case for a share of 0.22). This implies that the income of students living at
their parents’ place is relatively higher than that of students who declared the
same income but have to pay the rent in addition. Hence, I decided to ask for
‘income after having paid the rent’ for the rest of the study. Thus, I have to
deal with the fact that there are two kinds of data. I take the observations
where it was asked for ‘income after having paid the rent’ as benchmark since
these answers should be more reliable and since I have roughly three times
as many of these observation as of the other kind. I correct the data where
I asked for ‘income in general’ using several methods. The first method to
take the differences into account is adjustment method 1 which can be seen in
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Table 5.14. Here, I simply replace all observations where I asked for income in
general by the mean income of the other observations.
Table 5.14: Adjustment method 1
Income category on form 1 Income after having Corrected income
paid the rent
> 350 1 1.7234
350-500 2 1.7234
500-650 3 1.7234
650-800 4 1.7234
800-950 5 1.7234
950-1100 6 1.7234
>1100 7 1.7234
Adjustment method 2 is still rather simple. I just put every observation
where I asked for income in general one income category lower compared to
income after having paid rent. That means I use the adjustment scheme ac-
cording to Table 5.15:
Table 5.15: Adjustment method 2
Income category on form 1 Income after having Corrected income
paid the rent
<350 1 0
350-500 2 1
500-650 3 2
650-800 4 3
800-950 5 4
950-1100 6 5
>1100 7 6
Adjustment method 3 follows a scheme where the same category on the
questionnaire would be one category higher for the income in general than
the one for the ‘income without having paid the rent’ but in a category that
is lower than the next category for income in general. This scheme leads to
Table 5.16.
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Table 5.16: Adjustment method 3
Income category on form 1 Income after having Corrected income
paid the rent
<350 2 1
350-500 4 3
500-650 6 5
650-800 8 7
800-950 10 9
950-1100 12 11
>1100 14 13
Adjustment method 4 is more complicated than the other ones. I tried to
extrapolate the relative share of the income that is devoted to rent and thereby
calculate the mean values for the income categories. Therefore I used the 17th
‘Sozialerhebung des Deutschen Studentenwerks’ 2003. Actually, the relevant
observations that have to be extrapolated are from the time October 2000 to
January 2001, hence the 16th survey would be more appropriate since it is
from 2000. However, this survey contained no data on the income-rent ratio,
so I took the survey from 2003. This report states the average rent payments
and the rent-income ratio for income quartiles. With the help of these two
variables I calculate the average income of each quartile which can be seen in
Table 5.17.
Table 5.17: Sozialerhebung des Deutschen Studentenwerks
Average income Average rent Average rent/income-ratio
515 197 0.382
665 229 0.344
798 258 0.323
1107 319 0.288
Then, I regress the average rent/income-ratio on income using OLS using
the following regression equation7
Average rent
Income
= β0 + β1Income+ ε.
The results of this regression can be seen in Table 5.18.
7I am aware that I have the independent variable included in the dependent variable.
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Table 5.18: Extrapolating the average rent/income-ratio
Variable Coefficient P-value
β0 0.452 0.002
β1 -0.000153 0.021
Using β0 and β1, I extrapolate the average rent/income-ratio for the differ-
ent income categories for the people who filled out a form where I asked for the
general income. Then, I inferred from the extrapolated average rent/income-
ratio to the actual income without rent these participants should have. Note,
that instead of values 1 to 8 for ‘income after having paid rent’ I used an
assumed mean income with ad hoc estimations for the lowest and highest cat-
egory (see Table 5.19).
Table 5.19: Extrapolating income without rent from the average rent/income-
ratio
Income Average rent/income-ratio Income without rent
275 0.41 162.23
425 0.387 260.48
575 0.364 365.61
725 0.341 477.63
875 0.318 596.53
1025 0.295 722.31
1325 0.249 994.54
Thus, I have the following adjustment scheme for the corrected income (see
Table 5.20).
Table 5.20: Adjustment method 4
Income category on form 1 Income after having Corrected income
paid the rent
<350 275 162.23
350-500 425 260.48
500-650 575 365.61
650-800 725 477,63
800-950 875 596.53
950-1100 1025 722.31
>1100 1325 994.54
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5.3.2 Presentation of the categories for study subject
In the questionnaires participant were also asked about their study subject.
Since there is a large range of study subjects, it is necessary to form categories.
Table 5.21 indicates which subject was put into which category.
Table 5.21: Study subjects and categories
Subject Category
Computer Science Science
Physics Science
Chemistry Science
Biology Science
Economics Economics
Business Economics
Languages Humanities
Philosophy Humanities
History Humanities
Medical Science Other
Psychology Other
Sports Other
Teacher Other
Geography Other
Agricultural Science Other
Pharmacy Other
Law Other
Nutritional Science Other
Other subjects Other
Pupil Other
Worker/Employee Other
I chose ”science” as category 1, ”economics and business” as category 2,
”humanities” as category 3 and ”others” as category 4. The last group con-
tained subjects that from my point of view did not really fit into the three
other categories and the few participants who did not study.
5.3.3 Regression analysis - results
I have the following regression equation with the share passed on by subject
A, (1 − α), as dependent variable. Note, that subject and treatment are
multi-column vectors.
(1− α) = β0 + β1 · gender + β2 · income+ β3 · age
+β4 · subject+ β5 · sust+ β6 · treatment+ ε
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I compare the OLS regression results of all four income adjustment methods
and it turns out that income adjustment method 1 seems to perform best, see
Table 5.22.
Table 5.22: Comparison of regressions with different income adjustment meth-
ods - initial model
Income adjustment method R2 P-value income regressor
1 0.176 0.012
2 0.167 0.029
3 0.159 0.071
4 0.170 0.021
Hence, the results using income adjustment method 1 are used for the regres-
sion results in Table 5.23, p-values are in parenthesis beneath point estimates.
The displayed values for a Tobit regression are discussed later in this section.
Table 5.23: Regression A, initial model. Dependent variable: Share passed on
by A
Variable OLS Tobit
Constant 0.246 0.210
(0.041) (0.115)
Gender -0.129 -0.157
(0.002) (0.001)
Income1 0.055 0.062
(0.011) (0.009)
Age 0.003 0.003
(0.554) (0.530)
Science 0.008 0.012
(0.873) (0.829)
Economics 0.021 0.037
(0.645) (0.471)
Humanities -0.020 -0.021
(0.774) (0.784)
Sustainability 0.008 0.009
(0.828) (0.840)
Treatment 2 0.158 0.172
(0.002) (0.002)
Treatment 3 0.162 0.177
(0.001) (0.001)
Treatment 4 -0.014 -0.012
(0.781) (0.832)
The treatment comparison from section 5.1 showed that there should be no
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difference between treatment 2 and 3. A Wald-coefficient test confirms this
evidence, treatment dummy 2 and treatment dummy 3 are not significantly
different. I therefore replace both variables by a dummy for social interaction
(SocInt), hence confirming the evidence from the former section. In order to
select the appropriate model for my data I apply a procedure suggested by
Herwartz (2007):
Step 1: I regress a constant on my dependent variable.
Step 2: The resulting residuals are now used as dependent variable.
Step 3: I regress every variable alone and a constant on the residuals
and choose the variable that has the highest LM statistic λ.
λ = TR2 where T denotes the number of observations and R2
denotes the coefficient of determination.
Step 4: If λ > c1−α, c1−α being the (1−α)-quantile of a χ2-distribution
(c0.95 = 3.841146), I restart at step 1, now regressing this vari-
able and the constant on my initial dependent variable.
Step 5: I repeat steps 1 to 5 until λ < c1−α
The results of an OLS-regression where I used this model selection procedure
are reported in Table 5.24.
Table 5.24: Regression A, final model. Dependent variable: Share passed on
by A
Variable OLS Tobit
Constant 0.305 0.285
(0.000) (0.000)
Gender -0.117 -0.141
(0.002) (0.001)
Income1 0.057 0.064
(0.006) (0.006)
SocInt 0.169 0.183
(0.000) (0.000)
Again, I used income adjustment method 1 for the regression because com-
paring the different income modifications for the final OLS model shows that
income adjustment method 1 performs best, see 5.25. My analysis reveals that
gender has a significant effect. Females pass on around 11 percentage points
more of the pie than males. Note further that female candidates were un-
derrepresented in treatments 2 and 3. I had about 25% females in the pooled
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Table 5.25: Comparison of regressions with different income adjustment meth-
ods - Final model
Method R2 P-value income
1 0.172 0.006
2 0.161 0.018
3 0.153 0.045
4 0.164 0.014
sample of treatments 2 and 3, compared to 31% and 48% females in treatments
1 and 4, respectively. These two facts explain the even stronger effect of social
interaction in the regression analysis (significant at the 1%-level) increasing
the share passed on by A by almost 17 percentage points while comparing
simple treatment means yields a difference of only 14 percentage points. The
reason for this is the non-weighted sample. Since women tend to be more
generous, the social interaction effect is underestimated by comparing pure
sample means if women are underrepresented in these samples.
Also, the regression analysis reveals that income plays a role. Its impact,
however, is considerably smaller than that of both gender and social inter-
action. If income is increased by 150¿ (the income difference between the
different categories), subjects A pass on 4 percentage points more.
As is typical for regressions using dictator game data, the adjusted R-
squared (0.16) is rather low. Thus personal data do matter, but their predictive
power is not overwhelming. A White test rejects heteroscedasticity (p-value
0.094), hence in this respect OLS is a suitable tool.
I also employ the Tobit regression method that accounts for the two-stage
nature of the decision process in dictator games (see section 3.6). However,
the results summarized in Table 5.23 remain almost unchanged.8
8Note, that in a Tobit regression the regression coefficients can no longer be interpreted
as elasticities.
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Chapter 6
Analysis of the second
generation’s allocation choice
In this chapter, I analyze the decisions of subjects B, the second generation,
with the same methodology as for the first generation. I start with descriptive
statistics, then I test for differences between treatments. I also check for some
treatment differences, where the subjects taking the whole pie are excluded.
Finally, I investigate factors determining B’s decision by running regressions
using the asked personal data.
6.1 Treatment comparison entire sample
6.1.1 Descriptive analysis
Table 6.1 reports the results for descriptive statistics of the different treat-
ments. Treatments ‘4Bself’ and ‘4Bdice’ refer to the subsamples of treatment
4 where either candidates A or the random process via a 20-sided dice de-
termines (1 − α), the amount to be passed on. Again, I find that in the
Table 6.1: Descriptive results allocation choice B
Treatment Mean shares passed on by B Obs
1B 0.29 44
2B 0.37 35
3B 0.39 35
4B 0.20 64
4Bself 0.19 28
4Bdice 0.20 36
treatments with social interaction subjects pass on more than in those with-
out. Interestingly, in treatment 4, subjects B are substantially less generous
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than in treatment 1, although the average share passed on by A was almost
the same in both treatments and hence cannot explain the difference.
The results from the four treatments are displayed as histograms in Figure
6.1. Note that if subjects A pass on zero, there are no observations for subjects
B. Hence we have fewer observations for subjects B compared to subjects A.
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Figure 6.1: Frequency distribution of B’s shares, treatments 1-4
In treatments 1 through 3 the shares passed on from subjects B to C peak
at shares of 0.5 of the remaining pie (1 − α). In treatment 4, by contrast,
the most frequent share passed on by subject B lies between 0 and 0.1. One
subject from treatment 2 passed on the complete pie. Her explanation (that
she trusted C) did not make sense to me. Another subject B from treatment
4 received 13¿ from A and then passed on 8¿ (=62%) to C. Her explanation
was that 5 and 8 were her ”lucky numbers.” Interestingly, she chose to take
the smaller amount for herself, but did not give any explanation for that.
6.1.2 Comparison of distributions
When analyzing the allocation behavior of subjects B there is an additional
factor potentially influencing the choice made by B. Previous experimental
evidence from, say, ultimatum games (see e.g. Gu¨th et al., 1982) shows that
subjects tend to reciprocate on A’s choice if they have the chance to do so.
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Normally, reciprocity can be observed among the same subjects. Reciprocity
then often follows a ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy: Once a person X has treated person
Y nicely, Y reciprocates by treating person X nicely in return. In my case,
however, subject B cannot apply this strategy to subject A but can only dictate
the share allocated to a third party, here subject C. Even if C has not been
involved in A’s decision, B may want to reciprocate somehow and, therefore,
reciprocates on C. Put differently, if A behaves generously (greedily) towards
B, B may tend to be generous (greedy) to C.
I call this undirected reciprocity the social history effect. This effect could
(and in fact does) have a strong impact on B’s choice and, as a consequence,
could make it impossible to distinguish between this effect and the treatment
effect using treatment comparisons. Spearman’s rank correlation test strongly
confirms the existence of the social history effect with a p-value of 0.000.
Nonetheless, the results from treatment comparisons are presented in Table
6.2, since they show some interesting features.
Table 6.2: Treatment comparison B
Treatments compared MW AD ES
The effect of social
interaction
1B vs 2B -1.291 1.545 11.755
(0.197) (0.167) (0.019)
1B vs 3B -2.159 3.596 5.613
(0.031) (0.013) (0.230)
2B vs 4B -4.144 7.872 18.958
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
3B vs 4B -4.792 11.330 33.108
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Possibility of a
non-human allocator
1B vs 4B -2.386 3.670 17.548
(0.017) (0.012) (0.002)
4Bself vs 4Bdice 0.089 0.492 2.537
(0.929) (0.766) (0.638)
Social interaction
before or after choice
2B vs 3B 1.032 1.129 4.914
(0.302) (0.296) (0.296)
Bs choice vs.
traditional dictator
1B vs TDG 0.700 1.100 4.036
(0.484) (0.308) (0.401)
1B vs FHSS -1.596 1.916 13.997
(0.111) (0.100) (0.007)
1B vs HMSS 1.034 1.669 9.943
(0.301) (0.139) (0.041)
Similarly to the choice of A, I find that the outcomes from the treatments
with social interaction, i.e. 2 and 3, differ from those without, i.e. treatments
1 and 4, the only exception is that treatment 1 and 2 do not differ any longer
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for the MW- and AD-statistic. Note, that for comparing treatment 1 and 3,
the ES statistic is not significant any longer, either. The differences between
treatments are not necessarily triggered by the social interaction itself but
could also be motivated by the social history effect. Again, it does not matter
if social interaction takes place before or after the allocation choice.
When comparing the shares chosen by B to be passed on to C in treatment
1 (as the only recipient left) with the shares passed on by subject A in the
replication treatment ‘TDG’, I do not find a significant difference. Hence, the
second generation in a three-person dictator game does not behave significantly
different from the allocator in a traditional dictator game. The same holds if
I use the results by FHSS and HMSS instead of my replication TDG.1
Unlike A’s allocation behavior, I find that the outcomes of treatments 1
and 4 are now significantly different. This is rather surprising, since one would
expect the decision set-up for type-B subjects to be not much different from
that for type-A subjects. One might surmise that candidates B could somehow
infer from the amount they observe whether the decision was taken by subject
A or by the random process since subjects sometimes tend to choose prominent
numbers and as a consequence will behave differently if the random process
is operative. Looking at Table 6.3, I see that the pattern of shares chosen by
A is not significantly different from the pattern generated by the dice. Note,
however, that the MW and the AD statistics are close to being significant.
Table 6.3: Comparison of the subsamples: Subject vs. the dice in treatment
4a
Treatments compared MW AD ES
4Aself vs 4Adice -1.668 1.742 4.849
(0.095) (0.127) (0.303)
This evidence is further confirmed by comparing the outcomes of the sub-
samples for B’s behavior in treatment 4, where either subject A (‘4Bself’) or
the dice (‘4Bdice’) was responsible for the share passed on by the first genera-
tion to B. Here I do not find any significant difference (see Table ??). Hence in
treatment 4, subjects B were not able to distinguish whether subject A or the
random process was responsible for the division, or at least it had no bearing
on subject B′s decision.
So, there must be something else involved to explain the differences in B’s
behavior in treatments 1 and 4. The random process somehow seems to trigger
1Employing the data from FHSS and HMMS (instead of my ‘TDG’) in this comparison,
I find a significant difference for the ES statistic. I ignore this result, since comparing pooled
data from FHSS to those of HMMS also yields a significant difference under the ES statistic.
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different behavior. According to Malle and Knobe (1997), people distinguish
between behavior they perceive to be intentional or unintentional. For this
situation, this means that if subject B knew or presumed that subject A was
responsible for the division of the initial pie, it would make sense to reciprocate
on that action, whereas it would not make sense if B knew or presumed that
the pie had been divided by a random process. Blount (1995) confirms the
important role of attributing intentions. In a series of ultimatum games, the
average minimum acceptable offer declined significantly if the proposer was
replaced by a random process.
This explanation, however, is not fully able to explain the difference be-
tween the two treatments 1 and 4, because on average the reciprocity effects
should cancel out. Some of the subjects A have been generous, some have
been greedy, but the average share passed on by A was approximately equal
in both treatments 1 and 4. Hence something else must be operate. In a
series of one-shot sequential experiments (where reciprocity is possible) Char-
ness and Rabin (2002) find that friendly behavior has almost no influence on
the response of the second mover and thus almost no explanatory power for
respondents’ behavior, whereas different levels of unfriendly behavior are re-
ciprocated by unfriendly behavior. Offerman (2002) confirms this evidence so
far. Additionally, in his study, it matters to subjects whether an action is
chosen intentionally by another subject or by nature. If a negative action is
chosen intentionally, subjects typically reciprocate strongly, while remaining
largely neutral in the face of a positive intentional action. Conducting another
psychological experiment, Knobe (2006) shows that some subjects are more
inclined to perceive an action by another person as intentional rather than
as a random by-product, if that action has a bad rather than a good effect.
Applying this evidence to my experiment, I can interpret the results in the
following way: If, in treatment 4, subjects B receive a high share, they tend to
ignore this possible generosity by A since the random process may have been
responsible as well. After receiving a small share, however, B candidates are
more likely to attribute this result to the greed of A and not to the random
process and will then indirectly reciprocate negatively in their behavior to C.
This reasoning is in line with my data from the questionnaires, where sub-
jects explained their allocation behavior. In treatment 1, 9.1% of the subjects
explained their behavior by some kind of positive reciprocity. In treatment 4,
by contrast, no one named positive reciprocity as an explanation, while 4.7%
of the subjects explained their behavior with reference to negative reciprocity.
Note that in treatment 1, 15.9% of the subjects referred to negative reciprocity
to explain their behavior. Thus my results are in line with previous evidence
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showing that negative reciprocity is stronger than positive reciprocity.
Now, I analyze differences in allocation behavior with regard to gender for
subjects B. Mean share passed is rather similar for both males and females
except for treatment 1 (see Table 6.4).
Table 6.4: Descriptive results of B’s choice with regard to gender
Treatment Mean share Obs males Mean share Obs females
passed by males passed by females
1B 0.25 28 0.36 16
2B 0.36 21 0.38 14
3B 0.37 23 0.43 12
4B 0.18 33 0.21 31
4BDice 0.17 20 0.23 16
4BSelf 0.20 13 0.19 15
Testing for gender effects, I do not find any significant differences between
females and males in any of the treatments (see Tables 6.5). The gender effect
in treatment 2 when A allocated vanishes, possibly being dominated by the
social history effect.
Table 6.5: Testing for the impact of gender on B’s choice
Treatments compared MW AD ES
1B -1.246 1.720 4.722
(0.213) (0.128) (0.317)
2B 0.190 0.526 3.540
(0.849) (0.738) (0.472)
3B 0 1.118 8.230
(1) (0.303) (0.084)
4B -0.422 0.728 2.248
(0.673) (0.539) (0.690)
4BSelf -0.305 0.556 3.251
(0.760) (0.712) (0.517)
4BDice -0.934 0.668 2.268
(0.350) (0.600) (0.687)
Other factors, such as income and subject of study, do not yield any sig-
nificant results either when using Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient.
Comparing A’s and B’s choice (within treatments) yields significant dif-
ferences for all treatments, except in treatment 1, the MW statistic is not
significant, see Table 6.6. Obviously, B passes on significantly less than A. I
relegated the comparison of the treatments of the male and female subsamples
to the appendix, see section 11.4, because this comparison does from my point
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Table 6.6: Comparison of A’s and B’s allocation choice
Treatments MW AD ES
1 1.192 3.029 20.140
(0.233) (0.025) (0.000)
2 3.220 6.650 27.190
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
3 3.245 5.774 33.011
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
4 -2.828 4.230 9.652
(0.005) (0.006) (0.047)
of view not lead to insightful results. The same holds for the comparison of
A’a and B’s behavior for the male and female subsamples.
6.1.3 Comparison of proportions passing zero
Taking a look at proportions of subjects passing zero shows that there is a
difference between the treatments without and with social interaction. Only
a small share of subjects in the treatments with social interaction took the
whole pie while in the treatments without social interaction this share was
substantial (see Table 6.7).
Table 6.7: Proportion of subjects B passing zero
Treatment Proportion passing zero
1B 0.27
2B 0.03
3B 0.09
4B 0.30
4Bself 0.32
4Bice 0.28
Repl 0.25
FHSS 0.30
HMSS 0.21
A comparison of proportions of subjects passing zero in the different treat-
ments using Fisher’s exact test confirms this impression, see Table 6.8. Treatment
2 is significantly different from treatment 1 and from 4, while between the other
treatments there is no significant difference. Treatment 3 is marginally differ-
ent from treatment 1 and 4, respectively.
The difference between proportions of males and females passing zero seems
to be substantial, too, at least for Treatment 1-2 (see Table 6.9). But the
comparison of proportions of males and females passing nothing shows no
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Table 6.8: Comparison of proportion of subjects B passing zero
Treatments compared P-value from Fisher exact test
1B vs 2B 0.013
1B vs 3B 0.092
1B vs 4B 1
2B vs 3B 0.615
2B vs 4B 0.007
3B vs 4B 0.073
1B vs Repl 0.829
1B vs FHSS 0.832
1B vs HMSS 1
Table 6.9: Proportion of male and female Bs passing zero
Treatment Male: Female:
Proportion passing zero Proportion passing zero
1B 0.27 0.13
2B 0.13 0
3B 0.05 0
4B 0.36 0.32
4BDice 0.23 0.40
4BSelf 0.30 0.25
significant difference (see Table 6.10), the effects seems to be too weak to show
up with these sample sizes.
Table 6.10: Comparison of proportion of male and female Bs passing zero
Treatment P-value Fisher exact test
1B 0.300
2B 1
3B 0.54
4B 0.798
6.2 Treatment comparison, including only Bs
passing a positive amount
Comparing samples where the Bs passing on zero are excluded does not reveal
new insights. Just note, that some minor results that have been significant
turn out to be not significant any longer. I skip mentioning these because a
useful interpretation is very hard. For the sake of completeness I relegate these
comparisons to the appendix.
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6.3 Regression analysis of B’s choice
As mentioned earlier, by virtue of the social history effect, type-B subjects’
decisions may be influenced by the varying amounts passed on by A. This
effect must not be confused with a possible scale effect, which according to
FHSS would be of minor importance. Hence I again use a regression analysis
at this point to explain what factors determine B′s behavior. With the share
passed on by B as the dependent variable, I use a similar regression equation
as used for A, extended by some further regressors. In order to capture the
social history effect, I add the share being passed on by A to B, (1−α). Addi-
tionally, I include two dummies more expected2 and less expected3, indicating
whether B’s share passed on by A falls short of or exceeds B′s expectations,
respectively.4 I obtain the following regression equation:
(1− β) = β0 + β1 · (1− α) + β2 · less expected+ β3 ·more expected
+β4 · gender + β5 · income+ β6 · age
+β7 · subject+ β8 · sust+ β9 · treatment+ ε
Using OLS yields the results from Table 6.11.
Applying once again the model selection procedure by Herwartz (2007), I
obtain the final model implicit in Table 6.12.
Replacing less expected by a regressor that captures the expected share of
money passed by B reduces R2 from 0.293 to 0.250. Hence, I abstain from
doing so.
I observe that the social history effect represented by the variable (1 − α)
and indicating how much A passes on to B is highly significant and much
stronger than any other effect. If A increases the share to be passed to the
B by 1 percentage point, B reciprocates by increasing the share passed on
to C by almost 0.4 percentage points. This finding is confirmed by 18.6% of
the subjects B explaining their behavior by reciprocity (note that more than
one explanation was possible). Interestingly, 10.3% of the subjects A obviously
anticipated this social history effect. They explained their choice by expressing
the hope that they would act as a standard for B.
Gender may play a role because females are again slightly more generous
than males (the result being significant close to the 5% significance level). How-
ever, in the regression the variable gender was discarded by the model selection
2Indicating that B expected more than B actually received.
3Indicating that B expected less than B actually received.
4Note that subjects where asked about their expectations after being notified about the
share they received, see section 7 for a discussion on that matter.
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Table 6.11: Regression B, initial model. Dependent variable: Share passed on
by B
Variable OLS Tobit
Constant 0.099 0.007
(0.273) (0.948)
1− α 0.392 0.521
(0.000) (0.000)
Gender -0.048 -0.056
(0.084) (0.085)
Income 0.009 0.012
(0.506) (0.463)
Less expected -0.148 -0.175
(0.000) (0.000)
More expected 0.042 0.058
(0.243) (0.172)
Age 0.003 0.004
(0.333) (0.343)
Science -0.044 -0.051
(0.253) (0.264)
Economics -0.038 -0.052
(0.227) (0.163)
Humanities -0.060 -0.059
(0.263) (0.344)
Sustainability 0.039 0.046
(0.154) (0.155)
Exp2 0.052 0.071
(0.203) (0.140)
Exp3 0.061 0.075
(0.141) (0.126)
Exp4 -0.085 -0.086
(0.014) (0.035)
process. Income is no longer significant. Age, study subject, and knowledge
about the concept of sustainability are not important in this regression, either,
nor is it important whether the candidate expected more money.
Interestingly, however, the expectations of subjects B about the generosity
of A play an important role. I observe that subjects who had been positively
surprised by A’s choice (less expected) reciprocate negatively by passing on 16
percentage points less. At first glance, this result seems to be counterintuitive,
as I found a strong propensity to reciprocate positively. There are two possible
explanations for this paradox, though. First, subjects B may have an a-priori
idea about how much C should obtain, say 33.3%. If A passes on more than
expected, say 70% instead of 66.6%, B may feel inclined to keep the extra
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Table 6.12: Regression B, final model. Dependent variable: Shares passed on
by B
Variable OLS Tobit
Constant 0.207 0.145
(0.000) (0.002)
1− α 0.386 0.502
(0.000) (0.000)
Less expected -0.163 -0.193
(0.000) (0.000)
Exp4 -0.107 -0.117
(0.000) (0.001)
share of 3.3%. An alternative explanation is based on a self-selection effect.
In an environment where subjects have no experience about how dictators
customarily divide a pie, the adequate heuristic would be to infer from yourself.
Being a selfish type, one would expect others to be selfish, too, and vice versa.
Thus the value of the expectation dummy can be interpreted as a proxy for
subject type. Under this hypothesis, there is a positive correlation between
being greedy and being positively surprised. In other words, if the variable
less expected takes the value 1, it is likely to pick a selfish type that would pass
on little anyway. This finding about subjects having different preferences with
respect to altruism is consistent with similar results obtained by Andreoni and
Miller (2002). Those authors distinguished between three types of preferences
among subjects: The selfish type, whose utility depends only on her own payoff;
the Rawlsian type, whose utility depends on her and the recipient’s payoff and
is represented by a Leontief utility function; and finally the utilitarian type,
who considers the allocator’s and the recipient’s payoff as perfect substitutes.
Another interesting result I have obtained is that social interaction does not
matter any longer, since the dummies for treatment 2 and 3 are not significant.
Hence the results from the treatment comparison must be interpreted in the
following way: There is a treatment effect that results not so much from the
social interaction between B and C, but from the previous social interaction
between A and B. This effect is transferred via the social history effect.
Finally, the outcomes from treatment 4 turn out to be significantly different
from the outcomes in all other treatments (almost at the 1% significance level),
confirming the results from the treatment comparison in the former section.
The adjusted R-squared is 0.29 which is considerably higher than 0.16,
the corresponding value of the regression for subjects A. I attribute this to
the strong influence of reciprocity. A White test rejects heteroscedasticity (p-
value of 0.738), hence OLS is suitable. Running a Tobit regression as well (the
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results of which are also reported in Table 6.12), I observe that significance
levels improve slightly for the dummy variable representing B′s expectations.
One problem in my analysis may be possible multicollinearity between the
variables (1 − α) and less expected since both regressors are related. If α is
low, B receives a large amount. As a consequence, it is likely that B expected
less. Correlation between α and less expected is -0.3766 indicating a medium
negative relation. Farrar and Glauber (1967) cite a rule of thumb which says
that multicollinearity is a severe problem starting from a correlation coefficient
> |0.8| (which is far from my value) but mention, that this rule has to be used
with care. Farrar and Glauber (1967) also noted that the R2 should be larger
than the correlation between the two variables which is not the case in my
analysis. Marquardt (1977) states that the variance inflation factor5, VIF, of
a variable should be between 1.0 and 10. The VIF of less expected is 1.15 and
hence very far away from the values > 10 where multicollinearity problems
start. Note, that if multicollinearity is present, the estimation remains best
linear unbiased (BLUE) and not affected in its forecasting properties for the
dependent variable. But: The interpretation of the regressors and the value
of the regressors could change dramatically, since the effect of collinearity and
relation to the dependent variable cannot be distinguished in the estimation
process.
5Interpretation of the VIF according to Maddala (1988): The ratio of the actual variance
of the regressor to what the variance of the regressor would have been if the variable was
uncorrelated with the remaining variables. In the best case, this would be 1.
94
Chapter 7
Analysis of subjects’
expectations
In form 2, subjects were also asked about their expectation on the amount of
money they received. The results for B ’s expectation are reported in Table
7.1. Subjects B were on average pretty reliable in there expectations on the
Table 7.1: Expectations B on A’s allocation choice
Treatment Mean share Mean Variance
received by B expectations B expectations B
1 0.36 0.39 0.23
2 0.48 0.44 0.18
3 0.49 0.51 0.24
4 0.31 0.35 0.18
4self 0.33 0.38 0.17
4dice 0.30 0.32 0.19
amount of money that was allocated, however, the variance of the expectations
was comparably large. But this result has to be treated carefully. Subjects
B had to report their expectation after they have been informed about A’s
allocation. Hence, anchoring1 could play a role such that there is a possible
adjustment of subjects in the right direction. I decided to not asking subjects
about their expectations ex-ante because this would have introduced a different
factor possibly influencing the allocation behavior and the allocation choice was
paramount for this study while expectations where of ancillary importance.
1Anchoring means that subjects, if they have to estimate a value, take an initial value
into account if they make their estimates and hence adjust these according to the staring
value. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) have investigated this effect: In presence of subjects,
a wheel of fortune was spun. Subjects were paid for accuracy. They asked e.g. a group of
subjects to estimate the share of African countries in the UN. As an example for groups
receiving a 10 by the wheel their median estimate was 25, while groups receiving a 65,
median estimate was 45.
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Also candidates C were asked about their expectations (see Table 7.2).
Subjects C were also very reliable in their predictions but also the C can-
Table 7.2: Expectations C on B’s allocation choice
Treatment Mean share Mean Variance
received by C expectations C expectations C
1 0.11 0.09 0.10
2 0.18 0.12 0.11
3 0.20 0.18 0.12
4 0.07 0.12 0.12
4self 0.08 0.11 0.12
4dice 0.06 0.12 0.13
didates were informed about the allocation before they had to report their
expectations. Note, that there is a rather high variance among the C candi-
date’s expectation, too.
Regressing (1− α) and (1− β) and personal data on the expected amount
of money and applying the model selection process by Herwartz (2007, see
5.3), I obtain the following regression model (see Table 7.3). R2 = 0.201 is
Table 7.3: Regression results with expectation B as dependent variable
Variable OLS
Constant 0.227
(0.000)
(1− β) 0.351
(0.000)
(1− α) 0.205
(0.007)
rather low. The strong impact of (1 − β), the share subject B passed on,
can again be explained by the idea that the share you take indicates that you
are of a certain type, (see 6.3). Hence, if you passed on more (meaning that
you are a generous type) you also expected more. The regressor (1 − α) is
highly significant, thus anchoring is at play, here. Interestingly, the treatment
dummies are not incorporated in the model selection process. Possibly their
influence is absorbed by (1− α).
I skip showing the regression results for the ‘expectation of C on the share
passed on by B because the regression conveys no new insights.
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Chapter 8
Analysis of subjects’
motivations for their allocation
choice
After the allocation choice, subjects where asked to explain their behavior. The
question was open, hence there was a vast array of answers. Of course it would
have been possible to let subjects choose within a list of reasons. But maybe it
would not have been possible to anticipate all the reasons why subjects chose
their allocation and hence the open question format was used. I categorized
subjects’ explanations. Often people mentioned more than one reason. I in-
cluded all explanations in the different categories hence the categories are not
mutually exclusive. A closer explanation of the different categories is attached
in the appendix, see 11.6.1, 11.6.2 and 11.6.3. The number in brackets behind
the category refers to the explanations in the appendix.
8.1 The first generation’s explanations
Table 8.1 gives an overview on the used explanations by the first generation.
First, I take a look at the explanations aggregated over all treatments. The
explanation used mostly by the subjects A is ‘fairness’. A share of 0.35 of the
subjects explained their behavior with this reason. Fairness could either be
attributed to the inequity aversion preferences by Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
and Bolton and Ockenfels (1999) or to the ‘social welfare’ preferences by An-
dreoni and Miller (2202) and Charness and Rabin (2002), see section 2.2.13. A
share of 0.24 of the subjects used egoism as explanation. Often, subjects used
more than two reasons to explain their behavior and especially frequent is the
combination of fairness and selfishness, hence I have a rather low support for
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Table 8.1: Explanation A
Explanation A T1 T2 T3 T4 all
Fairness (1) 0.185 0.450 0.538 0.273 0.349
Selfishness (2) 0.278 0.200 0.179 0.303 0.241
B and/or C should receive >0 (3) 0.204 0.175 0.077 0.273 0.181
Luck (4) 0.259 0.125 0.154 0.061 0.163
Personal neediness (5) 0.167 0.075 0.051 0.242 0.133
Role model for B (6) 0.056 0.050 0.179 0.121 0.096
Anonymity (7) 0.204 0.025 0 0.121 0.096
Others the same (8) 0.074 0.050 0.077 0.121 0.078
Power (9) 0.093 0.050 0.026 0.121 0.072
Unclear answer (10) 0.111 0.025 0 0.061 0.054
B plays twice (11) 0 0.050 0.179 0 0.054
Norm (intrinsic) (12) 0.019 0.125 0 0.061 0.048
Same effort (13) 0.074 0 0.077 0 0.042
Participation to earn (14) 0.019 0.025 0.077 0 0.030
Rationality (15) 0.074 0.025 0 0 0.030
Maintain incentive (16) 0 0.100 0 0 0.024
Norm (17) 0 0 0.051 0.061 0.024
Maintain incentive not important (18) 0 0.075 0 0 0.018
C should receive >0 (19) 0.037 0 0 0 0.012
C does not know (20) 0 0 0.026 0.030 0.012
Did not get to know C (21) 0 0 0.051 0 0.012
Others are not needy (22) 0.037 0 0 0 0.012
Rules of game accepted (23) 0 0 0.026 0.030 0.012
Reward for cooperation (24) 0 0 0.026 0 0.006
Have ro play vis-a´-vis with B (25) 0 0.025 0 0 0.006
the classical economic model of an agent with a utility function having his own
payoff as single argument. A share of 0.18 used the explanation ‘B and/or C
should receive >0’ which is rather similar to the ‘fairness’ category but these
explanations have not explicitly mentioned fairness. Also, the connotation is
little different: There would be an altruism term in A’s utility function but
A does not necessarily care about an equitable outcome, it is only important
that B and C will not end up with nothing. This preference type refers to the
‘warm glow of giving’ preferences by Sadrieh (2003), see section 2.6.2. Obvi-
ously, for some subjects (a share of 0.16) it does matter if they earned the right
to be in position A or if it was pure chance if they were in this position. This
is in line with the results by HMSS (1994) who found that it made a difference
if the entitlement to be in the position of the allocator was earned or the result
of a random process. A share of 0.13 claimed that personal neediness governed
their behavior. This might also be seen as a confirmation of the models where
others’ payoff is included in the utility function: Even though the subjects
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where selfish, they said that if it would not be costly, they would like to help
B and C or if they had more money than at the present stage, they would
be more generous. The expressed ‘Hope to be role model for B’ by a share of
0.1 of the As confirms that A anticipates that B is prone to reciprocity. This
stresses the importance of the model by Charness and Rabin who incorporate
a reciprocity term in their preferences. Anonymity does matter. It is clear
to see that we do care more about people we know personally, so being more
generous with people we interacted socially would make sense. The study by
Andreoni (2007), where the possible veil of hiding behind a random process
lead to less generosity, confirms this evidence (see section 2.2.15). A share of
0.1 of the subjects referred to anonymity, explaining their choice. Note, that
for treatment 2 and 3 this explanation does not make much sense1, hence,
the overall share of people who think that anonymity is important should be
almost 0.2. ‘Others the same’ is a rather collectivistic explanation by a share
of 0.08 of the subjects. It seems that some subjects would like to conform to
other people’s behavior. This explanation is used both by subjects who take
more than the fair share and by subjects who take less. ‘Power’ is used by a
share of 0.07 of the subjects. Here, the mere possibility to behave unfair seems
to be justification enough to do so.
When analyzing explanations with regard to treatments, I find some dif-
ferences between treatments. ‘Fairness’ plays a much bigger role for the social
interaction treatments while ‘Selfishness’ is much more important for the treat-
ments without social interaction. Obviously, social interaction seems to trigger
fairness while it oppresses selfishness. ‘B and/or C should receive an amount
>0’ was used when rather low amounts of money were passed to B and C
which was more often the case for treatment 1 and 4 and hence it appears
more often in this treatments. Neediness does also appear much more often in
treatment 1 and 4. Since the share of people that are needy should be roughly
equal in all treatments, subjects seem to feel compelled to use this explanation
more often if they were greedy, to justify their behavior and maybe maintain
a positive self-image.
The explanations for the replication of the TDG are roughly in line with
treatment 1, but more subjects refer to fairness while less to selfishness, see
Table 8.2.
1The one subject in treatment 3, who mentioned anonymity referred to the fact that she
did not get to know the personal data of B.
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Table 8.2: Explanation A in the TDG
Explanation A Replication
Fairness 0.300
Selfishness 0.175
B and/or C should receive > 0.200
Luck 0.050
Personal neediness 0.175
Anonymity 0.15
S.th. unfair in real life (33) 0.05
Adequate Pay B (34) 0.05
’Positive Empathy’ (35) 0.05
’Negative Empathy’ (36) 0.025
Others the same 0.025
Power 0.025
Rationality 0.025
Gift (37) 0.025
Christian values (38) 0.025
Game 0.025
8.2 The second generation’s explanations
Table 8.3 gives an overview on the used explanations by the second generation.
The analysis all treatments reveals that also most of the subjects B explain
their behavior with ’fairness’, though only a share of 0.31 overall used it com-
pared to a share of 0.34 of the A’s. ‘Selfishness’ is second with an overall share
of 0.21. A share of 0.19 justified their behavior with reciprocity. Given that
reciprocity was named, a share of 0.59 used positive reciprocity and share of
0.38 used negative reciprocity as explanation. The rest imitated A’s behavior
by taking the same share as A, hence not allowing a categorization of reci-
procity in terms of positive or negative. ‘Personal neediness’ is still mentioned
frequently (a share of 0.11), while the importance of ‘luck’ as explanation is
greatly reduced from a share of 0.16 for the As to 0.03 for the Bs. The im-
portance that a positive amount of money should be passed on is reduced to a
share of 0.11. A share of 0.10 used the argument that there is not much left to
pass on while ‘power’ is only used by a share of 0.03. Anonymity is not very
important any longer, either, only a share of 0.06 of the subjects used it as
explanation.
Comparing the different treatments with each other yields results that are
partly similar to the analysis of A’s behavior. Fairness is much more important
in the treatments with social interaction, again in treatment 3 most of the
people use this explanation. Selfishness is most important in the treatments
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Table 8.3: Explanation B
Explanation B T1 T2 T3 T4 all
Fairness (1) 0.250 0.371 0.514 0.203 0.309
Selfishness (2) 0.205 0.171 0.143 0.370 0.208
Reciprocity (26) 0.295 0.229 0.343 0.063 0.208
Personal neediness (5) 0.136 0.086 0.029 0.156 0.112
Positive reciprocity (5) 0.091 0.200 0.257 0 0.112
C should receive >0 (3) 0.068 0.057 0.029 0.188 0.101
Not much left to pass (27) 0.136 0.086 0 0.125 0.096
Unclear (10) 0.045 0.143 0.057 0.094 0.084
Negative reciprocity (5) 0.159 0.029 0.086 0.047 0.079
Anonymity (7) 0.114 0 0 0.078 0.056
Wanted certain amount (28) 0.068 0 0 0.047 0.034
Power (9) 0.023 0.029 0.057 0.031 0.034
Luck (4) 0.045 0 0 0.047 0.028
Maintain incentive (16) 0 0.114 0 0 0.022
B plays twice (29) 0 0 0.114 0 0.022
Norm (intrinsic) (12) 0.045 0.029 0 0.016 0.022
Norm (17) 0.023 0.057 0.029 0.000 0.022
’Got to know each other’ (30) 0 0 0.086 0 0.017
’Rationality’ (15) 0.045 0 0 0.016 0.017
Compassion (31) 0 0.029 0 0.031 0.017
’Others the same’ (8) 0 0 0 0.031 0.011
Participation to earn (14) 0 0.029 0 0.016 0.011
Same effort (13) 0.023 0 0 0 0.006
’C does not know (20) 0 0.029 0 0 0.006
without social interaction, here, treatment 4 has the highest share. Reciprocity
is mentioned roughly with the same frequency in treatment 1 to 3 while in
treatment 4 it is rarely used, which makes sense since subjects should not be
able to tell apart if a random process or a subject allocated.
Again, social interaction seems to trigger the desire to be fair while re-
ducing selfishness. The higher share of subjects using positive reciprocity for
the treatments with social interaction could have two reasons: Since subjects
passed on more money on average in these treatments, it is likely that posi-
tive reciprocity is triggered more often. But also the social interaction effect
could enhance the desire to reciprocate positively. However, social interaction
may also evoke a stronger propensity to reciprocate negatively because you
feel particularly upset if someone you interacted with is unfair to you.
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8.3 A note on the validity of subjects’ answers
Since subjects explanations were not linked to any incentive scheme that re-
wards answering truly, one might doubt the validity of the answers. Subjects
may feel uncomfortably reporting the true motivations and hence make up ex-
planations that they perceive as socially more adequate. However, an incentive
scheme that rewards answering truly is unfeasible, hence, this is the only way
to obtain insight into subjects’ motivations.
It is even unclear if the stated explanations by subjects are the real causes
since subjects may generally not be aware of the underlying mechanism that
is responsible for their decision. This claim might sound a little presumptuous
but maybe my point becomes clearer after an example. This example is not
directly related to resource allocation but to moral reasoning, which should
also be part of the allocation decision. Consider the following example first
introduce by Foot (1967): There are two scenarios, in both scenarios there is
train out of control and will kill five workmen on the tracks if nothing is done.
In the first scenario, a person is standing beside a switch, that will turn the
train on a sideway, thereby killing one person. In the second scenario, a person
is standing on a bridge together with a heavy man, who would, if thrown on
the tracks, stop the train. Mikhail (2000) asked subjects, if it was morally
permissible to throw the switch and if it was morally permissible to push the
man down the tracks. An overwhelming majority of the subjects considered
acting in the first scenario permissible while in the second scenario acting was
not permissible, the difference was highly significant. The interesting aspect
here is, that although there seemed to be a clear pattern, the subjects asked to
justify their choice were not conscious of the underlying operational principle.
They mostly used inconclusive answers like referring to intuition. Mikhail
(2000) states that there is a moral grammar that is used by all subjects. This
concept is the same as for using language in one’s mother tongue, where the
governing principles are, even if correctly applied, not necessarily consciously
known. Mikhail (2000) claims that comparing the two scenarios, subjects
unconsciously refer to the moral grammar: On the one hand, the negative
consequence in the first scenario is only foreseen while in the second it is
intended2. In addition, in the first scenario the required action is neutral
(flipping a switch, which is an impersonal act) while the second involves a
negative, personal action (pushing a man down a bridge). Of course the moral
ramifications seem to be more clear cut in allocation games, nevertheless it can
2In the first scenario, flipping the switch is the desired action, the persons death is a
foreseen consequence. In the second scenario you stop the train by killing the heavy man.
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be doubted if the numerous reasons used as explanations are really the true
motivations or if there are not very few principles, governing subjects behavior
in a partly unconscious manner.
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Chapter 9
Suggestions for future
experimental studies
Experiments in natural science are usually conducted in a controlled laboratory
setup. Everything is hold constant1 and only one factor is varied to investigate
its impact. Experimental economics try to ensure a similar procedure, although
this is much more difficult since we work with human beings. Nonetheless, it
is tried to achieve a procedure that is standardized to ensure that only the
treatment variations and not any other, uncontrolled variations affect subjects
behavior.
That starts with the subject recruitment. I always used the same flyer to
recruit subjects. To facilitate the recruitment process, I used an online-sign-
up procedure from the second session on. Here, after having noticed some
problems, I introduced some additional features in the recruitment process.
One important issue is absenteeism of subjects, especially if you need multiples
of three. Usually, a share of 0.1 to 0.2 of the subjects does not show up.
Hence, I started to recruit reserve candidates that received the show-up fee and
participated only if needed. I also started sending a reminder one day before
the experiment. Since some subjects tended to come late, I also included a
notice in the reminder, that subjects who were late could not participate and
did not receive any payoff.
With regard to the procedure, I had a protocol, but the protocol was not
as explicit as it should have been. Every word and sentence that is used in the
procedure should be standardized according to protocol. Still, I do not believe
that this less detailed protocol had a measurable impact.
There is a shortcoming with respect to the asked income in the question-
naires. I should have asked for the income at disposal after paying rent from
1The well-known ‘ceteribus paribus’ approach.
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the begin on. Also, it would have been better to ask for the amount of money
and not to use categories.
Another important issue is the payment of the subjects. The experimenter
(not the other subjects) got to know the subjects’ name during the experiment.
It would have been better to preserve subjects’ anonymity using simply A, B,
and C and the corresponding numbers. I also paid subjects within groups A,
B, and C together. It would have been better to pay all subjects privately
which is standard for such experiments. This could be accomplished best by
using envelopes that can be picked up a day later. Hence, subjects are not
aware of the others payoff and the experimenter has time to assign the payoffs.
I believe it is unlikely that the criticized aspects influenced subjects’ be-
havior. Nonetheless, it would have been better if the experiment had been run
considering the named shortcomings from the begin on and thereby ensuring a
higher level of standardization and/or conform more to standards in economic
experiments.
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Chapter 10
Conclusion: Intergenerational
solidarity - it is feasible!
There is a large strand of literature concerning the experimental study of this
thesis. The evidence from this literature is rich and it is not easy to find a
common denominator for all the results. Rather, one has to regard the develop-
ment of the experiments as an evolutionary evolvement where the experiments
one after another investigated possible explanations for the results so far and
often improved the setup in response to former experiments. Especially in the
first experiments, the development of the procedure could be seen as ‘learning
by doing’ where a standard methodology still had to be developed.
The experiments by Gu¨th et al. (1982) certainly were pioneering but suf-
fered from methodological deficiencies and also some later experiments had
serious shortcomings though often providing good ideas, see e.g. Frohlich et al.
(2001). Gu¨th et al. (1982) did not seem to ensure between-subject anonymity,
instructions did not seem to have a real protocol and were done informally
and the distance between experimenter and subjects was too close. But, as
reaction to such shortcomings the experimental procedures were refined and
standard setups were developed. FHSS are to be mentioned in this context, en-
suring between-subject anonymity and having a clear protocol for instructions.
HMSS set the other standard by implementing the double blind procedure that
ensured also subject-experimenter anonymity. Both setups have been repeat-
edly used by other studies or were at least used as benchmark. The results
from the ultimatum and especially the dictator games confronted the scientists
with a puzzle: Subjects did not behave in accordance with the classic economic
model of the purely selfish agent but displayed a propensity for other regarding
behavior. There were a lot of attempts to explain this behavior but one could
encompass most of the literature in two factions: One admitting that subjects
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are altruistic and one rejecting this hypothesis while claiming that these results
can also be traced back to the selfish agent. First, FHSS found evidence for
altruism in a controlled standard setup. HMSS introduced the double blind
procedure that reduced altruism to a negligible extent. HMSS claim that sub-
jects’ altruism is caused by subjects’ expectation that being altruistic could
lead to future pay-off via being considered for future experiments. If subjects
cannot be identified and do not have the incentive to please the experimenter,
they behave in accordance with the traditional model. Bohnet and Frey (1999)
also ensured this experimenter-subject anonymity (with regard to allocators)
but reduced social distance between subjects without creating an incentive to
being nice due to repeated game effects. Their experimental results provide
evidence for subjects’ inclination to be altruistic. This evidence is confirmed
by many following studies that reduce social distance. Frohlich et al. (2001)
deliver an alternative explanation why the double blind procedure could cause
subjects to be less generous, they claim that subjects could doubt the existence
of a recipient. Unfortunately, they compromised their evidence by treatments
with two few observations and by using the inadequate statistical instruments
in their treatment comparison. Cherry et al. (2003) showed that earning the
pie reduced altruism without using the double blind procedure.
Other approaches abstracting from anonymity but introducing preferences,
governed by certain features, have been made to explain the subjects’ behavior
in these experiments. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000) explain the evidence by subjects’ inequality aversion. Andreoni and
Miller (2002) interpret their experimental results by using different preference
types of players. Except for the selfish type, players have their own payoff
and the other’s payoff as arguments in their utility function. Charness and
Rabin (2002) findings from an experimental study can be explained best by
preferences that depend on social welfare. Charness’ and Rabin’s results from
a response games (where two subjects interacted sequentially) also suggest
that reciprocity is an important element in subjects’ decision making process.
In their experimental study, subjects’ willingness to help others was greatly
reduced if previously the other subjects themselves behaved selfishly. The
results of the classic ultimatum games, where recipients frequently forfeit offers
that they perceive as too low confirm this theory (see e.g. Gu¨th et al., 1982).
When explaining why altruism has emerged authors sometimes refer to
our ancestral heritage, see e.g. Haley (2005) or Burnham (2003). They claim
that altruism facilitates cooperation and was useful in early small-scale kinship
societies. From their view it is a genetical atavism that manifests if triggered
adequately. But the evidence by Henrich (2003) rather points in the direction
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that cultural education plays an important role, too.
Bardsley (2005) and List (2007) gave the allocators the opportunity to take
money from the recipient. They found that the share of subjects taking money
was larger than subjects, who gave nothing in the traditional setup. Thus,
they conclude ’heretically’ that the evidence for other-regarding behavior so
far could be an experimental artefact
Another approach explaining the experimental evidence of other-regarding
behavior is given by neuro-scientists. According to Singer et al. (2005), people
have the capacity to empathize. That means that people are able to put
themselves in the position of others and try to build prospects of the others
ideas. One could say they share the state of mind of others without a direct
emotional stimulus of themselves. Hence, imagining or seeing someone else
who feels certain sensations triggers automatically a representation of this
state in the subjects brain.1 According to Singer et al., MRI2 studies have
shown that there are common neural responses to either seeing other people’s
sensations (both known or unknown, of course the extent varies) or experience
these sensations yourself. They claim that mind reading and empathy have
important impacts on economic behavior. People are able to predict other
people’s behavior that is necessary in order to act consistently if you would
like to achieve your own aims. If your opponent is a reciprocator, it is not
only important to be aware of his beliefs but also of his emotional state. In
order to reach your goals you must be able to understand which action will
render the opponent in an emotionally desirable state. But this capacity for
empathy has a side-effect. People become more concerned about other people
and their propensity towards altruistic behavior could be enhanced. Thus, a
process that initially added to optimizing your ability to act in a self-interested
manner induces other-regarding behavior due to its side-effects. However, the
causality may as well be vice versa since cooperative behavior often allows to
reach Pareto superior stages and this in turn could simply be a fit to evolution.
It is important to note that the ability to empathize varies across people. This
could also explain the differences in preferences between subject types found
by Andreoni and Miller (2002).
Camerer et al. (2005) reject the approach of preferences that have the pur-
pose to maximize humans utility. They point out that ‘humans did not evolve
to be happy, but to survive and to reproduce’. One attempt by the body to
ensure this survival is called homeostasis. Here, as soon as detectors monitor
1This process can work without a conscious control but its occurrence can be deliberately
oppressed.
2Magnetic Resonance Imaging
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a divergence from certain equilibrium states (e.g. a body temperature of 37 de-
gree Celsius) unconscious and conscious actions result. The unconscious action
is to start sweating. The conscious actions are normally attached to reward
and punishment. Departing from the reference point feels unpleasant (e.g. like
being to warm if it is hot outside), returning to this point feels good (taking
a bath). Economists usually see preferences and the attached pleasure of ful-
filling them as the starting point of human behavior. From the neuroscience
perspective, pleasure must be seen as an information due to homeostasis.
Sanfey et al. (2006) also criticize the traditional economic models that have
a unitary all purpose approach. They admit that these models are ‘formally
explicit, analytically tractable, and can be used to make quantitatively precise
predictions about decision-making in a wide variety of circumstances’. But
they claim that there is a large strand of literature in psychology and espe-
cially neuroscience that indicates that human behavior is not the result of a
single process but of the interaction of different subsystems. A very important
distinction is the one between automatic and controlled processes. In addition
there are a subsystems for emotions and for deliberation. This evidence is con-
firmed by the study by Sanfey et al. (2003) that stresses the trade of between
emotions and deliberation. The evidence from neuroscience could by the way
still be in line with the cultural learning hypothesis, since it is not clear if the
neurological responses are manifestations that are genetically unalterable or
part of a process that has been adopted via cultural learning.
For this study, I devised an experiment to test for people’s willingness to
share resources with third parties they will not meet directly. One possible
interpretation of this experiment is whether people are willing to bequeath re-
sources to future generations they will never meet. The experimental evidence
confirms the well-established fact that people are willing to sacrifice resources
for the sake of others without being rewarded materially. I also find that the
subjects are aware of the intergenerational context of my experimental set-
up. They pass on more resources than we usually observe in the traditional
dictator game. The subjects thus indicate that they take the upcoming gen-
eration into consideration. They also deliberately sacrifice resources to trigger
generosity by the next generation via the reciprocity channel. Vice versa, I
observe that if people realize that the previous generation behaved generously,
they at least partially reciprocate by behaving generously to a third party they
get involved with and that one may interpret as the ‘future generation’. Thus
there is empirical evidence for the existence of a social history effect.
A further important finding is that social interaction enhances (intergen-
erational) generosity. The reasons for this generosity are not entirely obvious,
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but there are some clues. People may feel uncomfortable if they behave greed-
ily without the veil of complete anonymity. Thus social interaction can lead
to increased affection triggering altruism. With respect to the first genera-
tion, I also find that gender matters in particular circumstances. Moreover,
higher income (as socio-economic feature) increases the willingness to sacrifice
resources at the initial stage.
The dominant factor determining the second generation’s decision is the
choice made by the first generation. On the one hand, I observe a strong
social history effect. If the first generation increases the share passed on to
the second generation, the second generation will indirectly reciprocate by
increasing the share it passes on to the third generation. On the other hand,
expectations about how much will be received, play an important role too. If
the second generation is positively surprised by the size of share passed on to
it, it is likely to keep this surplus for itself instead of passing it on to the third
generation. By contrast, the impact of gender is considerably softened, and
the impact of income vanishes completely.
Finally, I find that introducing the possibility that the first generation’s
allocation choice was made by a random process reduces the generosity of the
second generation significantly compared to the case where the choice is made
with certainty by a human allocator.
My model also contributes to experiments on common-pool resources where
subjects prove to be altruistic. In those set-ups, the desire to be altruistic
could, however, be mixed with strategic considerations, while in my set-up the
wish to be altruistic is obvious. My results allow for an optimistic conclusion.
People confronted with very simple kinds of intergenerational problems seem
to be willing to sacrifice some wealth in order to increase intergenerational
fairness. Of course I am aware that this is just a simple laboratory experiment.
However, I consider it a start in eliciting social preferences about the well-being
of other, anonymous individuals we may be associated with via a sequence of
social interactions.
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Chapter 11
Appendix
11.1 Instructions
Instructions for Experiment I
There are three candidates called A, B, and C who are in a group. Candidates
are randomly assigned to a group. The candidates do not get to know each
other. The task is to divide 30 euros.
Step 1: Candidate A chooses an amount between 0 and 30 euros that
she keeps for herself. The rest R will be divided by candidate
B between B and C.
Step 2: Candidate B is told of the amount R that A has passed on to B
and C. Then B chooses an amount between 0 and R that she
keeps for herself. Candidate C receives the rest of the money.
Step 3: The allocated amounts are paid to A, B, and C.
The experiment is over.
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Instructions for Experiment II
There are three candidates called A, B, and C who are in a group. Candidates
are randomly assigned to a group. The task is to divide 30 euros. A and B
and B and C meet, A and C do not meet.
Step 1: Candidate A chooses an amount between 0 and 30 euros that
she keeps for herself. The rest R will be divided by candidate
B between B and C.
Step 2: Candidate A and B play a kind of Scrabble (a game with let-
ters, for instructions see below), in which they can earn addi-
tional money. The better A and B cooperate, the higher the
amount which they earn. Each of them receives half of the
amount earned. Time limit for the game is 15 minutes.
Step 3: Candidate B chooses an amount between 0 and R that she
keeps for herself. C receives the rest of the money.
Step 4: Candidate B is told of the amount R that A passed on to B
and C.
Step 5: Candidates B and C play the scrabble game. See Step 2.
Step 6: The allocated amounts, including the profit from playing the
scrabble game, are paid to A, B, and C.
The experiment is over.
Instructions for the Scrabble game
There are 101 letters, that can be used to form words. The numbers on the
letters indicate the value of each letter. Words may be formed crosswise. For
each letter used, you obtain points according to the value of the letter. Letters
that appear in two words count twice.
One point is worth two cents.
The amount earned by player A and B (or B and C) is divided equally between
them.
Note that you can earn a maximum of 6 euros (that means 3 euros per player).
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Instructions for Experiment III
There are three candidates called A, B, and C who are in a group. Candidates
are randomly assigned to a group. The task is to divide 30 euros. A and B
and B and C meet, A and C do not meet.
Step 1: Candidates A and B play a kind of Scrabble (a game with
letters, for instructions see below), in which they can earn ad-
ditional money. The better A and B cooperate, the higher the
amount they earn. Each of them receives half of the amount
earned. Time limit for the Scrabble game is 15 minutes. B
leaves the room.
Step 2: Candidate A chooses an amount between 0 and 30 euros that
she keeps for herself. The rest R will be divided by candidate
B between B and C.
Step 3: Candidate B is told of the amount R that A passed on to B
and C.
Step 4: Candidates B and C play the Scrabble game. See Step 1.
Step 5: Candidate B chooses an amount between 0 and R that she
keeps for herself. Candidate C receives the rest of the money.
Step 6: The allocated amounts, including the profit from playing the
Scrabble game, are paid to A, B, and C.
The experiment is over.
Instructions for the Scrabble game
There are 101 letters, that can be used to form words. The numbers on the
letters indicate the value of each letter. Words may be formed crosswise. For
each letter used, you obtain points according to the value of the letter. Letters
that appear in two words count twice.
One point is worth two cents.
The amount earned by player A and B (or B and C) is divided equally between
them.
Note that you can earn a maximum of 6 euros (that means 3 euros per player).
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Instructions for Experiment IV
There are three candidates called A, B, and C who are in a group. Candi-
dates are randomly assigned to a group. The candidates do not get to know
each other. The task is to divide 30 euros.
Step 1: It is decided by tossing a coin whether i) a 20-sided dice divides
for candidate A or ii) candidate A does the dividing herself.
i) If the 20-sided dice divides for candidate A:
Step 2: The 20-sided dice determines an integer amount (in euros, no
cents) between 10 and 30 euros that A receives. The rest R
will be divided by candidate B between B and C.
Step 3: Candidate B is told of the amount R that A has passed on to B
and C. Then B chooses an amount between 0 and R that she
keeps for herself. Candidate C receives the rest of the money.
Step 4: The allocated amounts are paid to A, B, and C.
The experiment is finished.
i) In case candidate A divides herself:
Step 2: Candidate A chooses an amount between 0 and 30 Euros that
she keeps for herself. The rest R will be divided by candidate
B between B and C.
Step 3: Candidate B is told the amount R that A passed on to B and
C. Then B chooses an amount between 0 and R that she keeps
for herself. Candidate C receives the rest of the money.
Step 4: The allocated amounts are paid to A, B, and C.
The experiment is over.
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Instructions for the Experiment V
There are two candidates called A and B who are in a group. Candidates are
randomly assigned to a group. The candidates do not get to know each other.
The task is to divide 30 euros.
Step 1: Candidate A chooses an amount between 0 and 30 euros that
she keeps for herself. The rest R is given to candidate B.
Step 2: The allocated amounts are paid to A and B.
The experiment is over.
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Form 1
Date:
Group: Type:
The amount of 30 euros is divided into
EUR for me
EUR for B and C (B will then divide this amount between herself and C).
Statistical data
1.) Age: years
2.) Sex: female male
3.) Subject studied:
4.) After having paid my rent, I have an average monthly income of
below 350 euros 650 - 800 euros above 1100 euros
350 - 500 euros 800 - 950 euros
500 - 650 euros 950 - 1100 euros
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Form 2
Questionnaire player B
Fill in the your subject number (e.g. B1)
Fill in the date
1.) Explain why you divided the amount the way you did.
2.) Did the amount of money you received from Player A correspond to your
expectations? Tick accordingly:
a.) Yes, roughly.
b.) I expected more, roughly euros.
c.) I expected less, roughly euros.
3.) Have you ever heard the term ‘sustainability’?
Yes No
If yes, what do you think it means?
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11.2 Program codes
11.2.1 Anderson-Darling test - my Matlab code
Note, that the p-value approximation is taken from Sefton’s code.
i=1;
j=1;
i1=1;
j1=1;
z=0;
k=0;
m=0;
X1=sample1;
X2=sample2;
X1=sort(X1);
X2=sort(X2);
n1=size(X1,1);
n2=size(X2,1);
n12=n1+n2;
for n=1:(n12-1)
MinX1=min(X1(i:end));
MinX2=min(X2(j:end));
if MinX2<MinX1 & j1<(n2)
j=j+1;
j1=j1+1;
k=k+1;
elseif MinX2<MinX1 & j1==(n2)
j1=j1+1;
k=k+1;
elseif MinX2<MinX1 & j1>(n2) & i1<(n1)
i=i+1;
i1=i1+1;
k=k+1;
elseif
MinX2<MinX1 & j1>(n2) & i1==(n1)
i1=i1+1;
k=k+1;
elseif MinX2>MinX1 & i1<(n1) i=i+1
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i1=i1+1;
k=k+1;
elseif MinX2>MinX1 & i1==(n1)
i1=i1+1;
k=k+1;
elseif MinX2>MinX1 & i1>(n1) & j1<(n2)
j=j+1;
j1=j1+1;
k=k+1;
elseif MinX2>MinX1 & i1>(n1) & j1==(n2)
j1=j1+1;
k=k+1;
end
Z1=(i1-1)/n1;
Z2=(j1-1)/n2;
w=(k/n12*(1-k/n12))̂(-1);
a=Z1-Z2;
a2=â(2);
c=w*(a2);
z=z+c;
end
AD=z*n1*n2/(n12)̂(2)
pval=0;
for i=1:10000
h=rand(n1+n2,1);
h=[h[ones(n1,1);zeros(n2,1)]];
h=sortrows(h,1);
mi=cumsum(h(1:n1+n2-1,2));
imin=1:n1+n2-1;
imin=imin’;
Fmn=(mi*(n1+n2)-n1*imin);
Fmn=Fmn.̂(2);
ADart=(1/(n1*n2))*sum(Fmn./(imin*(n1+n2)-imin.̂(2)));
if ADart>AD
pval=pval+1/10000;
else pval=pval;
end
end
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11.2.2 Anderson-Darling test - GAUSS code by Martin
Sefton
/* AD.PRG computes Anderson-Darling test */
n1=rows(X1);
n2=rows(X2);
h=(X1—X2) (ones(n1,1)—zeros(n2,1));
h=sortc(h,1);
mi=cumsumc(h[1:n1+n2-1,2]);
imin=seqa(1,1,n1+n2-1);
Fmn=(mi*(n1+n2)-n1*imin)̂(2);
AD=(1/(n1*n2))*sumc(Fmn./(imin*(n1+n2)-imin)̂(2));
rejad=AD.>2.492;
/* approximating p-value */
reps=10000
rep=1;
pval=0;do until rep>reps;
h=rndu(n1+n2,1) (ones(n1,1)—zeros(n2,1));
h=sortc(h,1);
mi=cumsumc(h[1:n1+n2-1,2]);
Fmn=(mi*(n1+n2)-n1*imin)̂(2);
ADart=(1/(n1*n2))*sumc(Fmn./(imin*(n1+n2)-imin)̂(2)));
pval=pval+(ADart.>AD)/reps;
rep=rep+1; endo;
/* screen output */ output file=test.out; output on; print ”number of ob-
servations ” n1 ” ” n2; ? ;
print ”AD statistic ” AD; ? ; print ” approx p-value ” pval;
print ” output saved in TEST.OUT ”;output off;
11.2.3 Epps-Singleton test - my Matlab code
X1=sample1;
X2=sample2;
X1=sort(X1);
X2=sort(X2);
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X12=[X1;X2];
X12=sort(X12);
n1=size(X1,1);
n2=size(X2,1);
n12=n1+n2;
Lreal=n12/4;
L=fix(Lreal);
U=n12-L;
Yu=X12(n12-U,1);
Yu1=X12(n12-U+1,1);
Yl=X12(n12-L,1);
Yl1=X12(n12-L-1,1);
fi=0.5*((Yl+Yl1)/2-(Yu+Yu1)/2);
t1=0.4/fi t2=0.8/fi;
g1=[cos(t1*X1) sin(t1*X1) cos(t2*X1) sin(t2*X1)]’;
g2=[cos(t1*X2) sin(t1*X2) cos(t2*X2) sin(t2*X2)]’;
g 11=sum(g1’);
g 22=sum(g2’);
g 1=n1̂(-1)*sum(g1’);
g 2=n2̂(-1)*sum(g2’);
s1=g1*g1’-n1*(g 1’*g 1);
s2=g2*g2’-n2*(g 2’*g 2);
s11=1/n1*s1;
s22=1/n2*s2;
omega=(s11+s22)*n12*(1/n1+1/n2)/2;
C=(1+(n1+n2)̂(-0.45)+10.1*(n1̂(-1.7)+n2̂(-1.7)))̂(-1);
if n1>=50 & n2>=50
Epps=n12*(((g 1’-g 2’)’)*(omega)̂(-1)*(g 1’-g 2’))
Prob=1-chiSquareProb(4,0,Epps);
else
Epps=n12*(((g 1’-g 2’)’)*(omega)̂(-1)*(g 1’-g 2’))*C
Prob=1-chiSquareProb(4,0,Epps)
end
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11.3 Overview experiments
Most of the table’s content is self-explaining. Still, there are some remarks
to be made: In case there was more than 1 treatment, there is one main
row for the experiment (with reference to the section). The rows in italics
below refer to the treatments. If there are columns with no entry, there are
two possibilities: Either the entry is in the main row for the experiment and
then holds for all treatments. Or there are differences between treatments
and then the entry in the main row will be empty while there will be entries
in the rows for the treatment. In some experiments, there were more then
1 observation per subject, in some experiments, only some observations were
paid. To inform about this, I use the column with ‘#Obs’/ ‘#Subj.’/ ‘#Obs
paid’. ‘#Obs’ represents the overall number of observations, ‘#Subj.’ refers to
the number of subjects who allocated and ‘#Obs paid’ stands for the number
of observations where subjects received actual payments for their allocation
choice. Hence, 100/10/10 means that there were 10 proposers who had to
make 10 proposals each and 1 out of 10 proposals was paid. The column
‘#Sess’ stands for number of sessions of the experiment since most experiments
where run on more than one day. For the test-statistics, which were applied
for the analysis, I used the following abbreviations: ‘FE’: Fisher exact test
(tests for differences of proportions), ‘Sp’: Spearman’s rank Correlation test
(non-parametric correlation test), ‘Pr’: Probit regression (binary maximum
likelihood regression), ‘χ2’: χ2-test (contingency table test to check for sample
differences),and Jonchkeere (non-parametric order test). In case there is a ‘?’
as entry, the information was not mentioned in the article. In case there is a
‘-’, the experimental setup makes the use of this category impossible. For the
pie-size, the amounts being combined with ‘≈’ refer to a pie-size that was in
another currency. To ensure comparability, I converted these in US-$.
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11.3.2 Dictator games
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11.4 Some treatment comparison results for B
Table 11.1: Treatment comparison B for ‘uni-gender’ subsamples
Treatments compared MW AD ES
The effect of social
interaction
Males 1B vs 2B -1.668 2.371 7.848
(0.095) (0.056) (0.097)
Females 1B vs 2B 0.212 0.452 4.256
(0.832) (0.819) (0.373)
Males 1B vs 3B -1.985 2.089 9.348
(0.047) (0.079) (0.053)
Females 1B vs 3B -0.839 0.567 2.677
(0.402) (0.701) (0.613)
Males 2B vs 4B -3.453 6.634 16.323
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003)
Females 2B vs 4B -2.387 2.970 8.382
(0.017) (0.025) (0.079)
Males 3B vs 4B -3.500 7.455 24.258
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Females 3B vs 4B -3.245 5.374 20.021
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Possibility of a
non-human allocator
Males 1B vs 4B -1.143 3.276 13.503
(0.253) (0.018) (0.009)
Females 1B vs 4B -2.412 3.171 8.756
(0.016) (0.020) (0.068)
Males 4Bself vs 4Bdice -0.596 0.885 5.444
(0.551) (0.428) (0.245)
Females 4Bself vs 4Bdice 0.684 0.305 1.295
(0.494) (0.955) (0.862)
Social interaction
before or after choice
Males 2B vs 3B 0.635 0.894 2.235
(0.525) (0.422) (0.693)
Females 2B vs 3B 1.2963 1.693 4.768
(0.207) (0.133) (0.312)
Extension to three
persons
Males 1B vs TDG -0.426 0.849 6.297
(0.670) (0.453) (0.178)
Females 1B vs TDG -0.369 0.355 0.298
(0.712) (0.915) (0.990)
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Table 11.2: Comparison of A’s and B’s allocation choice in uni-gender sub-
samples within treatments
Treatments MW AD ES
Males 1 1.071 1.686 11.497
(0.281) (0.138) (0.022)
Females 1 -0.709 1.205 8.290
(0.479) (0.264) (0.082)
Males 2 1.915 4.103 15.172
(0.056) (0.007) (0.004)
Females 2 -3.032 5.301 23.112
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Males 3 2.183 3.162 16.915
(0.029) (0.022) (0.002)
Females 3 -2.2788 5.175 17.739
(0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
Males 4 -1.541 2.064 4.918
(0.123) (0.082) (0.296)
Females 4 -2.356 2.817 5.497
(0.019) (0.031) (0.240)
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11.5 Results for the subsample of B passing
on a positive amount
Table 11.3: Allocation choice B excluding observations where B passed zero
Treatment Mean Share B
1B 0.40
2B 0.38
3B 0.42
4B 0.28
4Bself 0.28
4Bdice 0.28
Table 11.4: Treatment comparison Bs excluding observations where B passed
zero
Treatments compared MW AD ES
The effect of social
interaction
1B vs 2B -0.795 0.702 3.133
(0.427) (0.562) (0.536)
1B vs 3B 0.947 1.263 1.547
(0.344) (0.243) (0.818)
2B vs 4B -2.606 3.145 7.252
(0.009) (0.022) (0.123)
3B vs 4B -4.306 8.605 25.550
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Possibility of a
non-human allocator
1B vs 4B -3.570 6.050 18.522
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
4Bself vs 4Bdice -0.334 0.949 3.632
(0.738) (0.390) (0.458)
Social interaction
before or after choice
2B vs 3B -1.617 1.924 4.375
(0.106) (0.098) (0.358)
Bs choice vs.
traditional dictator
1B vs TDG 1.416 1.480 4.358
(0.157) (0.181) (0.360)
1B vs FHSS -2.192 3.044 16.664
(0.028) (0.025) (0.002)
1B vs HMSS 2.273 3.061 10.062
(0.024) (0.023) (0.039)
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Table 11.5: Treatment comparison of A’s and B’s allocation choice excluding
observations where B passed zero
Treatments MW AD ES
1 0.649 3.036 22.042
(0.516) (0.025) (0.000)
2 4.470 10.871 34.255
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
3 3.965 7.390 34.376
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
4 -2.442 3.155 7.752
(0.015) (0.022) (0.101)
Table 11.6: Treatment comparison of A’s and B’s allocation in uni-gender
samples excluding observations where B passed zero
Treatments MW AD ES
Males 1 0.467 1.483 13.684
(0.641) (0.178) (0.008)
Females 1 0.441 1.461 9.188
(0.659) (0.183) (0.057)
Males 2 3.224 6.422 14.526
(0.001) (0.000) (0.006)
Females 2 -3.032 5.301 23.112
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Males 3 2.873 4.070 17.760
(0.004) (0.006) (0.001)
Females 3 -2.788 5.175 17.739
(0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
Males 4 -2.042 2.797 4.951
(0.041) (0.032) (0.292)
Females 4 -1.275 1.003 2.201
(0.202) (0.357) (0.699)
135
Table 11.7: Treatment comparison Bs in uni-gender samples excluding obser-
vations where B passed zero
Treatments compared MW AD ES
The effect of social
interaction
Males 1B vs 2B -0.310 0.994 2.652
(0.757) (0.361) (0.618)
Females 1B vs 2B -0.894 0.873 3.003
(0.371) (0.437) (0.557)
Males 1B vs 3B 0.862 0.745 7.991
(0.389) (0.532) (0.092)
Females 1B vs 3B -0.295 0.265 1.353
(0.768) (0.981) (0.852)
Males 2B vs 4B -2.736 4.476 13.828
(0.006) (0.004) (0.008)
Females 2B vs 4B -0.899 0.569 1.641
(0.369) (0.692) (0.801)
Males 3B vs 4B -3.689 7.762 28.854
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Females 3B vs 4B -2.214 2.756 9.298
(0.027) (0.032) (0.054)
Possibility of a
non-human allocator
Males 1B vs 4B -2.993 5.543 13.620
(0.003) (0.001) (0.009)
Females 1B vs 4B -1.944 2.146 6.379
(0.052) (0.072) (0.173)
Males 4Bself vs 4Bdice -0.411 1.252 5.557
(0.681) (0.247) (0.235)
Females 4Bself vs 4Bdice 0 0.202 0.902
(1) (0.999) (0.924)
Social interaction
before or after choice
Males 2B vs 3B 1.354 1.445 1.423
(0.176) (0.189) (0.840)
Females 2B vs 3B -1.263 1.693 4.768
(0.207) (0.133) (0.312)
Bs choice vs.
traditional dictator
Males 1B vs TDG -1.535 1.934 7.360
(0.125) (0.096) (0.118)
Females 1B vs TDG 0.076 0.265 4.342
(0.939) (0.980) (0.362)
136
Table 11.8: Testing for the impact of gender on B’s allocation choice excluding
observations where B passed zero
Treatment MW AD ES
1B 0.060 0.789 2.338
(0.952) (498) (0.674)
2B 0.451 0.589 2.831
(0.652) (0.673) (0.587)
3B 0.788 1.230 9.567
(0.431) (0.257) (0.048)
4B -1.289 1.375 2.550
(0.197) (0.208) (0.636)
4BDice -1.083 0.800 2.208
(0.279) (0.491) (0.698)
4BSelf 0.096 0.884 2.019
(0.923) (0.432) (0.732)
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11.6 Presentation of the categories for the qual-
itative analysis to explain allocation be-
havior
11.6.1 A’s explanations
1. ‘Selfishness’ refers to explanations including claims like: ‘Selfishness’, ‘I
wanted most of the money for me’, ‘I think of my personal welfare first’.
Note, that an explanation using ‘selfishness’ does not necessarily mean that
the subject took the whole pie, there were also subjects who took little more
than one third and still justified their behavior with selfishness. Possibly these
subjects would like to stress that their own payoff is one argument of their
utility function but that there are other arguments like e.g. altruism.
2. ‘Fairness’ refers to explanations including claims like: ‘Fairness’, ‘I
wanted to achieve an equal distribution of the pie’. The latter was only used
by subjects taking one third of the pie while the former also includes subjects
who took more than one third. As in the case for ‘selfishness’, these subjects
possibly wanted to highlight that ‘fairness’ is one argument of their utility
function.
3. ‘B and/or C should receive > 0’ refers to explanations including claims
like: ‘I chose the amount in this way to gain a large amount for me without
leaving the others with nothing.’ These subjects hence indicated that they
wanted to pass some money to B and/or C so that everybody earned a positive
amount. Unlike in the category ‘Fairness’, it seems likely that subjects receive
a ‘warm glow of giving’ according to the model by Sadrieh (2003).
4. ‘Luck’ refers to explanations including claims like: ‘Because it was an
experiment and none had any costs and it was chance, in which group you
were drawn, I decided, that it is an adequate amount (...)’ These subjects
stressed that it was due to chance or luck that they became A or they referred
to the randomness of the assignment process as explanation. Subjects used it
either to explain taking more than one third, in this case they said that they
would like to exploit their luck or they interpreted randomness in a way that
they have not made any effort to be in the position and hence passed on a fair
share.
5. ‘Personal neediness’ refers to explanations including claims like: ‘I do
not have got that much money (...)’, ‘(...) my financial position played a
role’. Subjects either used their personal income situation declaring themselves
as poor or not having much money or they stated that they needed money.
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Sometimes these explanations were followed by very specific details for what
purpose the money was needed, e.g. to buy a used tricycle for her daughter,
to pay a fine for speeding or to pay the repair of a bicycle.
6. ‘Hope to be role model for B’ refers to explanations including claims like:
‘I have divided the 30¿ in 10¿ for me and 20¿ for the other candidates, in
the hope that candidate B will give 10¿ to candidate C, too (...)’ Subjects in
this category tried to induce positive reciprocity. They specifically mentioned
that they hoped that B would imitate their fair behavior.
7. ‘Anonymity’ refers to explanations including claims like: ‘Anonymity’,
‘I do not know the others’. Anonymity is used in two different senses: Almost
all (for treatment 1 and 4) subjects use it in the sense that it is completely
unclear who B and C will be. But there is also one subject in treatment 2
who used anonymity as explanation: In this case it must be understood in the
way that the subject did not personally knew the other subject though it met
the subject during the interaction of the experiment.
8. ‘Others would have done the same’ refers to subjects who claimed that
if someone else had been in their position she would have made the same
decision.
9. ‘Power’ refers to explanations including claims like: ‘I divided the
amount of money in 15¿ for me and 15¿ for B and C, because the one with
the highest decision power (hence A) obtains the highest amount of money in
any case (...)’ or ‘I wanted to exploit my privileged position(...)’ One of the
subjects, a political science student, even mentioned Machiavelli.
10. ‘Unclear answer’ refers to explanations including claims like: ‘If I
divided the amount into 10¿ : 10¿ : 10¿ this result would not reflect the
reality.’ ‘I wanted to have 15¿ for me and 15¿ for B and C. But I love prime
numbers. Hence, I took the larger number (17¿) for me and passed on the
smaller number.’ ‘Why not? A profit distribution is constructed in a similar
way 1 : 2/3.’ ‘I am not entirely sure. Theoretically, I do not know it at all,
I just followed a feeling’ ‘22 is my jersey number. Besides, we have an even
number. Additionally, I am 22.’ Hence, the explanations in this categories did
not make sense or were idiosyncratic.
11. ‘B plays twice’ refers to explanations including claims like: ‘I gave
myself 12¿ because B has the chance to earn twice playing scrabble twice. I
hope that B passes on 12¿ to C, then everybody leaves the experiment with
the most equitable amount of money.’ Most of the subjects use the explanation
in line with the first example hence specifically mention their desire to obtain
an equitable outcome and hence revealing a preference structure according to
the equity model by Fehr and Schmit (1998) and Bolton and Ockenfels (1998).
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But there were also few subjects taking e.g. amounts of larger than 15¿ up
to 30¿ and mentioning that B plays twice (mostly, this was accompanied by
other explanations from other categories).
12. ‘Norm (intrinsic)’ refers to explanations including claims like: ‘I divided
the amount fairly in my opinion. (...) I would have a bad consciousness,
otherwise.’ Hence, subjects considered their allocation (mostly they took one
third) as a moral obligation. Interestingly, the explanation does not so much
refer to the desire to be altruistic but to avoiding to have a bad consciousness.
13. ‘Same effort’ refers to explanations including claims like: ‘(...). Some-
thing different would be unfair, since I have not made a bigger effort than the
others (...).’ These subjects claim that overall, A, B or C had to make the
same effort during the experiment (which was not true, since B played the
scrabble game twice and the amount of time that had to be spent was differ-
ent) and hence do deserve a roughly equal amount of the pie. These subjects
probably consider a concept of wage per hour worked. Mostly, A took one
third in this case.
14. ‘Participation to earn’ refers to explanations including claims like: ‘(...)
I was here for the money’. These explanations refer so subjects who specifically
claimed that they had a financial motivation to participate in the experiment
(though also the ones not mentioning this had this reason). This explanation
was used to justify a choice were A took more than one third. Possibly, subjects
wanted to indicate that they still have a desire to be fair but that under this
setup fairness was not so important for them.
15. ‘Rationality’ refers to explanations including claims like: ‘I divided
the amount accordingly because it would not be rational to pass on money
to people I do not know, (...)’ These explanations specifically mention the
concept of rationality in the economic sense. Interestingly, only one of the five
subjects using this explanation studied economics.
16. ‘Maintain incentive’ refers to explanations including claims like: ‘(...)
I wanted to ensure that my partner is motivated in order to perform better in
constructing words in the second part’. These subjects saw a fair or close to
fair allocation as incentive compatible behavior. The idea was that if A took
a large share for himself that could be perceived as unfair by B and hence B
could reciprocate by not cooperating (even though B would forfeit potential
gain). This explanation was only used in treatment 2, since it only made sense
to use this argument if you allocated before you played.
17. ‘Norm’ refers to explanations including claims like: ‘Taking more would
be inadequate’, ‘I did not deserve more’, ‘The others should not receive zero
and e.g. (passing) 1 Euro would have been pretty mean’. Explanations in
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this category refer to subjects who claim that with their allocation choice they
followed a moral obligation. In this category, unlike the category ‘internal
norm’, it is unclear if the subjects refer to their own perception or to the
perception of the society.
18. ‘Maintain incentive not important’ refers to explanations including
claims like: ‘I kept 30¿ for myself. I try to maximize my payoff. The 30 I
have for sure. In case B was sour and refused to play with me, I would play
alone. Even if I only manage to construct few words I will have the highest
payoff among A, B and C.’, ‘There were at the maximum 5¿ to win in the
letter game, hence negligible. So I kept the whole 30¿. I will not play again
with the other people and hence cannot lose anything with respect to the
future’. Thus, these subjects argue that even if B reciprocated on A’s unfair
behavior by refusing to cooperate in the scrabble game, this would have almost
no impact on A’s payoff due to the very low amount that could be earned in
the scrabble game.
19. ‘C should receive >0’ refers to explanations including claims like: ‘(...).
And then C hopefully will receive a small sum, too.’ Hence, these subjects
explicitly considered C in their reasoning. For both subjects, who mentioned
this idea, this was not the only explanation.
20. ‘C does not know’ refers to an explanations including claims like: ‘(...)
B will keep the entire amount left for himself in any case and tell C that A
did not leave anything’
21. ‘Did not get to know C’ refers to explanations including claims like: ‘I
did not get to know C. Hence, I give B the fair share of 15¿ and then B can
see if she would like to pass something on to C.’
22. ‘Others are not needy’ refers to explanations including claims like:
‘Students’ existence is normally not in danger’ This reasoning is based on the
idea that subjects, who participate in these experiments, are usually students
whose basic needs are covered.
23. ‘Rules of game accepted’ refers to explanations including claims like:
‘(...). I chose this, because all participants knew the experimental setup and
agreed on it.’ These subjects claim that subjects B and C were aware of the
experimental setup and that they knew they may receive an amount which is
smaller than the fair share. Maybe the subjects referred also to the announce-
ments in the student cafeteria, where I told the potential participants that they
would earn between 3 to 35¿ for participation. Maybe the subjects derived
from that that it was be morally justifiable to pass only a small amount or
nothing due to this.
24. ‘Reward for cooperation’ refers to an explanation by one subject: ‘(...)
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I did not take the whole amount, because I did not wanted to fleece B of his
share. The cooperation with him was very successful (...)’. Hence, this subject
wanted to reward the other subject for the successful cooperation.
25. ‘Have to play vis-a`-vis with B’ refers to an explanation by one subject:
‘(...) Because B will personally sit in front of me during the game, maybe I
was too shy to be more greedy.’
11.6.2 B’s explanations
A lot of explanations that A used are similar to the ones used by B. But there
are some additional explanations by B which would not make sense if A used
them.
26. ‘Reciprocity’ refers to explanations including claims like: ‘A was so
nice to pass on 20 Euro to me and C, hence I divided the overall money fairly.
I was very happy about this and was of the opinion that C would be as glad as
me if I behaved in the same way A did...’ or ‘I considered the amount of money
A left to us ridiculous and mean, that is why I reacted mean and ripped off
C...’. There were also few subjects which imitated A’s behavior by taking the
same share of the left money: ‘8¿ for me and 5¿ for C because A took also
17/30 of the overall money.’ ‘One adapts to one’s environment: An allocation
of 75% to 25% resembles roughly the one by A’. Hence, this category captures
all claims by B who said that As behavior influenced their allocation decision.
I also reported the relative shares for positive and negative reciprocity which
are subsets of the set ‘reciprocity’.
27. ‘Not much left to pass’ refers to explanations including claims like:
‘There was not much left to pass, hence I took the whole amount’.
28. ‘Wanted certain amount of money’ refers to explanations including
claims like: ‘(...) Average payoff of the experiment: 13¿. I wanted to ensure
to obtain this amount. I would have passed more money if possible.’ These
subjects B claim that they had an ex-ante expectation of how much money
they would like to have for themselves. This argument was often used to justify
an unfair division of (1− α) if A passed less then two thirds of the pie.
29. ‘B played twice’ refers to explanations including claims like: ‘(...) I
have played twice (...)’ The argument that B played twice was used by B too,
but mostly in another sense: Now B used it in her favor claiming that having
to play twice is twice the effort and hence entitles to more payoff.
30. ‘Got to know each other’ refers to explanations including claims like:
‘Because I got to know him I thought it would be adequate to pass on a certain
amount.’
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31. ‘Compassion’ refers to explanations including claims like: ‘Due to
compassion for C I did not take all’ SubjectsA did not use this explanation.
The reason for this is possibly that B could directly see how much C would
receive. They would feel sorry for C if she passed on nothing.
11.6.3 A’s explanations in TDG
In the replication treatment, the subjects used some new explanations. Actu-
ally, with regard to number of candidates (40), there were surprisingly many
new explanations.
33. ‘S.th. unfair in real life’ refers to explanations including claims like:
‘Someone stole money from me and hence I am unfair, too, now.’ Hence, this
explanations refer to subjects who claimed that something unfair happened to
them, recently, and that is why they were unfair, too. That would again be a
claim for the social history effect on an even more abstract level.
34. ‘Adequate pay B’ refers to explanations including claims like: ‘B should
be rewarded adequately for his effort’. One added, that the amount passed on
would have been satisfying for her if she were B.
35. ‘Positive empathy’ refers to explanations including claims like: ‘If I were
B I would be in the need of A’s benevolence’ or ‘If I were B I would be happy
to receive some money, too’. Hence, these subjects empathized positively with
B.
36. ‘Negative empathy’ refers to an explanation by one subject: ‘If I were
B I would have expected a zero payoff.’ This subject took 30 ¿.
37. ‘Gift’ refers to an explanation by one subject: ‘I see it (the experiment)
as a game, being A means I won, B just gets a consolation gift.’
38. ‘Christian values’ refers to an explanation by one subject: ‘I am obliged
to Christian values.’ This subject split fairly.
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